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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, we develop four essays to analyse several aspects of migration for Pakistan on 
the basis of household level panel and cross-sectional data from 1986 to 2007. The aspects 
analysed are decision to migrate domestically and internationally, financing of migration, 
decision to send remittances and spill-over effects on remittances. These essays are presented in 
Chapters four through seven. Other chapters include a general introduction, literature review and 
concluding remarks and policy discussions. 
Chapter four (essay one) studies the determinants of the two locational migrations (internal-and-
international migration) using discrete choice models. The study begins by investigating 
migration as a whole and then looks at the more disaggregate choice. On the snapshot of 
migration as a whole we detect an intriguing size-composition effect on the household’s 
probability of migration: the larger the household, the greater the probability of migration. On the 
other hand, the more dependants a household has (in terms of the number of children and young 
females), the less likely it is to have migrant member. This relation is by and large true for both 
types of migration – internal or international. We also find that the probability of migration is 
inversely related to the pre-migration initial (as observed at the beginning of the study period) 
landholding of the household. For a one-acre decrease in landholding will results in 11% increase 
in international migration relative to never migration, and comparatively it shows a 1.3% increase 
in internal migration. So it is most likely that households have depleted their landholding to raise 
finances for their migration.  
 
Using the same dataset (of chapter four) in chapter five (essay two), we study the determinants of 
receiving remittances by constructing a Box-Cox double hurdle model for households. The first 
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hurdle deals with the decision to receive remittance, and conditional on participation, the hurdle 
deals with the amount or level of remittances.  The first stage regression does reveal household 
characteristics such as household head age, number of children aged less than 11 years, and the 
district level fixed effects to be important for remittances, be it for internal or international 
migration. From these factors, it may be concluded that household level characteristics and 
regional factors are the important determinants for the probability of remittances. The second 
hurdle deals with the determinants of remittance amounts, conditional on being a remitter. The 
household head education and age appear to affect the level of remittances, unlike the 
participation results. Comparing the impact across the participation and the level of remittances 
received by the household, we find that both members travelling within and outside of the 
country are the important determinant for both hurdles. We find that there exists opposing effect 
of probability to receive remittances and the level of remittances at the district level. 
 
Chapter six (essay three) studies the determinants of internal- and –international remittances by 
introducing the random- and –fixed effects by employing a multilevel econometric methodology 
to study the spread of remittances at different levels of spatial aggregation. Few studies use 
multilevel analyses on remittance data, but to the best of our knowledge, there is none for in the 
context of a developing country such as Pakistan. We use data from Pakistan Household 
Integrated Economic Survey of 2001-02, employing household-,village-, district-, province- and 
regional-level variables to understand how heterogeneities at these different levels impact on the 
probability of receiving (or sending)  remittances, relative to other households in the same village 
or district. Our findings suggest that the determinants of internal remittances are different from 
those of international remittances. We find greater variation in the odds of receiving remittances 
(both internal and international) among households from same villages within the same district 
than those located in different villages within same district. Also with regional fixed effects, the 
correlation is refined and thus it becomes smaller.  
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In chapter seven (essay four), we empirically study the possible multiplier effect (spill over) 
triggered by remittances by using the Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey of 2007-
08. While the existing studies provide a compelling empirical evidence of remittance income is 
more likely to be saved and invested in land, housing, and human capital, but it is unclear to what 
extent it contribute to the origin community. The existing literature is unable to answer the 
question whether remittances causes multiplier or spill-over effect. If they do exists, then to what 
extent? Motivated by the concern that the remittance can generate multiplier effects in origin 
communities. We investigate the role of household interdependencies of the remittances by 
exploiting a novel method of identification based on the comparison of the variance of household 
behaviour at the different level of aggregation within and between a different districts of Pakistan 
(Graham, 2008). This method allows for identification of two problems that arise due to self-
selection and unobservable heterogeneity. We quantify the social multiplier of remittances to be 
1.12, suggesting sizable spill-over between eighty one districts in Pakistan. Our result suggests 
that social multiplier in terms of remittances has contributed to the development of rural 
household of Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to acknowledge the University of Balochistan and the Higher Education Commission 
of Pakistan for the scholarship, without which I would not have been able to pursue my ambition 
for this research degree overseas. My gratitude also extends to the ‘International Food Policy 
Research Institute’ (IFPRI) for providing the household panel data set used for the empirical 
analysis of chapters four and five. Additionally, I express gratitude to the ‘Federal Bureau of 
Statistics’ (PBS) of Pakistan for disseminating the ‘Household Integrated Economic Survey’ 
(HIES-2001-02 and -2007-08) data set for my core empirical chapters six and seven.         
I sincerely thank my principal advisor, Associate Professor Bibhas Saha, for his experienced 
guidance, wisdom, advice and support throughout my studies. His dedication and generosity with 
his time, knowledge and experience not only challenged my research but also enhanced my 
dissertation. He has shown great patience and flexibility and his commitment to the highest 
standards inspired and motivated me during my PhD journey. 
I am deeply indebted to my secondary advisor, Dr Franco Mariuzzo, for his valuable help in 
developing my solid learning (and keen interest) in the field of micro-econometrics. 
Undoubtedly, his sound knowledge in the field of econometrics has been vitally important in the 
different stages of this thesis. I am thankful for his generous time and his prompt responses 
despite his busy schedule. It would have been very difficult to complete my studies without his 
supervision. It would be a pleasure to work with both of my supervisors in the future, and I am 
pleased to have built such strong professional and personal relationships with them. My sincere 
thank extend to Dr Farasat Bokhari and Dr Gaia Narciso for being the examiners and providing 
valuable suggestions and enhancing the overall quality of the thesis. 
I additionally wish to thank Professor Peter Moffatt, who offered his assistance at a crucial time. I 
am deeply thankful for his sage advice, timely help and advice regarding the Box-Cox double 
 
 
vi 
 
hurdle model. I extend my appreciation and gratitude to the faculty and my ‘Post Graduate 
Research’ (PGR) colleagues at the University of East Anglia with whom I interacted during my 
time in the Economics department. I have had the opportunity of being an ‘Associate Tutor’ and 
closely working with the module convenors which has been a hugely beneficial experience.  My 
sincere thanks extend to the Dean of the Student Office (DOS) and the Student Union (SU) at the 
University of East Anglia for providing me heartfelt help and contributing toward an unrestrained 
research. 
I will not forget the well-spent days with Dr Saeed Alkatheeri during our MSc, and PhD studies 
together at the University of East Anglia. I find him very open minded, caring and honest. I 
would like to thank for his support, generosity and kindness.     
Outside of university, my family is lucky for having made such close friends in Norwich. I am 
grateful for their support, help, care and attention when my wife underwent ankle surgery. Their 
support was immense in terms of taking care of my children, and providing such delicious 
sustenance in terms of Asian food. I would particularly like to mention the families of Dr Awais 
Anwar, Dr Khadi Shah Afridi, Engr. Mansoor Undre, Dr Muhammad Rafiq Afridi, Engr Jawad 
Fahim, and Dr Imran Riaz Sandhu. My special thank extend to Mr. Rashid Murtaza, Mr. Aamad 
Ali Yousafzai, Mr. Muhammad Idress, Mr Furrukh Shahzad, and Mr. Zulfiqar Jatoi for being my 
closest and dearest friends.   
My sincere thanks goes to my landlord Mr. Nick Taylor, Managing Director of the “Hadley 
Taylor Property Limited, Norwich” for tolerating the noise of my children during his office 
hours.     
I also gratefully acknowledge the importance of my family members for their love and support 
throughout my research at University of East Anglia. My appreciation especially goes to my elder 
brother Mr. Arshad Ali, who always believed in me and unquestionably supported me throughout 
my student career. This research is an outcome of his motivation and inspiration throughout my 
 
 
vii 
 
academic life. A tremendous amount of thanks goes to my wife: Humaira Rehman and children: 
Muhammad Izhan, Muhammad Shayan, and Ahab-Ur-Rehman for their patience, understanding 
and endurance particularly with my long hours of absence from home. My wife and children are 
my best friends and I love them all affectionately. Last but not least, my massive thanks goes to 
my parents for their unconditional prayers, love and support over the years. I owe them 
everything and wish I could express to them how cherished and precious they are to me. I am 
really thankful for their sacrifices during my lifetime and for making my education possible at 
each level. I cannot forget the demise of my dear uncle, aunt and sister in law during my stay in 
the UK. You will always be remembered in my prayers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................ xv 
CHAPTER ONE ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Chapter Two ............................................................................................................................ 8 
1.2 Chapter Three .......................................................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Chapter four ............................................................................................................................ 9 
1.4 Chapter five ........................................................................................................................... 12 
1.5 Chapter six ............................................................................................................................ 13 
1.6 Chapter seven ........................................................................................................................ 15 
1.7 Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................................ 15 
CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................................. 17 
Historical Overview of Migration and Remittances in Pakistan ........................................................... 17 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Internal migration .................................................................................................................. 18 
2.3 International migration .......................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.1 International migration to Middle East ......................................................................... 20 
2.3.2 International migration to developed countries ............................................................. 21 
2.4 Remittances overview ........................................................................................................... 30 
2.5 The study area for chapter four and five ............................................................................... 39 
2.5.1 Faisalabad district ......................................................................................................... 43 
2.5.2 Attock district ................................................................................................................ 45 
2.5.3 Badin district ................................................................................................................. 47 
2.5.4 Dir district ..................................................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER THREE .............................................................................................................................. 52 
Review of Literature ............................................................................................................................. 52 
3.1 Chapter four review of the literature ..................................................................................... 52 
3.1.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 52 
3.1.2 General overview of the migration literature ................................................................ 56 
3.1.3 The relationship between landholding and migration ................................................... 59 
3.2 Chapter five review of the literature ..................................................................................... 63 
3.2.1 Determinants of remittances ......................................................................................... 63 
 
 
ix 
 
3.3 Chapter six review of the literature ....................................................................................... 64 
3.3.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 64 
3.3.2 Remittances ................................................................................................................... 67 
3.3.3 Multilevel analysis ........................................................................................................ 71 
3.4 Chapter seven review of the literature .................................................................................. 73 
3.4.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 73 
3.4.2 Multiplier or Peer effects .............................................................................................. 76 
CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................................. 81 
(ESSAY ONE) ...................................................................................................................................... 81 
Determinants of Internal and International Migration .......................................................................... 81 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 81 
4.2 Data set.................................................................................................................................. 87 
4.3 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................. 93 
4.4 The econometric regression and main determinants ............................................................. 99 
4.5 Results and discussion ........................................................................................................ 104 
4.5.1 Logit regression result ................................................................................................. 104 
4.5.2 Multinomial logit regression result ............................................................................. 110 
4.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 115 
Appendix: ........................................................................................................................................ 117 
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................................ 123 
(ESSAY TWO) ................................................................................................................................... 123 
A Box-Cox Double Hurdle Model of Remittances ............................................................................. 123 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 123 
5.2 Descriptive statistics ........................................................................................................... 126 
5.3 Research Methodology ....................................................................................................... 129 
5.3.1 Historical evolution of double-hurdle Model .............................................................. 129 
5.3.2 A Box-Cox double hurdle approach ........................................................................... 131 
5.4 Results and discussions ....................................................................................................... 133 
5.4.1 The Participation Equation .......................................................................................... 136 
5.4.2 The level Equation ...................................................................................................... 138 
5.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 140 
Appendix: ........................................................................................................................................ 142 
CHAPTER SIX ................................................................................................................................... 143 
(ESSAY THREE) ............................................................................................................................... 143 
Household Heterogeneity and Hierarchical Decision-Making for Remittances ................................. 143 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 143 
6.2 Data set................................................................................................................................ 146 
 
 
x 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................... 149 
6.4 Research Methodology ....................................................................................................... 154 
6.4.1 Intra-class Correlations ............................................................................................... 157 
6.4.2 Odds ratios .................................................................................................................. 157 
6.5 Results and Discussions ...................................................................................................... 159 
6.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 169 
CHAPTER SEVEN ............................................................................................................................ 171 
(ESSAY FOUR).................................................................................................................................. 171 
Multiplier or spillover Effects of Remittances .................................................................................... 171 
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 171 
7.2 Data set................................................................................................................................ 174 
7.3 Descriptive statistics ........................................................................................................... 178 
7.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification ................................................................................. 185 
7.4.1 Instrumental variables ................................................................................................. 190 
7.5 Results and Discussions ...................................................................................................... 191 
7.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 194 
Appendix: ........................................................................................................................................ 195 
CHAPTER EIGHT ............................................................................................................................. 200 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 200 
8.1 Major findings and policy implications .............................................................................. 201 
8.1.1 Chapter four ................................................................................................................ 201 
8.1.2 Chapter five ................................................................................................................. 205 
8.1.3 Chapter six .................................................................................................................. 208 
8.1.4 Chapter seven .............................................................................................................. 212 
8.2 Limitations of the research .................................................................................................. 216 
8.3 Future areas of research ...................................................................................................... 217 
BLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 4.1 Households distribution by region ........................................................................................ 89 
Table 4.2 Household participation in survey over time ........................................................................ 93 
Table 4.3 The proportion of different type of the Household by districts ............................................ 93 
Table 4.4 Household level characteristics by their status of migration ................................................ 97 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics by District ........................................................................................... 98 
Table 4.6 Determinants of migration (Logit Regression) ................................................................... 106 
Table 4.7 Determinants of migration: (Multinomial Logit Regression) ............................................. 112 
Table A.1 Determinants of migration: (Logit Regression) ................................................................. 117 
Table A.2 Determinants of migration: (Multinomial Logit Regression) ............................................ 119 
Table A.3 Determinants of migration for the subsample of initial migrant households: (Logit 
regression) ........................................................................................................................................... 121 
Table A.4 Determinants of migration for the subsample of non-initial migrant households: Logit 
regression ............................................................................................................................................ 122 
Table 5.1 Summary of remittances at District level ............................................................................ 127 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics of households receive and do not receive remittances ......................... 128 
Table 5.3 MLEs for Box-Cox double hurdle model ........................................................................... 135 
Table B.1 MLEs for Box-Cox double hurdle model; ......................................................................... 142 
Table 6.1 Summary statistics .............................................................................................................. 151 
 
 
xii 
 
Table 6.2 Household Distribution by Region and Province ............................................................... 152 
Table 6.3 Internal and International remittances by Region and Provinces ........................................ 153 
Table 6.4 Maximum likelihood estimates for three-level logistic random-intercept model ............... 163 
Table 6.5 Maximum likelihood estimates for three-level logistic random-intercept model ............... 164 
Table 6.6 Intra-class correlations of the proportion of households receiving international and internal 
remittances and respective odds ratios ................................................................................................ 166 
Table 7.1 Households distribution by Provinces and Districts ........................................................... 179 
Table 7.2 Household head characteristics ........................................................................................... 179 
Table 7.3 Internal and international remittances (in thousand rupees) by Province ........................... 181 
Table 7.4 Internal, international and total remittances (in thousand rupees) by the gender of the 
household head per provinces ............................................................................................................. 182 
Table 7.5 Summary Statistics.............................................................................................................. 183 
Table 7.6 GMM Estimate of γ^2 for normalised remittances ............................................................. 193 
Table C.1 List of Instrument variables at district level ....................................................................... 195 
Table C.2 Number of household in each District ................................................................................ 196 
Table C.3 Household distribution between provinces ........................................................................ 197 
Table C.4 GMM Estimates of γ^2 for normalised remittances ........................................................... 198 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1 Emigration from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE ..................................................... 23 
Figure 2.2 Skill-wise Emigration from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE .................................... 24 
Figure 2.3 Country-wise Emigration (high) from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE .................... 26 
Figure 2.4 Country-wise Emigration (low) from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE ..................... 26 
Figure 2.5 Country-wise share of total stock of Pakistan's Emigrants (1971-2013); Source: BEOE ... 28 
Figure 2.6 Province Wise Emigration from Pakistan (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ............................. 29 
Figure 2.7 Provincial Capital City-wise Emigration from Pakistan (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ....... 30 
Figure 2.8 Total Remittances Received in Pakistan (1973-2013); Source: Various Pakistan Economic 
Survey ................................................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 2.9 Remittances % of GDP (1976-2013); Source: World Bank ................................................ 33 
Figure 2.10 Remittances as % of Total Export (1973-2002); Source: (Guzdar, 2003) ......................... 35 
Figure 2.11 Remittances and FDI in Million US$ (1976-2012); Source: World Bank ........................ 36 
Figure 2.12 Official Remittances from Countries of Origin (1998-2012); Source: State Bank of 
Pakistan ................................................................................................................................................. 37 
Figure 2.13 The districts covered in the study; Source: Rosen (2007: 98) ........................................... 40 
Figure 2.14 District wise total stock of migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE .................................. 43 
Figure 2.15 District Faisalabad (Punjab Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ................ 44 
 
 
xiv 
 
Figure 2.16 District Attock (Punjab Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ...................... 46 
Figure 2.17 District Badin (Sindh Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ......................... 49 
Figure 2.18 District Dir (NWFP Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE ........................... 50 
Figure 2.19 Three-level model; Sources: Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008: 431)........................... 155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AJK  Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
ARL  Attock Refinery Limited   
ARTEP  Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion 
BEOE  Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment  
BPPEP  British Petroleum Pakistan Exploration and Production Inc.  
EU  European Union  
FATA   Federally Administered Tribal Areas  
FBS  Pakistan Bureau of Statistics  
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment  
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
HDR  Human Development Report  
HIES  Household Integrated Economic Survey  
IC  Intra class correlation  
IFPRI  International Food Policy Research Institute  
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development   
ILO   International Labour Organization’s 
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
KNOMAD  Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development  
KPK   Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
 
 
xvi 
 
KSA  Kindom of Saudi Arabia  
LFS   Labour Force Survey 
MDGs   Millennium Development Goals 
MOIA   Ministry of Overseas Indian Affair 
MOP   Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis 
MPI   Migration Policy Institute  
NELM  New Economic of Labour Migration  
NWFP  Noth-West Frontier Province  
ODA  Official Development Assistance  
OLS   Ordinary Least Square  
OR   Odd ratios  
PES  Pakistan Economic Survey  
PKR   Pakistan Rupee 
POEA   Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 
PPS   Probability Proportional to Size 
PMU   Project Management Unit  
PSLM   Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey 
PSUs   Primary Sampling Units  
SAR  South Asian Region 
SBP  State Bank of Pakistan  
SSUs   Secondary Sampling Units 
STAR   Student Teacher Achievement Ratio 
 
 
xvii 
 
UAE  United Arab Emirates  
UK  United Kingdom  
UN   United Nations  
UNDP  United Nation Development Programme  
USA  United States of America 
WBG  World Bank Group Engagement 
WU  Western Union  
ZTBL  Zarai Tarqiati Bank Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xviii 
 
 
 
Dedicated to 
 
my parents,  
wife 
and 
our children 
 
 
 
 
For their endless love, support and encouragement. 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
We begin with a discussion of the motivation of the dissertation building up to an overview of the 
following chapters exploring some important issues of migration and remittances in the context of 
Pakistan. Push and pull factors have long been the instigators of migration. The push factors are 
such as poverty, injustice, armed conflict, whereas the pull factors are better jobs and higher 
incomes at the destination places. These factors have led to, in international contexts, 
economically vibrant diaspora in different parts of the world. The origins of the diaspora are 
spread across the developing world, the South Asian diaspora being one of the largest ones. These 
migrant communities are known to be catalyst of important changes in their home countries. 
Likewise in the national contexts, migration benefits the source communities, well beyond 
individual households. 
The significance of this research emanates from the fact that, according to the World Bank1, there 
were 232 million international migrants (or 3.2 percent of world population) in 2013, an increase 
of 57 million (from 175 million) since 2000. The total stock of international migration from 
Pakistan has increased from 3.97 million in 2004 to around 7 million in 2013, an annual net 
increase of about 0.34 million workers. The remittances received in developing countries by 
international migrant stood at $404 billion in 2013, and the figure is expected rise to $516 billion 
                                                             
 
 
1 Ratha et al., (2014), Migration and Development Brief 22 
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per annum by 2016. The share of remittances to the South Asia Region (SAR) stood at $111 
billion in 2013. International migrant remittances to Pakistan reached to the $15 billion in 2013. 
Remittances in Pakistan continue to support the balance of payments, and were 284 percent of 
international reserves in 2013. In addition, share of remittances to the Pakistan Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) stood at the 6 percent in 2012. The remittance shares are much larger than Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Pakistan.  According to 
World Bank, the surges in remittances in developing countries are due to reduced remittance 
costs, exchange rate movement, and improved employment conditions in the destination 
countries. 
One of the main paradigms of migration analysis is the neo-classical theory, which assumes that 
individuals make the migration decision, and they do so in accordance with rational cost-benefit 
calculation (Borjas; 1989, Borjas and Bronars, 1990). A modification of this approach, known as 
the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) due to Stark and Bloom (1985), Stark and 
Levhari (1982) and Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) models migration not as an outcome of an 
individual’s decision to migrate but that of the household the individual belongs to. Thus, in this 
approach household member collectively act not only to maximize their expected income but also 
to minimize risks and to overcome the constraints associated with a variety of market failures 
(such as capital and insurance market that are imperfect, inaccessible, or non-existent). Given 
these sorts of market failures, which are common in developing countries, people migrate not 
only to reap a higher benefit but also to manage risk and gain access to capital. Unlike 
individuals, households are in a better position to diversify their allocation of labour to control 
risks to their economic wellbeing. So, migration is viewed as a household response to income 
risks, since remittances serve as income insurance for households in the country of origin (De 
Haas, 2005).  
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Migration may result from an individual strategy to boost income or a household strategy to 
diversify risk. Migration may be assisted by the presence of other migrants in the community who 
provides the relevant information about a network. The underlying mechanisms that explain 
migration may differ depending on whether households or individuals are considered (Garip, 
2014). Our research is in the perspective of the NELM, and in this thesis migration and 
remittances are considered as household decisions.                
The increase in international migration has attracted the attention of many researchers 
(sociologists and economists), who study the impact of migration and remittances flows in origin 
communities (micro data), or their impact on receiving countries (macro-level data) in the past 
two decades (DiMaggio and Garip; 2012). The centrality of remittances for households in the 
process of migration has been extensively studied in the context of migration-development nexus, 
as well as being important discourse around poverty-alleviation and development (Adams and 
Cuecuecha; 2010). In several countries remittances have the potential to act as a top source of 
investment capital, support governments and local economic development during economic crises 
(Cohen, 2011).    
Remittances are not only important to the balance of payments of a country, but also because they 
provide a risk diversification opportunity to many households, by insuring income and 
consumption smoothing against domestic market failures. The remittances received by many 
migrant-sending households are proved to be poverty reducing and to improve livelihood for 
many beneficiaries through direct and indirect effects (De Haas, 2005). Remittances usually go 
directly to poor households by avoiding pockets of corrupt government officials (Kapur, 2003). 
This research tries to understand the complex link between migration and remittances; in 
particular, the socio-spatial perspective, uneven geographical development and multiplier effects 
have rarely been framed in terms of a systemic analysis. This thesis is an attempt to relate internal 
and international migration, in particular, it aims to unravel how both types of migration link with 
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pre- and –post migration wealth and socio-spatial relations through remittances. Hence, on the 
one hand, this thesis examines the determinants of internal-and –international migration from 
rural Pakistan; on the other, it explores the role of remittances at district level, with particular, 
with reference to their contribution within- and –between districts. 
The specific focus of this thesis is differential migration, remittances, and development patterns 
in rural Pakistan from 1986 to 2007. In this period, migration and remittances turned out to be an 
integral part of Pakistan's economy and provided a livelihood for many households. Pakistan 
provides an interesting case for unravelling the social change and community development that 
occurs due to the sheer size of migrant remittances. 
Chapters four and five, chapter six and chapter seven use three different data sets. Chapters four 
and five are based a panel dataset collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) on four selected districts: Faisalabad and Attock in Punjab, Badin in Sindh, and Dir in 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP2) which were chosen using the district ranking 
methodology of Pasha and Hassan (1982) from 1986-91. Chapters six and seven are based on two 
different cross sectional household survey data (Household Integrated Economic Survey) 
covering the whole country for 2001-02 and 2006-07.   
In chapter four, we create two sub-samples. The one consist of all sampled households, with or 
without out-migrants, and in the latter case regardless of the destination of the migration. In the 
second sample, households are categorized into three groups; (i) households with no migration; 
(ii) households with internal migration; and (iii) households with international migration. We 
begin our analysis by first studying migration as a whole. Thus, in the first regression, the 
                                                             
 
 
2 Formally known as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is one of the four provinces 
that comprises Pakistan. In April 2010, the constitution of Pakistan was amended and the former NWFP renamed to 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). This thesis identifies the province as NWFP because the first data (1986-91) was 
collected under this name and also for consistency throughout the thesis.   
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dependent variable, out-migration, is set to one if the household has reported out-migration, and 
zero otherwise. In the second regression, the discrete outcome variable represents different forms 
of migration, where regressors vary across the aforementioned alternatives. We use data for both 
households and individuals and also use fixed effects at the district level.  
Using the same dataset of Chapter 4 we study the determinants of receiving remittances by 
constructing a Box-Cox double hurdle model for households in the chapter 5. Even though, there 
is extensive research on the issue of migration and remittances, only limited work is focused on 
this aspect in Pakistan, which comes in the world top ten remittances receiving countries. We fill 
this gap in the literature by analysing the determinants of remittances, employing the Box-Cox 
double hurdle model using the panel data described above. In particular, the return on migration 
whether internal or international is given by the level of remittances, if one wishes to model 
remittances, they have to be aware of the large number of zeroes in the data. The motivation 
behind using the Box-Cox double hurdle model in remittance's study is that there is a large cluster 
of zero-s denoting households receiving no remittances. The double hurdle approach proposed by 
Cragg (1971), overcomes these and other econometric problems that arise when the dependent 
variable takes a value of zero in a logarithmic regression, which is the case with non-remitters in 
our model. The data panel contains information on 973 households for five years to approach our 
research question from the receiving household’s perspective.  
It has the limitation that it does not distinguish between internal and international remittances. In 
the data set, remittances information is listed under a variable labelled `remittances` instead of the 
two separate variables --internal and international remittances. By using supporting information 
on the migration status – internal or international—we could distinguish between the sources of 
remittances, but we have chosen not to do so due to the possibility of measurement error and 
other data complications that might arise. In light of this, our paper treats remittances –internal or 
international—uniformly as additional inflow of income for households. Our aim is to analyse the 
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factors that play an important role in determining the probability, and the amount of remittances 
received by the households from the migrants who are currently abroad. 
Then in Chapter 6, we use data from Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey of 2001-
02, employing household-village- district- province- and regional-level variables to understand 
how heterogeneities at these different levels impact the probability of receiving (or sending)  
remittances, relative to other households in the same village or district. In this study we employ a 
multilevel econometric methodology to study the spread of remittances at different levels of 
spatial aggregation. Few studies use multilevel analyses on remittance data, but to the best of our 
knowledge, there is none for in context of developing country such as Pakistan. The data set 
consists of 14,831 households (level-one) nested within 1,050 villages (level-two) which are 
further nested in 147 districts (level-three) into two region (rural versus urban) and four 
provinces. Many studies have analysed the impact of remittances on recipient countries but study 
of remittances at various level of spatial aggregation has received limited attention that affect 
individuals, families, communities, and indeed whole country. From each regression (internal-and 
–international remittances), we obtain the correlation coefficients for two randomly selected 
households from the same village and same district (denoted 𝜌 (village,district)) in terms of the 
probability of receiving remittances (internal or international) and the correlation coefficients for 
two randomly selected households residing in two different villages within the same district 
(denoted 𝜌 (district)).  
The research on migration or remittances may suffer from methodological concern that 
remittances are in general not randomly allocated across households, so any observed relation 
between household outcome in term of remittances or migration may reflect the influence of 
unobserved factors. The households that have more members working abroad will receive larger 
remittances or the households that recently experienced a natural calamities might send members 
abroad to make up lost income (Yang, 2008). The household level unexplained heterogeneity 
should be accounted for in the empirical analysis of remittances.  
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Research on the migration or remittances suggests that community differential structure and 
social networks impact remittances outcomes. These finding provide evidence that supports the 
Hierarchical Models and suggest that there are critical mechanisms that produce varying 
outcomes, which yet to be systematically explored (Garip and Western, 2009). In hierarchical 
models, households are nested in social contexts—like village in district—whose effect are 
thought to shape household outcomes. Researchers rarely study model investigate aggregate 
patterns of variation by including fixed and random effects. We present an analysis of Pakistani 
remittances data, in which households are nested in villages and villages in districts. Through the 
unexplained heterogeneity, we calculated an inter- and intra-village correlation to study how 
remittances are distributed between two randomly selected households from same village within 
same district than between two different villages from same district.  
A similar dataset from 2007-08 is studied in Chapter 7, where our attention shifts to studying peer 
effect in migration. In this chapter, we go beyond the existing literature to investigate multiplier 
effects triggered by remittances in rural households by using the data set of Household Integrated 
Economic Survey of 2007-08. Our unique data in context of Pakistan allows us to compare the 
magnitude of multiplier effects across different districts in rural areas (81 districts), while taking 
into account of household-level characteristics along with prior measure of asset holding. It thus 
provides an opportunity to investigate whether the multiplier effects uncovered in existing 
literature are confined to the specific households or districts receiving remittances. At the same 
time, our comparison of the magnitude of multiplier effects across different districts of Pakistan 
provides new evidence on what drives these multiplier effects. It is believed that remittances, like 
many other economic activities, have social interaction, which often is labelled as neighbourhood 
or multiplier effects. In this paper, we use the term ‘multiplier effects’. However, despite the 
economic importance of multiplier effects, empirical evidence for such effects for the remittances 
is yet to be understood in fullest. The handful number of studies on the labour market provides 
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evidence of multiplier effects in the workplace due to the knowledge spill over (Cornelissen, et al. 
2013). Still it is unclear to what extent these findings can be extended to remittances. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next seven sections of the chapter present an 
overview of each of the six chapters and in particular highlight how each chapter contributes to 
the existing body of knowledge. Finally, Section 1.7 outlines the structure of the remainder of the 
thesis.  
 
1.1 Chapter Two  
 
 
Chapter two provides relevant (aggregate) background information on migration patterns from 
Pakistan to overseas (and internally) (for instance, where people migrate to), as well as a 
breakdown of total remittances coming into Pakistan from various regions. It provides 
information on which parts of Pakistan from – city or province, migration takes place 
significantly. Chapter two also presents the motivation to perform this study in the context of 
Pakistan and highlights the importance of migration and remittances as a steadily growing 
external source of capital for the economy. Over the last decade, the sheer increase in migration 
and remittances attracted attention of not only many researchers but also international agencies 
like World Bank Group Engagement (WBG), such as the Global Knowledge Partnership on 
Migration and Development (KNOMAD), which play important roles in collecting data, 
generating and synthesizing knowledge on migration and remittances issues for sending and 
receiving countries. Similarly, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) collects 
data on migration, whereas, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) compiles data for remittances in 
Pakistan. The data for chapter two analyses is mostly drawn from the BEOE, SBP, and various 
issues of the Pakistan Economic Survey (PES).  
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The aggregate data on remittances (all current transfer in cash or in kind made or received by 
resident households to or non-resident households as defined by IMF) come from balance of 
payments data provided by each country central bank to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The central banks rely on money transfer operators (private banks, Western Union) and other 
institution (Post offices) to provide reports on the transaction they process. However, there is an 
evidence of miss reporting in some instances. 
1.2 Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three presents an overview of the literature related to the four essays contained in this 
thesis. In particular, it outlines the important advancement in the existing body of knowledge on 
migration and remittances based on why a member of household chooses to migrate and then 
choose to send remittances. For this reasons, a comprehensive understanding of the migration 
(remittances) theories and empirical literature is necessary to uncover underlying reasons behinds 
it. The past literature provides an opportunity to link it with new findings. The areas of migration 
and remittances are so tightly intertwined with each other. This overlapping concept distinct 
depending on the different nature of research questions set for each chapter in the following 
discussion. This study not only tries to understand that how well these remittances are distributed 
between villages and districts but also try to identify their multiplier effects at the district level. 
1.3 Chapter four 
 
The thesis begins by investigating how the initial wealth and loan (wealth and loan prior to 
migration) of internal-and-international migration households relative to never migrant 
households explains the divergent migration outcome observed in the four districts from 1986 to 
1991. The household initial wealth is commonly conceptualized as resources of assistance 
households need in absence of well-functioning credit market in rural Pakistan to cover the costs 
and risks of migrating. Several studies, provide evidence that access to initial wealth increases the 
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individuals’ likelihood of migration (Mines and Massey; 1985 and Rozelle et al., 1999). The 
empirical finding also suggest that initial wealth can work in different ways for different 
households (Haddinott; 1994, Massey et al., 1990, Zhang and Song; 2003), yet these ideas lack 
unanimity among researcher. In our data set, the migration variable may be predetermined. This 
means the unobserved variable may be correlated with both past migration status and the current 
wealth of household. If so, then our estimated impact of wealth on migration could reflect 
influences of these unobserved variables. In this case, it is difficult to determine whether wealth 
induces migration or the reverse. In our analysis, we addressed this concern by including a 
measure of migration-wealth interaction in the year 0, as an explanatory variable in the 
estimation. At the beginning household members face two decisions - to migrate (regardless of 
destination) or stay at home. If a household member decides to migrate in year 0, then we 
generate post-migration initial wealth variables by interacting initial wealth and migration 
dummy. Similarly, pre-migration initial wealth variables are generated by interacting initial 
wealth by one minus migration dummy.  
We use the logit model for dichotomous migration choice at first place and then we use the 
multinomial logit model for three discrete distinct choices; never migrant households, internal 
migrant households, and international migrant households. Distinguishing among these choices is 
important because each choice can influence individual migration behaviour in different ways, 
which is confirmed by our results. The motivation behind studying the internal-and-international 
migration is described by Czaika (2012; 125) as: 
“The links between internal and international migration have recently begun to attract attention 
at the international policy level, especially in response to concerns by developed countries over 
migrant flows. Important questions are whether today’s internal migrants are tomorrow’s 
international migrants; whether international migration and internal migration are substitutes 
for each other; and whether internal and international migrants share the same profile. Needless 
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to say, the answers depend very much on the local context and thus can only be arrived at 
through location-specific case studies”.  
Our primary focus is the question of whether internal-and-international migrants’ household share 
the similar set of determinants in Pakistan. The studies by Czaika, M. (2012), King and Skeldon 
(2010), Skeldon (2006), Ghatak, et al. (1996), and Massey et al. (1993) provides a range of 
possible determinants of internal and international migration. We find a common set of 
determinants for both internal and international migration, but also some differences related to 
initial wealth that household owns prior to migrating whether internally or internationally to 
afford some higher costs for migration to different destinations.               
The results provide evidence that a household’s human capital and specific assets are key 
determinants for alternative locational migration behaviour. On the snapshot of migration as a 
whole we detect an intriguing size-composition effect on the household’s probability of 
migration: the larger the household, the greater the probability of migration. On the other hand, 
the more dependants in a particular household (in terms of the number of children and young 
females), the less likely it is to have migrant member. This relation is true for both types of 
migration – internal or international. We also find that the probability of migration is inversely 
related to the pre-migration initial landholding of the household (as observed at the beginning of 
the study period). A one-acre decrease in landholding will result in an 11% increase in 
international migration (relative to never migration), and comparatively it shows a 1.3% increase 
in internal migration. However, the probability of both types of migration – internal or 
international is also negatively related to the pre-migration money borrowed from informal 
sources. It follows that households are unlikely to raise finances from the informal sector. This 
seems to suggest that poor families are more likely to migrate either within the country or 
overseas. But this is somewhat questionable, because migration is costly, even within the country. 
If the poorer sections of society were migrating, we would expect to see a positive relationship 
between loans taken and the probability of migration. Instead we see that the probability of 
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migration is unrelated to loans taken. It is more likely that households deplete their landholding to 
raise finances for their migration. 
 
1.4 Chapter five 
 
The finding of the fifth chapter attests to the vital importance of the migrant remittances in 
shaping household members’ migration choices in the Pakistani setting. Prior work in the 
literature in other settings finds that the remittances over time can also initiate a process of further 
migration in receiving household through which migration flows become self-sustaining.  
The presence of a household member in destination countries could result in building social 
network (as interpersonal ties linking kin, friends, and community members in their places of 
origin and destination) and creating close relationship or ties to institution and organisation that 
help kin, friends, and community members to migrate, get jobs, or adjust to society in the 
destination countries. In short such networks link potential migrants in origin areas with others—
often-family members—in destination areas (Garip, 2008). Extensive empirical evidence 
documents that past migration becomes a primary engine for future migration flows (Garip and 
Western; 2009). Using the same dataset of Chapter 4 we study the determinants of receiving 
remittances by constructing a Box-Cox double hurdle model for households. The first hurdle 
deals with the decision to receive remittance. An implicit assumption is that the decision to 
migrate as well as sending remittances is taken at the household. There are some migrant 
households, who decide not to receive remittances until the migrant permanently returns home, 
and there are households who would instruct their migrant members to remit regularly. The first 
stage regression, does reveal household characteristics such as household head age, number of 
children age less than 11 years, and the district level fixed effects to be of important for 
remittances, be it for internal or international migration. From these factors, it may be concluded 
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that household level characteristics, and regional factors are the important determinants for the 
probability of remittances.  
The second hurdle deals with the determinants of remittance amounts, conditional on being a 
remitter. It is interesting to note that household head education and age appear to affect the level 
of remittances, unlike the participation results. Comparing the impact across the participation and 
the level of remittances received by the household, we find that both members traveling within 
and outside of the country are the important determinant for both hurdles. This result confirms 
that households that have sent migrants, are improving their welfare by receiving greater welfare, 
but that depends on the households remittances and its capacity to send multiple member. 
Moreover, presence of male and the money loaned to other households positively affects only the 
level of remittances, but for participation, it was not statistically significant. This suggests that 
remittances also serve as an insurance mechanism for other household in rural Pakistan. We find 
that there exists opposing effect of probability to receive remittances and the level of remittances 
at the district level. 
1.5 Chapter six 
 
Though multilevel modelling in the area of migration and remittances is not new, it is not very 
common, possibly due to data limitations (DiMaggio and Garip; 2012). It is important to take into 
account several levels of analysis while studying the behaviour of migration and remittances. The 
use of a multilevel model enables us to consider community features such as economic structures 
and society as a group in the analysis. Few studies use multilevel analyses on remittance data, but 
to the best of our knowledge, there is none available in the context of Pakistan. In this chapter we 
are able to specify as many as five levels of a hierarchy of random effects—at household, village, 
district, region, and province levels, however of these five levels only three have unobserved 
random heterogeneity. The clustering of observations within layers of different context creates 
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data more challenging for analysis. The random effects have important implications for 
substantive conclusions for calculating inter-and-intra village correlation. In our analysis, three 
level hierarchical models provide a convenient framework for studying internal and international 
remittances outcome with fixed and random effects. We are also interested to focus on how the 
remittances (internal versus international) within villages and between villages is associated with 
a household’s likelihood of receiving remittances. It is reasonable to expect that household to 
receive remittances become more likely if they live in a village in which many others have 
migrated. According to Garip and Western (2009), this phenomenon is called the cumulative 
causation of migration. Our findings suggest that the determinants of internal remittances are 
different from those of international remittances. The effects of household characteristics tend to 
vary between internal and international remittances, and that too get further modified when we 
introduce regional fixed effects. We find that presence of the female member in the household 
determines only internal remittances. However, land holding is positively related to the 
international remittances. The household size is more robust determinant of the international 
remittances rather than internal remittances. We also study the village and district level 
unobservable heterogeneities. For this purpose we calculate the odds ratio of two randomly 
selected households’ prospects of receiving internal and international remittances, in two cases – 
in one, two households are located in the same village within the same district, and in the other, 
they are located in two different villages within the same district. We find greater variation in the 
odds of receiving remittances (both internal and international) among households from same 
villages within the same district than those located in different villages within same district. Also 
with regional fixed effects, the correlation is refined and thus it becomes smaller. Results of IC 
and OR support the notion that migrants remit less to households that are from different villages 
than the same village may be due to the networking, which is theorized to be associated with 
access to information within or outside the country regarding employment opportunities.   
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1.6 Chapter seven 
 
The overall impact of remittances on economic activities for the origin communities is still 
unclear. Whether it induces more investment or consumption and its impact on migration 
decisions of other community members is positive or negative are still open questions. But some 
sort of communication and social interaction between migrant and non-migrant households at 
origin communities exists. The coexistence of migrant versus non-migrant households produces 
“peer pressures”. This kind of interaction in economic literature is also called “knowledge 
spillover” or “social network” (Cornelissen, et al. 2013). In sociology this kind of social network 
is labelled the cost reducing factor of migration. Most of the empirical studies have estimated the 
social multiplier in a diverse area such as schooling performance, financial decision and criminal 
behaviour, but no study has gone beyond the conventional wisdom to study the remittances as an 
outcome variable to estimate the spillover or multiplier effects. In this chapter, we empirically 
study the possible multiplier effect (spillover) triggered by remittances by using the Pakistan 
Household Integrated Economic Survey of 2007-08. We investigate the role of household 
interdependencies of the remittances by exploiting a novel method of identification based on the 
comparison of the variance of household behaviour at the different level of aggregation within a 
different district of Pakistan (Graham, 2008). This method allows for identification of two 
problems that arise due to self-selection and unobservable heterogeneity. We quantify the social 
multiplier of remittances to be 1.12, suggesting sizable spill-over. Our result suggests that social 
multiplier in terms of remittances has contributed to the development of rural household of 
Pakistan. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
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The remainder of the thesis is structure as follow. The chapter 2 which examines the historical 
overview of migration and remittances in Pakistan. Chapter 3 presents the literature review of 
four chapters covered in this thesis. Chapter 4 presents the substantial chapter of determinants of 
internal- and –international migration from rural Pakistan, while chapter 5 presents the 
determinants of remittances using Box-Cox double hurdle model. In chapter 6 we employ a 
multilevel econometric methodology to study the spread of remittances at different levels of 
spatial aggregation. Similarly, in this chapter 7, we go beyond the existing literature to investigate 
multiplier effects triggered by remittances in 81 rural districts of Pakistan. Finally, chapter 8 
outlines the key findings and implications of the four chapters and the potential areas of future 
research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Historical Overview of Migration and Remittances in Pakistan 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents my motivation to perform this study in the context of Pakistan and 
highlights the importance of migration and remittances for reshaping the lives of many destitute 
households. Pakistan is among the top ten remittance recipient countries in the world. The total 
stock of international migration from Pakistan has increased from 3.97 million in 2004 to around 
7 million in 2013,  an annual net increase of about 0.34 million workers 3. There represents over a 
ten-fold increase in official remittances from around $1 billion in 2001 to approximately $15 
billion in 2013. According to some estimates, the actual remittances flow to Pakistan could be 
around more than $20 billion, if the remittances channelled through the informal sector are 
included.  According to the 2009 United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) on Human 
Development Report, globally the number of those who moved within their countries was nearly 
four times larger (740 million) than the 3% of the world population who moved internationally 
(214 million). Associated with migration are remittances, which may be called “unrequited 
transfers” unlike other financial flows such as debt, or equity flows (Kapur, 2003), and provides a 
safety net to the poor.  
This chapter aims to provide an overview of issues relating to migration and remittances. We 
focus on the international migration from Pakistan and domestic migration within Pakistan, but 
                                                             
 
 
3 Amjad, et al. (2012) study analyses the country-wise stock of overseas Pakistanis together with the historical annual 
amount of remittances received in Pakistan from 2001-2012. However, it is a descriptive study with some insightful 
discussion related to informal sector involvement in the transfer of money. This study finds that the total remittances 
flow to Pakistan could have been around $20 billion instead of the $12 billion officially declared.     
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not on the migration into Pakistan such as the refugee influx from Afghanistan. The data is 
mostly drawn from the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), which is a 
branch of the Ministry of Labour and Overseas Pakistanis with the main objective of promotion 
and regulation of labour migration to other countries. The BEOE reports gross flows of migration 
only and they do not take into account return migrants. The figure of migration should not be 
confused with the net migration rate in Pakistan. Other sources include the World Bank, the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP), and various issues of the Pakistan Economic Survey (PES). 
 
2.2 Internal migration 
 
It is more difficult to estimate the exact share of internal migrants in any country due to it nature 
and different patterns such as urban to urban migration, rural to urban migration, rural to rural 
migration, displacement due to projects, migration from arid areas, migration of share-tenants, 
pastoralists and seasonal migrants. Urban areas account for more than 60 percent of all domestic 
migration in Pakistan. Half of the total lifetime internal migration (greater than ten years) are 
inter-district migrations (intra-province), and about a quarter are due to inter-province migration 
(Karim and Nasar; 2003). Availability of basic public amenities in urban areas (Mann, 2003) and 
individual human capital endowment (Akram, et al., 2001) along with higher wages in urban 
areas (Guzdar; 2003) are positively linked with internal migration. The following strand of 
literature particularly focuses on the provinces of Pakistan to highlight inter-district (intra-
province) and inter-province migration by using the 1998 census data. In the Noth-West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), 69 percent of internal migration is inter-district (intra-province), while 15 
percent is inter-province (Khatak; 2004).  
The districts of Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi account for more than 33 percent of the total 
internal migration in Pakistan, according to the 1998 population Census. The Karachi district 
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alone embraces around 13 percent of all immigrants, suggesting a strong regional influence for 
urban immigration. Thus, it suggests that the urban cities of Punjab and Sindh are the main 
destination for internal migrants, however, migration patterns in Punjab are from rural or other 
urban areas of Punjab. The migration pattern in Sindh, especially in Karachi is  mostly from other 
provinces such as NWFP, Punjab and Balochistan. There is very little emigration from Sindh to 
other provinces. This pattern of migration from rural to urban areas, especially migration from 
NWFP to Punjab and Sindh does conform to a basic poverty-migration linkage. It seems that 
there is a historical link between migration from arid areas of NWFP and Punjab to irrigated 
regions of Sindh and southern Punjab. 
 
2.3 International migration  
 
Mohammad (1999) describes the four distinct migration movements from Pakistan during these 
decades. The first movement consisted of unskilled and semi-skilled labour to Britain in the 
1950s. The second movement is that of migration of qualified professionals (the so-called “brain 
drain”) to Britain, the USA, Canada and the Middle East (contract migration to the Middle East 
with a condition to return to Pakistan) in 1960s and 1970s. The third movement of migration 
continued to the aforementioned countries with less intensity, which may be due to more 
restrictive border controls, since the mid-1980s. The fourth and current wave of migration is to 
the USA, Canada and Australia for permanent settlement resulting from the immigration policies 
of these countries. On the other hand, internal migration from rural to urban areas is an on-going 
process due to multiple factors such as education (post graduate and professional level), better 
infrastructure, employment opportunities, higher fertility, returned international migrants 
preferring to reside in urban areas and reduction in psychological and social costs. 
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The first flow of international migration started to the United Kingdom primarily from the 
districts of Mirpur, Faisalabad, Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat and Peshawar in the  1950s. 
However, from 1965 we witnessed an increase in international migration to the US due to relaxed 
immigration policies and introduction of the quotas system. It was followed by a migration to 
Middle East in 1970s due to the exploration of oil. The Middle East currently has the highest 
concentration of overseas Pakistanis in residence. Almost 2 million Pakistanis migrated to the 
Gulf region in early 1980s, initially to work as construction labourers but subsequently their 
demand switched to other sectors such as trade, transport, social infrastructure and security 
services. This trend was followed by student migration from well-off families to Western Europe 
and North America in  the late 1980s4.  
The historical international migration from Pakistan can be broadly divided into two strands of 
literature, migration to the Middle East and to developed countries. 
  
2.3.1 International migration to Middle East 
 
The coastal region of Balochistan was once a part of the Sultanate of Oman before 1958, when it 
was merged into Pakistan. Before 1970s, this long established cultural and political connection 
resulted in a first wave of migration, specifically from these regions to Oman. This was followed 
by a second wave of migration induced by a Middle East oil boom in the 1970s, which attracted 
immense unskilled labour from the majority of rural areas. The migration from these areas 
brought material and economic prosperity. However, by the early 1980s, the Middle East started 
                                                             
 
 
4 Guzdar (2003) descriptive study provides an overview of issues relating to migration and poverty in Pakistan. Migration is 
approached from the perspective of vulnerability, rights and political sustainability. This study tried to answer three complex and 
interrelated questions. Firstly, what are the main forms of migration that are significant from the point of view of poverty and public 
policy? Secondly, how have researchers, activists, and policy-makers dealt with these forms of migration? And, finally, what are the 
keys issues for future research, activism and policy for the main types of migration? 
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reaping the benefits of the oil led economic boom in the majority of Middle East countries. Due 
to the labour and skills shortage in the Middle East region the door opened for migration from 
many Asian countries, which dramatically changed the traditional patterns of migration from 
unskilled labour to semi-skilled and skilled, especially from Pakistan. The migration was not 
solely confined to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, but it quickly dispersed to 
other countries comprising Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Iraq and Iran.  
The inconsistent economic policies directly linked with political instability and nationalization of 
industries in Pakistan not only encouraged labour migration but also flight of capital to the 
Middle East. Due to it expanding nature of industrial, commercial and financial activities, the 
Middle East economies developed in regional commercial hubs. This period was  followed by a 
trend of reduced economic activities in the region due to the 1991 Gulf War, which resulted in 
repatriation of many migrants, particularly from Kuwait. This unrest in the Gulf region 
transformed the demand of labour from unskilled to more skilled and educated not only from the 
traditional region of (NWFP), Punjab and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) but also from other 
regions of  Pakistan. After 2000s, Pakistani diaspora have gain access to the labour market of 
Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Hong Kong.  
It may be concluded that Middle East and Pakistan's cooperation in trade, investment and labour 
market access not only transformed the lives of many households in Pakistan but also at a macro 
level helped to improve country imbalances ranging from strengthening of the foreign exchange 
reserve to improving the budget and trade deficit.  
  
2.3.2 International migration to developed countries 
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The share of Pakistani origin international migrants in developed countries stand at around 2 to 3 
million (Burki, 2011). There is a historical link between Azad Jammu and Kasmir (AJK) and 
migration to the United Kingdom (UK). During the colonial period, many males from AJK were 
employed in maritime activities and resulted in the first wave of migration to UK. However, the 
second wave of youth  migration started in the 1950s and 1960s to the UK, due to the 
displacement of the many people as a result of the water storage project in this area. The UK 
government being an international guarantor for the irrigation project granted migrant status to a  
large number of people as a compensation package (Guzdar, 2003). This was followed by a 
settlement of the migrant families and dependants in the UK. In comparison, the migration to 
North America were proceeded by more professional and educated men, particularly in the field 
of medicine, which later resulted in the settlement of migrant families and dependents in North 
America in the 1970s. In the 1980s, due to martial law many people migrated to Western Europe 
and North America to avoid social and political suppression in Pakistan. However, during the late 
1980s and early 1990s many students went to the European Union (EU), North America and the 
UK for studies which was later followed by a  similar pattern of settlement of families and 
dependents. Similarly, the 1990s witnessed a migration not only to East Asian countries such as 
Japan and South Korea but developed countries as well (on visitor visas and then overstaying 
illegally).   
Figure 2.1 shows a histrorical trend of international migration in Pakistan (1971-2013). Pakistani 
Diasopra is comprised of around more than 7 million, which is around 4 percent of the country's 
population. The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) was established in 
October 1971 under the direction of the Government of Pakistan. It is responsible for managing a 
substantial share of workers pursuing formal employment abroad. BEOE registered that around 
3,534 migrants moved  abroad for employment in the year 1971 with increasing to around 
140,445 in 1977. However, this decade (1971-1980) witnesses the highest average annual growth 
rate of international migration to around 57.5 percent. This migration resulted due to the 
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separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), political unrest and nationalisation of industries. Yet 
again, this is followed by increasing trend in migration from 1987 to 1992. The 1980s observes 
the lowest average annual migration rate to around 1.64 percent with a substantial decrease in the 
annual rate from 57.5 percent. The next decade in 1990s repots annual migration rate to 2.74, 
greater than the last decade. 
Many Pakistani migrants had to unexpectedly return home with the outbreak of the Gulf war in 
1990s and consequent decreased economic activities in the Middle East, as is evident from Figure 
2.1, which has been a traditionally major destination for Pakistan’s international migrants. The 
aftermath of 9/11 and the global recession of 2008 launched a backlash on the immigrants and 
witnessed tougher immigration policies in the developed countries, but these factors did not curb 
migration from Pakistan.  
 
Figure 2.1 Emigration from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
The increasing trend of migration is related to multiple factors. Firstly, the Pakistani diaspora is 
concentrated in countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
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countries (including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) which have less hostile immigration 
controls. Secondly, internal security issues in Pakistan (suicide attacks, target killing, 
radicalisation, and sectarianism) encouraged (religious) minorities to migrate to countries that are 
considered safe, secure and also economically promising. According to the Ministry of Overseas 
Pakistanis, almost 2.7 million Pakistani migrated in last five years. The average annual migration 
growth rate in three years (2011-2013) increases to 21% from 16% in 2000s. 
 
Figure 2.2 Skill-wise Emigration from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the skills classification of Pakistani migrant workers, are divided into five main 
categories comprising of highly qualified, highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled, and un-skilled5. 
                                                             
 
 
5 The highly qualified category of emigration from Pakistan includes Doctor, Engineer, Accountant, and Manager. Additionally, 
highly skilled category comprises of Nurse (M&F), Foreman/Supervisor, Technician, Operator, Surveyor, Carpenter, Computer 
Programmer/Analyst, Designer, Pharmacist, Rigger, Draftsman, Photographer, and Artist.  
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The migration of the Pakistani professional (highly-qualified) such as doctors, IT experts and 
scientists to foreign countries shows an increasing trend during recent decades.  However, highly 
qualified, highly skilled, semi-skilled migration has a comparatively small share than skilled and 
un-skilled. The historical share of highly qualified migration stands at around 2 percent, while the 
share of highly skilled and semi-skilled migration is around 5 and 6 percent of the total stock of 
migrants respectively. Interestingly, the largest share is represented by the skilled and un-skilled 
migration which stands at around 43 and 44 percent, respectively of the total stock of migration 
from 1971 to 2013.  
The decade wise share of each category of migration highlights the changing pattern of the 
migration. The share of highly qualified, semi-skilled, and high skilled is around 5, 6, and 8 
percent respectively, although the highest shares are represented by the skilled and un-skilled at 
around 37 and 44 percent respectively in 1970s. However, there was a decreasing trend, 
particularly of skilled and un-skilled migration in the first half of the 1980s that are recovered in 
second half of the 1980s. In the 1980s, the share of highly qualified, semi-skilled, and highly 
skilled were around 1, 3, and 6 percent respectively, witnesses a substantial decrease in the share 
of each category. Whereas, the skilled migration is around 45 percent (with an increase of 8 
percent than 1970s ) and shares of the un-skilled migration are almost stable at around 45 percent. 
However, the 1990s shows a quite stable share of each category in the out-migration but with a 
decreasing trend in the major categories, such as skilled and un-skilled. The share of highly 
qualified increases from 1 percent to 2 percent, semi-skilled same at 3 percent, and high skilled 
increases from 6 to 8 percent, while share of skilled migration increases from 45 to 49 percent, 
and un-skilled migration decreases from 45 to 38 percent in 1980s to 1990s. Similarly, the share 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
Similarly, skilled category contains Welder, Secretary/Stenographer, Storekeeper, Clerk/Typist, Mason, Carpenter, Electrician, 
Plumber, Steel fixer, Painter, Mechanic, Cable jointer, Driver, Tailor, Fitter, Denter, Goldsmith, Blacksmith, and Salesman.  
However, semi-skilled category includes Cook and Waiter/Bearer.  
Finally, un-skilled category comprises of Agriculturalist, Labourer, and Farmer. 
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of highly qualified, semi-skilled, and high skilled are around 2, 2, and 8 percent respectively, 
although again, the highest shares are represented by the skilled and un-skilled around 44 and 44 
percent respectively in 2000s. 
 
Figure 2.3 Country-wise Emigration (high) from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Country-wise Emigration (low) from Pakistan (1971-2013); Source: BEOE 
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Figure 2.3 and 2.4 shows the emigration from Pakistan broken down by high and low destination 
country for the years 2001 to 2013. The intercept is the average out-migration for the the 30 years 
from 1971 to 2001. Kindom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman 
are  the largest destination countries for Pakistani migrants followed by Bahrain and Kuwait. Post 
2001, there is an increasing trend for migration until 2008 (the era of global economic crisis). 
This shows a fall in migration to the UAE, but migration to Saudi Arabia and Oman remains 
relatively stable. Worker migration to the UAE has declined from 2008 to 2010, which hosts 
almost half of all Pakistani migrants. The drop in migration to the UAE is offset by an increase in 
migration to Saudi Arabia. Labour migration to the European Union, including the UK, tripled 
from 2007 to 2009 (monthly average of 400-600 workers). During that time labour migration to 
the United States is comparatively smaller than other main destinations such as Saudi Arabia and 
UAE. 
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage share of total stock of Pakistani migrants in the main destination 
countries of the world (1971-2013). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC6) constitutes around 
more than 90 percent of the Pakistani Diaspora. Saudi Arabia stands as the largest source for 
Pakistani Diaspora that consists of around 52 percent, whereas, with the United Arab Emirates 
sharing 32 percent of the Pakistani immigrants. Likewise, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain constitute 
around 8, 3, and 2 percent of Pakistani immigrants, respectively. 
Overall, it is apparent that the migration to GCC countries had a strong positive impact not only 
at a household level in rural areas irrespective of it productive versus unproductive uses of 
remittances, but also on the macro-economic indicators, such as GDP growth rates and foreign 
exchange earnings as a result of an increase in employment opportunities. 
                                                             
 
 
6 Countries includes; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
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Figure 2.5 Country-wise share of total stock of Pakistan's Emigrants (1971-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the emigration trends originating from four provinces of Pakistan, namely 
Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan. It is quite evident that migration is not evenly distributed 
across the provinces of Pakistan. The provinces of Punjab and NWFP has comparatively higher 
incidences of migration than Sindh and Balochistan. The contribution of each province Punjab, 
NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan stands at 59, 10, 29 and 2 percent, respectively in the total 
migration from 1981-2013. We also do not find any striking difference by looking at the decade-
wise share of each province in migration; the trends are quite upward sloping with a minimal 
fluctuation for each province. This picture is changing somewhat in recent years, particularly, 
from Sindh and Balochistan. The unskilled and semi-skilled international migration to the Middle 
East mostly comes from upper Punjab, and NWFP regions (particularly from rain-fed) associated 
with low agricultural productivity. However, patterns of migration are quite different for central 
Punjab and the city of Karachi, where more skilled labour usually migrated internationally. 
Likewise, the poorer area of the country, particularly, lower Punjab, Balochistan, and rural Sindh 
account for relatively less migration. 
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Figure 2.6 Province Wise Emigration from Pakistan (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
Figure 2.7 represents the emigration from the four provincial capital cities of Pakistan from 1981 
to 2013. In terms of population, Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan, and Balochistan has 
the lowest population density. Lahore is the provincial capital of Punjab, Karachi (Sindh), 
Peshawar (NWFP) and Quetta (Balochistan). The international migration trends for all cities 
except Quetta show a quite similar pattern, but with different migration magnitudes. In 1981, the 
share of total migration from Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta is around 29, 63, 7, and 0.09 
percent respectively, so Karachi and Lahore city shares more than 90 percent of the international 
migration from the four provincial capital cities. Similarly, the share of migration from Lahore, 
Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta is around 45, 29, 24.5, and 1.50 percent respectively in 2013. 
Lahore’s share in international migration is increased from 29 to 45 percent (an increase of 16 
percent) from 1981 to 2013, Karachi’s share reduces from 63 to 29 percent (a decrease of 34 
percent) and Peshawar’s share is increased from 7 to 24.5 percent (an increase of 17.5 percent) 
from 1981 to 2013. In more than 30 years, Quetta’s share is around 1.5 percent. 
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Figure 2.7 Provincial Capital City-wise Emigration from Pakistan (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
2.4 Remittances overview 
 
In economics term, migration has payoff in terms of remittances.  Remittances are the money that 
migrants earn in a foreign country and then send back to their households, described as ‘Mother’s 
milk for poor nations’ and ‘a free lunch’ (Kapur and McHale 2003). Remittances are an important 
and growing source of foreign exchange for Asia, as 5 of the top 10 emigration countries are in 
Asia (India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines). Not surprisingly, the top 
emigration countries are also among the top remittances-receiving countries (Migration and 
Remittances Factbook (2011): World Bank, Washington, DC).  
The flow of remittances from developed to developing countries remained significant during the 
recession in 2008. Officially recorded remittances to developing countries reached up to $325 
billion in 2010 (in the aftermath of the global financial crisis). The remittance flows to South Asia 
and East Asia increased at a pace of 8.2% and 7.4% respectively in 2010. Worldwide flows of 
remittances grow at rates of 7 to 8% annually during 2011-13 and reached to $404 billion by 
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2014 in developing countries (World Bank Blog). The top recipients of remittances among 
developing countries were India ($58 billion), followed by China ($57 billion), Mexico ($24 
billion), the Philippines ($23 billion), and Pakistan ($12 billion) in 2011. Other large recipients in 
US dollar terms include Bangladesh, Nigeria, Vietnam, Egypt and Lebanon. It follows all top 
remittances receiving countries are lower-middle-income countries (World Bank Migration and 
Development Brief 17). In 2009, 45% of remittance inflows to Pakistan came from Asia, 32% 
from Europe and 22% from North America. Similarly, 73% of Pakistan's migrants are hosted by 
Asia, 17% by Europe and 9% by North America (Human Development Report (HDR), 2009). 
The labour migration to different parts of the world has contributed to worker remittances in 
Pakistan, which have increased significantly in the last decade and were equal to around $14 
billion in 2013. Due to it philanthropic nature, remittances became relevant not only in the 
household economies of migrant families but also contributed to the wider community and the 
national economy. Figure 2.8 shows the trend of total remittances received in Pakistan (in USD 
million, from 1973-2013). There is a noticeable increasing trend of remittances after 2001, which 
may be due to the 9/11 attack that resulted in a crush on informal money transfers such as Hundi 
and Hawala (shift of remittances from informal to formal channels) with the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) and developing international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and 
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). This resulted in better records keeping of financial 
transaction with identity. Other underlying reasons may be a change in the skills composition of 
migrants; an increase in international migration from Pakistan and improved technology and 
infrastructure for money transfers (Western Union; WU) coupled with reductions in the cost of 
sending remittances (more competition between money operators). The establishment of 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and developing international standards on anti-money 
laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) proved a blessing in disguise 
for Pakistan. Many Pakistanis with savings in offshore accounts repatriated their funds in fear of 
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a US-led investigation into terrorist financing. Where remittances increased from around $ 1 
billion in 2000 and exceeded to $ 15 billion in 2014 (Kapur, 2003).  
 
Figure 2.8 Total Remittances Received in Pakistan (1973-2013); Source: Various Pakistan Economic Survey 
 
 
Ultimately, the average annual percentage growth rate of remittances may help to understand its 
importance for each decade for Pakistan. The second half of the 1970s (1973-1980) recorded an 
average annual growth of remittances of around 47 percent, which is a substantial contribution to 
the foreign exchange of the country. The 1980s witnesses a drastic reduction in the average 
annual growth rate of remittances to around 2 percent. The 1990s is registered a negative average 
annual growth rate of around -5.5 percent which is characterized by macroeconomic instability in 
the country and the 1991 Gulf War. The first decade of the millennium proves to be a financial 
blessing for Pakistan, where the average annual growth rate of remittances is second highest 
around 29 percent. The average annual percentage growth rate is around 16 percent in the last 
three years (2011-2013). As such, remittances are emerged as a stable source of capital that 
requires no fees or servicing costs unlike other sources of capital that carry a cost for the 
receiving country, be it interest payments for loans or profit repatriation for investment. Its 
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importance for many receiving households will be clear from the passage of Kapur and McHale 
(2003; 50), “Within the development community, remittances strike the right cognitive chords. 
They fit in with a communitarian, ‘third way’ approach -neither inefficient socialism nor savage 
capitalism- and exemplify the principal of self-help. Immigrants, rather than governments, thus 
become the biggest provider of foreign aid”.  
Clemens and Mackenzie (2014) argue that the surge in remittances is due to measurement errors, 
but not due to changes in real financial flows. Secondly, if these increases were correctly 
measured, cross-country panel regression may have too little power to detect the effect of 
remittances on growth. Third, the greater driver of increase in remittances is increase in 
migration. This study argues that 79% of the growth in remittances received by developing 
countries over the last two decades reflects changes in measurement, with only 21% representing 
changes that can be due to the growth in the migrant stock. Migration and remittances clearly 
have first-order effects on welfare of families, poverty and community development through 
technology transfer, FDI, and trade.   
Figure 2.9 Remittances % of GDP (1976-2013); Source: World Bank 
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The real GDP growth rate provides an understanding of the rate at which the economy is 
growing. The historical trends in GDP growth rate have varied markedly and remained 
unsustainable in Pakistan. In the 1970s, the annual average growth rate in real GDP is around 5.2 
percent, while it is enjoyed higher annual average growth rates of around 6.4 percent across 
sectors when compared with other developing countries in the region in the 1980s. The average 
annual growth rate remained positive but more volatile in the early to mid-1990s, and the 
economy has undergone a noticeable slowdown and stagnation since the mid-1990s with a 
growth rate of around 4.5 percent in the 1990s. Yet again it fells to around 3.5 percent in first half 
of the 2000s.   
However, remittances as a percentage of GDP specify the contribution of remittances in the 
overall income of the country which is the most significant source of foreign exchange earnings 
for Pakistan. Figure 2.9 specifies the contribution of remittances in overall GDP of Pakistan. The 
significance of remittances to the share of GDP is quite apparent in the figure, especially in the 
1970s and 1980s. As a proportion of GDP, average annual remittances elapses from 6.5 percent 
in the 1970s to 7.2 percent in the 1980s. Even in some years, annual remittances contribution 
surpasses more than 10 percent of the GDP. Since the 1990s, average annual remittances records 
a declining trend to 2.3 percent of GDP. Key drivers contributing to the decline in worker 
remittances may be the decline in oil prices, the slowing down of economic activities particularly 
in the Gulf region, increased competition with other labour exporting countries and the freezing 
of foreign-currency accounts. Average annual remittances steadily increases in the years 2000-10 
to around 4.2 percent of GDP. The average annual remittances are again second highest in the last 
three years (2011-13) at 6.5 percent over the last two decades. Remittance receipts to Pakistan 
were about 4.2% of GDP in 2008 with the surge in remittances to Pakistan mainly coming from 
host countries in Gulf. Remittances from Saudi Arabia, UAE and GCC countries tripled from 
2005-06 to 2008-09, but remittances from USA, UK and Europe are only increased moderately. 
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The remittances are important not only for the receiving household but also have grown to be an 
important source of foreign exchange earnings for many developing countries. In almost all South 
Asian countries, remittances relative to GDP and exports have grown significantly over the last 
few decades. At a macro-level, the indirect effect of remittances on the exchange rate results in an 
appreciation of currency, which may make exports less competitive in the international market. 
The remittance receiving countries may experience a ‘Dutch disease’ problem with the allocation 
of labour moves away from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector due to real exchange 
appreciation and loss of international competitiveness. An implication of remittances at a 
household-level suggests that it is smooth consumption through an increase in disposable income. 
Regardless of the ‘Dutch disease’ problem the remittances have helped to build up international 
reserves and have provided a cushion against external shocks during the global economic crisis in 
low-income countries. 
Figure 2.10 Remittances as % of Total Export (1973-2002); Source: (Guzdar, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.10 represents the share of remittances as a percentage of total exports from Pakistan 
which ranges from 11.5 percent to 107 percent of export earnings over the past three decades. 
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From 1983, remittances as a percent of export earnings decline until the year 2000. In 1970s, the 
annual average percentage share of remittances to exports is around 47 percent, while the highest 
annual average percentage share of remittances to the export is around 75 percent in the 1980s. 
However, its share remains positive but more volatile in the 1990s, and the economy has 
undergone a noticeable slowdown and stagnation with a share around 20 percent in the 1990s. 
Remittances have been an important source of foreign exchange, especially in the balance of 
payments for developing countries since the 1970’s. In the 1980, Pakistan received remittances 
equal to 82% of its total exports and 38% of its total imports. Similarly in 1985, Pakistan received 
97.2% of its total exports and 43.8% of its imports. In 1990, the share of remittance is 40.4% of 
its total exports and 26.9% of its imports. The trade deficits in many developing countries have 
been largely offset by remittances in 2009.  
Figure 2.11 Remittances and FDI in Million US$ (1976-2012); Source: World Bank 
 
 
FDI inflows are larger than remittance's receipts in developing countries. This is not the case in 
Pakistan; remittance receipts have been much greater than FDI since 1975, except in 2007. In 
fact, FDI is strongly correlated with economic growth for many countries by adding to their 
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capital stock. The stock of FDI in any country is determined by many factors such as law and 
order, infrastructure development, regional trade agreements, multilateral trade openness and host 
country institutions. Figure 2.11 shows the relative contribution of remittances and FDI in the 
Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, the volume of remittances compensates the shortfall in FDI. 
However, the nature and significance of FDI and remittances is quite different for the overall 
contribution to the economy. 
Figure 2.12 Official Remittances from Countries of Origin (1998-2012); Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
 
 
Figure 2.12 provide a breakdown of the remittances received in Pakistan by  country of origin. 
The country-wise share of remittances suggests that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, the UK and 
other GCC countries are the major contributors to  Pakistan. However, the relative share of 
remittances from the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE account for around two thirds of the total 
remittances. Over the period 1998 to 2012, the average share of remittances from Saudi Arabia 
stands at 23 percent, the US at 22 percent, the UAE at 18 percent, other GCC countries at 14 
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percent, and  the UK at 8.5 percent. Saudi Arabia shows a steady growth in remittances from 
2001 and a sharp increase after 2010, but the US emerges as the single largest source of official 
remittances from 2001 to 2008. The remittances from the US shows a minimal decline following 
the global financial recession in 2008, otherwise remittances from all other major countries were 
resilient to the recession.   
In the 1970s and 1980s, the average annual share in total remittances from the US remains around 
5 percent which increased to 9.7 percent in the 1990s. From the UK, the average annual share of 
remittances are around 12.7 percent in 1970s. Comparatively, the annual average share of 
remittnaces are around 47 percent from Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, around 15.6 percent from the 
UAE during the 1970s, and similarly around 5 percent from the Kuwait in the 1970s (Iqbal and 
Sattar 2010). 
The overall picture from the above overview of migration and remittances sheds a light on the 
importance of remittances not only for the country but also for the receiving households. It can be 
concluded that migration and remittances have more than doubled since the last decade in 
Pakistan. The increase in remittances originated mostly from developed countries, especially 
from the US and the Gulf. However, migration to the Middle East remains important not only 
from the viewpoint of those who migrated (mostly migration to the Middle East comes from rural 
areas), but also for its primary effects on the remittance receiving households and as well 
secondary effects on the economy. From the perspective of microeconomics, migration to 
developed countries or the Middle East clearly proved to be the complex  poverty reducing 
mechanism, through the remittance's direct or indirect effect on the receiving household and on 
the rural economy as whole. At a macro-level, remittances became a permanent source of foreign 
exchange earnings for the capital deficient country.  
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2.5 The study area for chapter four and five 
 
To understand the determinants of internal and international migration covered in chapter four, it 
is important to examine the nature and role of the rural economy especially, the districts covered 
in the study. Pakistan is the sixth largest populous country in the world. It is located in South Asia 
with an estimated population of about 184.35 million in 2013, with an average inflation rate of 
8.03 percent from 1957 to 2014. The average unemployment rate is 5.4 percent from 1985 to 
2013. Punjab represents 56% of the population, while Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan have 
roughly 20%, 19% and 5%, respectively (According to population census of 1998). Besides it, 
geopolitical importance in the region, it covers a total area of around 197 million acres. Around 
27 percent of the surface area consists of cultivated land; 11 percent goes to cultivable waste, and 
4.5% are under forest, adding up to the total of 42.5 percent.  The remaining 57.5 percent of the 
surface area consists of mountains and deserts which are unsuitable for any types of farming or 
forestry activities.  
The country historically is an agro-based economy with agriculture accounting for 21.4 percent of 
GDP and employing 45 percent of the labour force in 2013. Almost 64 percent of the population 
resides in rural areas and rely directly and indirectly on food and fibre crops, livestock, dairy, 
fisheries, horticulture, orchards, and forestry (Faruqee, 1999). Agriculture is the largest source of 
foreign exchange earnings (70 percent of the foreign exchange through exports of raw, semi-
processed, and processed commodities) and meets the raw material needs of the country’s major 
industries; namely, textiles and sugar. Similarly, manufacturing and the industrial sector 
contribute around 25.55 percent of GDP and employ 20.10 percent of the labour force. Economic 
output is now dominated by the services sector which accounts for 44.60% of GDP and employs 
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35.70% of the labour force7. During the past two decades the livestock sector has grown steadily, 
and it now contributes about half of the agricultural share of GDP. 
The contribution of the four provinces, namely Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan stands at 
57 percent, 27.5 percent, 8 percent, and 3 percent respectively to Pakistan’s GDP in 2009. The 
agricultural sector contributes more than half of the country’s GDP in rural areas where 
approximately 85 percent of country’s population resided in the 1950s. Rural poverty, although 
less visible, is more prevalent than urban poverty. Another striking feature of the rural economy 
is landless households that represent over 20 percent and mostly work as seasonal labourers in the 
agricultural sector under the authority of a big landlord and can hardly afford hand to mouth 
living.  
Figure 2.13 The districts covered in the study; Source: Rosen (2007: 98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other major activities of rural households include livestock and informal business, work in 
industries sector, internal- and -international migration, but migration is associated with initial 
cost to finance travelling, accommodation, to look for work. The other characteristics include 
                                                             
 
 
7 From the various issues of the Pakistan Economic Survey   
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worse human development indexes and deteriorating living conditions due to weather vagaries, 
poor access to basic needs (health, education and absence of a social net), biased behaviour of 
formal capital market towards small farmers, cumbersome mechanisms of loan application and so 
on. These are all unavoidable circumstances for rural households resulting in chronic poverty of 
41 percent in 1963-64, rising to 55 percent in 1969-70, private sector led economy in the sixties 
(Chaudhry, et al. 2006). However, the incidence of poverty could have been worse without the 
‘green revolution package’ (high yield variety seed, pesticides, insecticides, tube-well and 
tractor).  
The migration to the oil-rich Gulf region took off in early 1970s. The main destinations were 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates; other destinations include Iran, Iraq, Qatar, 
Bahrain and Oman. The majority of the migrants come from the rural areas (63%) and most of 
them were employed as construction workers (Guzdar, 2003). However, the era of the 1980s was 
associated with liberalization, deregulation and denationalization policies bundled with immense 
foreign remittances and substantial foreign assistance due to the Afghan war. This was followed 
by a debt crisis in the 1990s and privatization coupled with excessive government borrowings, 
sluggish growth, and fall in remittances in 2000s.  
 
Higher concentrations of the most deprived households occur predominately in desert zones, 
steep hill areas, and area with endowment of natural resources8. The other striking common 
features include fewer employment opportunities (non-farm employment opportunities and only 
seasonal demand for labour), restricted access to social services (education and health), and non-
existence of infrastructure (road networks to market, irrigation system, electricity, access to basic 
input, and tenure system). These are severely segregated areas with a lower population density, 
                                                             
 
 
8 This includes the fourth province of Pakistan (Balochistan), which was not covered in the data collection.  
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less fertile land, and subsistence farming associated with low productivity and ignoble economic 
activity, which leads to substantial seasonal and annual variation in household income. Besides 
the subsistence-farming households in hill and desert areas are reliant on the livestock sector. The 
role of farm credit is apparently inevitable for sustainable agriculture. However, rural households 
have been severely restricted by the dearth of the credit market. Therefore, the household turns to 
informal credit sources such as; friends, relatives, landlords and commission agents for internal 
and international migration to minimise risks, diversify income earnings and to overcome 
financial constraints through remittances. These characteristics are most apparent in all surveyed 
districts except Faisalabad, a relatively prosperous district that makes the case study an 
interesting one in terms of investigating the relative deprivation argument in explaining 
migration. The following is the brief description of the selected districts in Pakistan. 
 
Figure 2.14 shows total international migrants stock from the four districts Dir (NWFP), 
Faisalabad and Attock (Punjab), and Badin (Sindh) covered in the survey from 1981 to 2013. The 
stock of international migrants has more than doubled since 2003 to 2013. Over the last ten years, 
the international number of migrants has increased from 135,142 to 269,044 (50%) from Dir 
district. Similarly, the number of migrants from Faisalabad, Attock and Badin has increased from 
86,517 to 187,688 (46%), 44,546 to 113,586 (40%), and 1,874 to 3,859 in 2013 (48%), 
respectively. The migration flows from these areas have considerable impacts not only on 
households, but also on their respective districts. However, it is quite difficult to estimate the true 
stock of internal migrants for each district. For this reason mostly studies rely on micro-studies 
based on survey data for internal migration. 
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Figure 2.14 District wise total stock of migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
2.5.1 Faisalabad district 
 
 Punjab is the biggest province of the country in term of population and contribution of the 
agricultural sector in the GDP. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and employment in 
rural areas. High levels of poverty in rural areas are closely linked with low growth of the 
agricultural sector over the past decade (Mubin, et al., 2013). Faisalabad is one of the districts in 
Punjab province, which was developed as a hub for agro-based industries. It is a comparatively a 
more prosperous district and included in the panel survey as a control. Faisalabad is the third 
largest city in Pakistan after Karachi and Lahore, with an estimated population of 2.6 million.  
For example, a large number of industries such as; wheat grinds and cotton ginning units (four 
flour mills, textile mills, twelve ginning and six engineering units) were localized in 1947. 
However, post-independence, the city was transformed with the support of the Government from 
basically an agro-based industrial city with its original base of power looms and textile 
processing to city with the largest concentration of chemical plants and manmade fibre producing 
mills in the country. Now, it hosts a variety of other industries, including sugar, fertilizer, 
chemical, engineering and steel, rubber, leather tanning, vegetable oil and paint factories. 
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        Figure 2.15 District Faisalabad (Punjab Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
Approximately, 70% of textile exports originate from Faisalabad. Lower Chenab canal is the 
main source of irrigation water, which meets the requirements of 80% of the cultivated land. 
Approximately 47 percent of the population lives in urban areas while around 53 percent reside in 
rural areas (According to the population census of 1998). Most of the rural households engage in 
farming activities with cotton and wheat as its major crops, along with fruit production and 
livestock rearing. The key reason for the inclusion of this comparatively prosperous district was 
to make it as a reference category. The nature of this reference category provided us with an 
opportunity to test the argument of relative deprivation9 of the household leading to internal and 
international migration. Figure 2.15 provides an overview of historical migration from Faisalabad 
                                                             
 
 
9 Coined by Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991); Stark and Bloom (1985) to point out the main push factor behind internal and internal 
migration. 
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province. The number of migrants shows a steady upward trend since 2003. The annual number 
of migrants is increased from 4,695 in 2004 to around 21,810 in 2013. The total number of 
international migrants stands at around 187,688 until 2013. It emerges that households in 
Faisalabad district are more engaged to participate in migration decisions through sending their 
family member to work internationally.       
 
2.5.2 Attock district 
 
Attock district is a part of the Punjab province. It lies in the barani zone of the province. 
However, it is famous for Attock fort10 and serves as a joining point for the Kabul River (flows 
east out of Afghanistan) and the Indus River (flows northeast of Kalabagh), where Kabul River 
ultimately falls into Indus River. Geographically, the district is mainly hills, plateaus and 
dissected plains. The urban area constitutes 21 percent of the district population, while the rural 
area has 79 percent of the population (Pakistan population census of 1998). The rural household 
engages in farming activities, livestock, and poultry as a basic source of income, where fodder 
deficiency is a serious concern. The agriculture production entirely relies on rainfall due to the 
nature of its barani land. For example, favourable weather results in a bumper crop for the 
households and bad weather results in crop failure that leaves household income uncertain. 
Household average landholding equals 9.6 acres in the district. However, only 14 percent of the 
households owns landholding of over 150 acres11. The Government of Pakistan has completed 26 
mini-dams and 10 small dams to overcome the deficiency of irrigated water in order to boost 
agricultural productivity.  The Hydro Power Station of Ghazi-Brotha is also located in the district 
                                                             
 
 
10 Emperor Akbar the Great, the grandson of Babar, recognizing the strategic importance of this area in 1581 to build his famous 
Attock Fort 
11 Land concentration has actually declined over the period 1980 –2000. But, a small number of households still own large land-
holdings. Land reforms have had little redistributive effect. Because of high prices of agricultural land, it is uncommon in rural 
Pakistan for tenants to buy land. 
 
 
46 
 
with electricity generation capacity of 1450 Mega-Watts. Attock Refinery Limited (ARL) is the 
pioneer in crude oil refining in the country where one-third of the country's oil is produced. The 
main crops of the rural household includes wheat, ground nut, maize and fruits (including citrus, 
guava, apricot) in addition to livestock rearing. Almost 10 percent of the total area is under forest, 
although it has around 52 medium, and small industrial units to engage surplus labour from rural 
area. Attock is accessible to large cities such as Rawalpindi and Peshawar by motorway and rail 
12.    
Figure 2.16 District Attock (Punjab Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
The following Figure 2.16 shows the international migration from the Attock district in Punjab 
province. The annual number of migrants increases from 2,868 in 2004 to 7,823 in 2013. 
However, the highest annual number of migrants around 13,798 is recorded in the year 2008. 
Except for the year 2008, the international migrant trend shows an increasing trend over the years 
in Attock district. 
                                                             
 
 
12 Directorate of Industries, Punjab (Attock Pre-Investment Study – 2012) 
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2.5.3 Badin district 
 
Sindh is the second largest province in the country in terms of population and agricultural area. 
Badin is the district in the Sindh province with a population in excess of one million population 
and covers 6,726 Square Km of fertile plain's land mostly irrigated from the Kotri and Sukkar 
barrage. Only 16 percent of the population lives in urban areas while 84 percent of the population 
is rural. The net cropped area is 0.66 million acres out of the total cultivable area of 2.8 million 
acres, mainly due to the lack of canal irrigation water and erratic rain fall (Lohano, 2009). Many 
of the farming households were adversely affected by the shortage of water supply leaving many 
in an extreme poverty trap due to the lack of an efficient network of tributaries, channels and 
watercourses. Rural areas in Badin are badly affected by waterlogging, salinity and lack of pure 
drinking water. It is a home of medium and large farming households where 57 percent of the 
households own on average above 25 acres of landholding. Farming is the main economic 
activity for many households in the district with sugarcane, rice, cotton, wheat and sunflower as 
the major crops whilst the rearing of cattle, fishing and agro-based industries account for the 
second largest source of income for households13. An industrial estate was established on an area 
of 30 acres in 1986, although it did not attract the attention of investors. The Badin has 
established itself as a sugarcane estate with more than seven large sugar mills, 79 rice husking 
mills and about 100 flour mills creating employment for the rural workforce. 
The share of livestock accounts for roughly one-third of agricultural production and it is also used 
for farm operations such as ploughing. Similarly, the contribution of the marine fish stands at 
                                                             
 
 
13 The discussion follows from the fascinating and comprehensive report prepared by “District Government Badin”( A Framework 
for Sustainable Development, ‘District Vision Badin’ District Government Badin; Government of Sindh, Pakistan), and another 
prepared by “Planning & Development Department Government of Sindh”( Sindh Vision 2030: Planning & Development 
Department Government of Sindh, Pakistan). For more comprehensive details consult it.    
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about 10 percent of the total fish exports in the country. However, its share of fresh waters 
fisheries stands at 17.5 percent of the total production. Similarly, the district has gas and oil 
reservoirs. The major petroleum discovery in the district was made in 1981 through the foreign 
company called BP Pakistan Exploration and Production Inc. (BP), with six more oil wells and 
six gas discoveries recorded up to 1986. To date BP has discovered 61 oil and gas wells. The oil 
and gas share stands at 44 percent and 8 percent respectively, of the total production in the 
country.  The average daily crude oil production was recorded to be 20,931 barrels, 24,002 
barrels and 25,762 barrels in 1995, 1996, and 1997 respectively. The oil and gas industry created 
employment opportunities for the residing households, but it still is a predominantly agricultural 
economy.  
Badin District is regularly exposed to natural calamities, which have resulted in more chronic 
poverty in the district. Theses natural calamities include cyclones in 1964/1965, heavy rain fall in 
1964/65, heavy rainfall in 1973, floods during 1988, torrential rainfall in 1994, an earthquake in 
2001 and floods in 2003. Despite its economic potential within the country, it is still the poorest 
district. Overall, agriculture is the largest source of employment for the household and 
consequently agro-based industries heavily rely on this sector. Ultimately, the fluctuation in 
agricultural production has an ability to upset the ecosystem not only of labour markets but also 
affects many households associated with it. The conditions even get considerably worse for rural 
households in an absence of inadequate credit facilities. This is quite apparent with only two 
branches of Zarai Tarqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) in the district. A large proportion of defaulter 
households reside in the district due to a high incidence of natural disasters resulting in tough 
criteria for banks to lend. In an area where subsistence-level agriculture is prevalent, livestock 
rearing and poultry farming become a crucial part of economic life by supplementing household 
income. Lately, however, crop yields in the district have been low. This is attributed to many 
factors including lack of research, low availability of quality crop seed and land degradation 
(waterlogging and salinity) caused by inappropriate farming practices.  
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Figure 2.17 District Badin (Sindh Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
The total number of international migrants is comparatively lower than the other districts covered 
in the survey. Overall, annual international migration is less than a thousand. The annual number 
of migrants is 115 in 2004 and increases to 353 in 2013. In 2008, the annual number of migrants 
is around 461, which is one of the highest registered migrant counts during the last ten years.  
2.5.4 Dir district 
 
NWFP is the third largest province in the country in terms of population. The province is land-
scarce (steep hill areas) and crop productivity is low and riskier due to inadequate irrigation water 
availability. However, 83% of the population lives in rural areas in the province. Dir is one of the 
districts of NWFP that was merged with Pakistan in 1969. It was declared as a district in 1970, 
which was further divided into Upper and Lower Dir districts in 1996. The majority of the 
households participate in agriculture, both crop cultivation and animal husbandry, which is a 
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primary source of income for more than 90 percent of the population residing in rural areas (The 
Pakistan population census of 1998). The contribution of the agricultural sector in the household 
income is less than 40 percent. Animal husbandry is a driving force in all the farming activity and 
crop cultivation is as much dominated by the need for livestock feed during winter season as by 
the basic food requirements of the family.  
Figure 2.18 District Dir (NWFP Province) Migration (1981-2013); Source: BEOE 
 
 
The average size of landholding is not sufficient for the households to even meet their subsistence 
needs given the large family sizes14. In winter whole area remains snow covered, thus double 
cultivation is not possible and crop yields are unpredictable. The infrastructure is comparatively 
less developed, and it does not have any large industries due to its distance from sources of raw 
                                                             
 
 
14 Farms in the project are generally small: below one Hectare on average, with about 70 per cent of the farms included in this 
segment. 
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materials and markets. The presence of micro-enterprise activities in the district is limited to the 
urban areas and is mainly non-manufacturing in nature15. 
The high mountains and forest with mostly Barani land dominate topography of the district. The 
main river is Panjkopra, which originates from Dir Kohistan. The supply of water is not enough 
to meet the demands of irrigation needs of the land due to a highly inefficient network of 
tributaries, channels and watercourses. However, heavy reliance on the agricultural sector for 
employment has shifted to the non-agricultural sector since 1980s. The non-agricultural sector 
activities are dominated by migration (internal and international) and engagement of households 
in semi-skilled work such as transport and construction. Overall, the stock of internal and 
international migrants accounted for 12 percent of the total population in the district. 
Furthermore, the migrant households are almost entirely dependent on migrant worker's 
remittances. 
The other striking feature is a very scattered settlement pattern of the district. The households 
lived in about 1900 settlements with only 43 percent of them having more than 50 households 
and just over one-third of all settlements containing more than 500 people. The vast majority of 
the poor are small landowners, sharecropping tenants and landless labourers. The unemployment 
rate in the district was measured at 37.1% in 1998.  The poverty rates, which had fallen 
substantially in the 1980s and early 1990s, started to rise again towards the end of the decade. In 
2004-05, 33% of the population was living below the poverty line.  Figure 2.18 shows the annual 
number of international migrants in Dir district. The number of international migrants is 
comparatively higher than the other districts covered in the survey. The annual number of 
international migrants stands at 5,029 in 2004 and increases to around 25,882 in 2012. 
                                                             
 
 
15 See for more details the document of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Dir Area support Project. The 
project targets the following five areas: (i) Agricultural development (including crop's development, livestock development and 
irrigation) (ii) community and women’s development (iii) roads development (iv) employment generation and (v) the Project 
Management Unit (PMU). The project targets the very poor households with landholding below one hectare on average, which 
accounts for the 70 percent of the farms included in this segment.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
Review of Literature 
 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature related to the four chapters contained in this 
thesis. In particular, it outlines the important advancement in the existing body of knowledge on 
migration and remittances. The areas of migration and remittances are so tightly intertwined with 
each other. This overlapping concept distinct depending on the different nature of research 
questions set for each chapter in the following discussion. For the ease of simplicity, my study 
will present the review of literature for chapter four under section 3.1. This is followed by a 
section 3.2 with a general overview of literature relevant to the determinants of remittances. 
Section 3.3 presents the literature related to multilevel analysis. Finally, section 3.4 outlines the 
literature of the multiplier or peer effects.             
3.1 Chapter four review of the literature 
 
3.1.1 Background 
 
A history of the early contribution to the scientific study of migration begins with influential 
work of Sjaastad’s cost-benefit analysis of migration (Sjaastad, 1962) and Harris and Todaro’s 
(Harris and Todaro, 1969) model of migration and unemployment focuses on rural-to-urban 
migration. The driving force behind the rural out-migration in the Harris-Todaro model is lack of 
employment opportunities, natural calamities (such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes, etc.), 
non-existence of a well- functioning capital market (e.g. absence of insurance markets) and the 
reliance on subsistence farming in rural areas. Reliance on subsistence farming has affected the 
local and household economy throughout developing countries. Households in modern, especially 
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low-income developing countries are particularly exposed to these income shocks for the 
aforementioned reasons and poor households need to save as a precaution against downturn risk. 
As a result, the wealth choices for poor households16 may be necessary to avoid the risk 
associated with expected income. In migration economics, numerous theoretical and empirical 
studies focus on households’ abilities to cope with these shocks through either migrating 
internally or internationally.  
In the last decade there has been an increasing body of research focused on international 
migration; such as, Massey et al. (1993) ‘Theories of international migration: a review and 
appraisal’, Castles et al. (2005) ‘The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World’ and Massey and Taylor (2004) ‘International Migration: Prospects and 
Policies in a Global Market’ and so on. More recently concerns over job losses and excessive 
immigration in developed countries have provided some impetus to the study of international 
migration (Czika, 2012)17. It is a much-debated topic in developed countries due to different 
social and economic concerns over immigration (Skeldon, 2006)18. 
In contrast, the literature on both internal and international migration is rather less developed; 
most rely either on internal or international migration while not taking into account both types of 
migration in a single study due to the non-availability of suitable data, different disciplinary 
background of researchers, different analytical techniques, and different research agendas that 
                                                             
 
 
16 The selected districts in the survey were poorest districts of Pakistan except Faisalabad, a prosperous district, which 
was chosen as a reference category. 
17 This paper uses the National Sample Survey of 2008 to study the likelihood of Indian out-migration (internal plus 
international) through disentangling the concept of relative deprivation by distinguishing feelings of individual and 
collective relative deprivation as sources of individual aspirations. For the likelihood of intra-state movements, both 
individual and collective relative deprivations are strong predictors. However, the likelihood of out-migration towards 
international destinations is significantly higher for households with lower levels of individual and collective relative 
deprivation. Our results are consistent that poor households or relative deprived households have stronger probability 
of out-migration either internally or internationally.    
18 This study tries to create a stronger link between internal and international migration in the Asian region. Internal 
and international migrations are integrated, and it is necessary to consider them as a unified system rather than in 
isolation. The hierarchical movements link richer and poorer groups together and need to be understood in the context 
of the implementation of programmes of poverty alleviation. By attempting to link internal and international 
migration, this paper emphasises for a more integrated framework for the study of migration.   
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reflect different policy concerns and funding sources (King and Skeldon 2010). But our 
perspective is the one from a developing country. The existing literature on migration in Pakistan 
also focuses either on internal or international migration, without taking into account both at the 
same time19. In recent years, there is only one study by Oda (2008), which used a multinomial 
logit model to investigate households’ decision on migration choices.  
Another study by Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) uses International Labour Organization’s and Asian 
Regional Team for Employment Promotion (ILO-ARTEP) survey data to study the determinants 
of the preference of self-employment among returned migrants. The returned migrants with high 
savings choose self-employment while other with low saving prefers wage-employment. It is 
concluded that return migration in Pakistan leads to small business development. The study finds 
a negative relationship between remittances, savings and loan obligations to immediate family. 
This implies that the initial cost to finance migration through family requires a subsequent 
repayment. The extended family plays an important role in financing migration cost and sharing 
the benefits of migration through inter-household public goods financed by remittances. The 
higher the cost of migration, the higher demand will be for loans to finance the migration, which 
leads pre-migration wealth to fall. Further, savings retained abroad and remittances to immediate 
family both fall with the pre-migration loan. This study is restrictive for not including the control 
group of non-migrant households and secondly the study may have a ‘self-selection’ problem 
related to the decision of returning home (family health problem, retirement or hard to find new 
work contact).  
There is a mixed opinion among the different researchers related to the productive use of 
remittances in Pakistan. A study by Amjad (1986) shows that remittances used for investment 
rose from 13% of total remittances in the 1980s to 30-35% in 1986. It also finds that most of the 
                                                             
 
 
19 As Guzdar (2003; ii) writes “In general, there is a need for more in-depth and focused policy-oriented research on 
both internal and international migration in Pakistan”. 
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remittances were spent on consumption good, consumer durables, buying land and building 
houses. Subsequently, Tsakok (1982) finds that, 62% of remittances were used for consumption, 
13% for the purchase of houses and construction of new houses; and 25 % were used for 
agricultural, industrial, commercial and financial investment in the 1980s. There is also a mixed 
opinion amongst the researchers about the impact of remittances on poverty and rural household 
income in Pakistan. For example, Abbasi and Irfan (1983) used the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES-1979) and finds that remittances contribute to unequal income or 
worsen the disparity of wealth in Pakistan. On the other hand, Adams (1991) uses household level 
panel data of three provinces in Pakistan to conclude that remittances are well distributed among 
rural households. Nishat and Bilgrami (1993) is one of the few empirical studies on the issues of 
migration and remittances. They surveyed 7,061 returned migrants from Kuwait and Iraq due to 
the Gulf crisis in 1990. This study finds that education, self-interest, family support, capital 
accumulation, level of skill and businesses are main determinants of remittances in Pakistan.   
Recently, Ahmed et al. (2010) used the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES, 2004-05) 
survey data of Pakistan to study the link between remittances and poverty. At the macro-level, 
fall in remittances leads to a fall in investment and consumption thereby increasing poverty. 
However, at the micro-level, it finds that the probability of households becoming poor decreases 
by 12.7% if they receive remittances. The study of Amjad and Kemal (1997) uses time-series data 
of 1960-90 and finds that international remittances significantly reduced poverty in Pakistan. 
Similarly, Abbasi and Irfan (1983) highlight the importance of remittances for receiving 
households in terms of school enrolments in both urban and rural area. They find that school 
enrolment between boys and girls was higher for remittance receiving households than the non-
migrant households. Recently, a Kock and Sun (2012) paper tries to answer the question as to 
why remittances in Pakistan have gone up and what were the factors responsible for its growth. 
The paper’s key findings are as follows; first, it is due to an increase in worker migration in 
recent years and second it is due to more skilled than unskilled migration. In Pakistan, the 
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research lacks fundamental issues relating to household level determinants of both internal and 
international migration in a single study to separate two competing choices. However, the studies 
have been conducted to separate out the macro and micro-level impact of remittances. At the 
macro-level, remittances are the stable and valuable source of foreign exchange earnings, 
especially for the countries, which have largely experienced negative current account balances 
(Ratha, 2006). The nature of data is a major concern with this kind of studies. These studies use 
only the official data (the money sent through formal channel and informal remittances are not 
recorded), so it is very difficult or impossible to accurately measure the true size of remittances 
flows. At the micro level, a number of studies have been conducted in Pakistan, particularly on 
the impact of remittances on well-being and poverty reduction of the recipient households. 
3.1.2 General overview of the migration literature 
 
Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) provided a rigorous theoretical framework, which 
presented a two-sector model of rural-to-urban migration. This approach assumed that an 
individual migrates to the urban sector from the rural sector when the ‘expected income’ in the 
urban sector is greater than the rural sector. Todaro (1969) theoretically showed that migration is 
the response due to income differential between rural and urban sectors, but did not account for 
changes to the welfare of the rural sector after migration because the loss of productivity in the 
rural sector could have potentially large implications on overall growth in less-developed 
countries. The Harris-Todaro model (1970) was the first theoretical model, which considered the 
welfare aspect of migration and used a static framework consisting of risk-averse individuals. 
Subsequently, Borjas (1987, 1989) applied the Harris-Todaro model of internal migration with 
some modification to international migration. Similarly, Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) made 
slight modifications in the neo-classical model by assuming migration as an investment in human 
capital and further included the cost and risks of migration in order to explain migration 
selectivity. The neo-classical migration theory and Harris and Todaro models argued 
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geographical differences in expected income and wages as major drivers for migration. De Haas 
(2010) argues that the Harris-Todaro model didn’t take into account other factors such as strong 
networks which usually migrant’s share, labour market, power inequalities, policies, states and 
social group formation. These factors strongly affect individual decisions to migrate or choices of 
migration destinations.  
The new economics of labour migration (NELM) developed by Stark and Bloom (1985) and 
Stark (1991) tried to counter the narrow focus of neoclassical models of migration. The NELM 
argues that migration is difficult to explain within a neo-classical framework, particularly under 
conditions of poverty and risk. Furthermore, NELM disagreed with the conventional neo-classical 
models that migration is the outcome of an individual’s decision to maximize income into well-
functioning markets based on the rational cost-benefit calculation. NELM hypothesizes that 
migration is a collective household strategy to spread income risk associated with market failures 
rather than the only response of income-maximizing individuals to expected wage differentials 
(Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark and Taylor, 1989, 1991). The NELM 
explains that migration is not the outcome of an individual’s decision to migrate but that of the 
household in which, people act collectively not only to maximize expected income but also to 
minimize risks and to overcome the constraints associated with a variety of market failures (such 
as capital and insurance market that are imperfect, inaccessible, or non-existent). Given these 
sorts of market failures, which are common in developing countries, people migrate not only to 
reap a higher benefit but also to manage risk and gain access to capital. Unlike individuals, 
households are in a better position to diversify their allocation of labour to control risks to their 
economic wellbeing. In the event of crop failure in rural areas or other natural calamities, the 
household can rely on migrant remittances for support. NELM also argues that relative 
deprivation and income inequality within sending societies are major drivers of migration 
(Skeldon 2002; Stark and Taylor 1989).  
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The recent literature on migration determinants is dominated by household level studies unlike in 
the past when individuals were the main focus. Such studies have tried to relate migration to a 
host of household level variables, such as the education, gender, age of the head of the household 
and landholding of household, etc. The use of longitudinal data has the ability to highlight the 
migration decision-making process. The research conducted within the area of migration is 
dominated by research on Mexico. The empirical analysis of Stark and Taylor (1989) supports the 
view that relative deprivation in rural Mexico play a significant role in the decision of poor 
Mexicans to migrate to the USA. Migration is an effective tool for achieving income gains by 
migrant sending households. In addition, controlling for absolute income gains, the probability 
that households participate in migration is directly related to the household’s initial relative 
deprivation.  Similarly, Lipton (1980) and Stahl (1982) argue that migration is an expensive 
decision due to the cost that is associated with it and therefore, is only accessible to economically 
better-off households, particularly for international migration. It may be concluded that there is 
lack of consensus amongst researchers in explaining migration, which might have resulted in 
different socio-economic factors depending upon either absolute deprivation or economically 
better-off households.   
A structural model of migration for rural Tunisia by Hay (1980) is a simplified version of a 
microeconomic model describing the relationship between migration behaviour based on rural 
and urban earnings and individuals characteristics. This paper argues that schooling, job skills, 
and work experience affect the probability of migration. However, the rate of return to these 
investments in human capital differs between the rural and urban sectors. King and Skeldon 
(2010) argue that the literature of migration is dominated by micro and macroeconomic studies. 
However, micro-level studies are further divided into internal and international migration, which 
is characterized by different literatures, concepts and policy agendas. Despite the fact that internal 
migration is more important but scholars nowadays is paying more attention to international 
migration. The distinction between internal and international migration is not clear due to 
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globalization, geopolitical events and the changing nature of borders. The study of migration 
without the reference of internal to international migration may result in a partial analysis because 
there is a considerable potential at both theoretical and empirical levels for bringing together the 
study of internal and international level migration. Furthermore, internal and international 
migration decision-making processes by the individual or household are influenced by a different 
set of economic, social, political and cultural factors.  
The relationship between internal and international migration has not been sufficiently 
highlighted, identifying similarities and differences between the two types of migration. 
However, Light and Johnston (2009), and Finney and Simpson (2009) try to link internal 
migration with international migration within the frame of overall migration. These studies find 
that internal migration usually leads to international migration. Furthermore, international and 
internal migration may be alternative responses to available opportunities; the migrant’s selection 
between internal and international migration may also be dependent on opportunities. To consider 
one form of migration without the other will result in a partial and unbalanced result (Skeldon 
2006). In another study, Findley (1997) writes that the migrant’s characteristics depend on 
economic, political, cultural and local conditions. But there are important variations across 
different countries and communities. Conceptually, according to the above-mentioned research, 
both types of migration, internal and international, derive from the different set of socio-
economic factors, which includes inequalities in regional development, employment 
opportunities, incomes and living conditions, law and order conditions, infrastructure facilities, 
health and education, between and within countries. Internal and international migration is thus 
complementary and can indeed supplement or substitute each other. According to Czika (2012), 
the links between internal and international migration have recently begun to attract attention 
from the policy makers to disentangle underlying factors and forces. 
3.1.3 The relationship between landholding and migration 
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A number of studies have examined the relationship between household landholding and 
migration, but still it lacks unanimity regarding the relationship. The studies that finds a negative 
relationship between migration and landholding includes; Nabi (1982), Hoddinott (1994), Massey 
et al. (1990), and Zhang and Song (2003). The Nabi (1982) research finds a negative relationship 
between internal migration and landholding in three villages of the Punjab province in Pakistan. 
Haddinott’s (1994) migration model included both individual- and -household level 
characteristics to reach the same conclusion for Western Kenya. Massey et al. (1987) conducted a 
comprehensive study using data from twenty five Mexican communities to arrive at a negative 
relationship between landholding and migration. Similarly, Zhang and Song (2003) used survey 
data from the province of Hebei to conclude that migrants mostly originate from the landless 
farmer population in terms of the most disadvantaged in China. On the other hand, the studies 
that found a positive relationship between landholding, and migration includes Mines and Massey 
(1985) and Rozelle et al. (1999). The former studied the migration behaviour of two Mexican 
communities, and the latter studied migration from rural China. Most of the research discussed 
above use a dichotomous of whether a household owns land or not, or they make comparisons 
between large farmers and small farmers, whereas in our study, land is available as a continuous 
measure. We use the pre and post migration landholding to avoid the reverse causality between 
landholding and migration. 
A number of studies also try to look at the relationship between remittances and asset 
accumulation in Pakistan. For instance, Adams (1998) uses 5 years panel data (1986-1991) of 469 
households in four rural districts to study the first-order effects of internal and international 
remittances on rural asset accumulation in Pakistan. This study finds that households treat 
international remittances as transitory income (temporary shocks to income), which may be used 
for investment. By contrast, households treat internal remittances as a mixture of both permanent 
and transitory income, which may be used for both consumption and investment. Finally, it is 
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concluded that international remittances play a more important role in asset accumulation in rural 
Pakistan than internal remittances. In rural areas, the landholding is an important factor for 
migration in the absence of an informal and formal lending agent in Pakistan (Irfan, 1989).    
The importance of landholding for the rural household economy has been highlighted in the 
literature by researchers. For example, VanWey’s (2005) study is based on eight ethnic groups 
over the period 1991-2001 at the district and national level in Mexico. This study argues that, at 
first, land in rural areas serve as wealth for households (view land as an asset that can be made 
liquid with relative ease), as an investment opportunity (due to the absence of the financial sector 
to mobilize household saving), as employment (related to farming activities) and as an 
opportunity for migration through inequality in ownership (it motivates deprived household in 
terms of rural landholding to migrate and accumulate land). On the one hand, households living 
in rural areas respond differently to the available opportunities, because landholding can provide 
an employment and livelihood for rural households discouraging them to migrate. Similarly, 
Massey and Espinosa (1997) defines land as an “investment opportunity” for households to 
overcome market failures in the absence of the credit and insurance market in developing 
countries, and migration is a response to purchase land, when credit to purchase of land in 
unavailable. So, we take land as the household-level investment opportunity for productive 
investment. The less land a household owns, the more need there is for migration to purchase the 
land. Furthermore, productivity of land also depends on the household-level opportunity to invest 
in modern inputs such as moving from staple crops to cash crops, purchasing fertilizer, 
insecticides, irrigating land, herbicides and investing in high-yielding varieties of crops all require 
capital that is often inaccessible in rural areas of developing countries. In this case migration may 
be a response from a household to enhance productive capacity of the land.    
Rodgers (1991) argues that households may be motivated by their relative deprivation in land 
ownership because land represents both current and future incomes to the household. It is 
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reasonable to assume that households compare their landholding with other households within the 
community, so migration would then be driven by the need for capital to purchase land, which 
would then improve their position on the distribution. However, Cain (1985) discusses “Land-
Security Hypothesis” and “Land-Labour hypothesis," which states that land provides security to 
households in the absence of well-functioning credit markets in rural areas of developing 
countries. Land can be regarded as security in a rural setting where financial markets are poorly 
developed and social security systems do not exist. The risk of natural calamity is the only main 
risk that may directly or indirectly affect the security of land assets. More direct threats include 
land reform. The increase in size of landholding will also increase opportunities for labour 
employment; consequently, demand for farm labour should also increase. In this context, 
Murray’s (1981) studies on the impact of labour migration in Lesotho finds migration was linked 
to rural economic insecurity, which supports NELM that households take migration as a risk 
spreading strategy and argues that household also takes into account incomplete and imperfect 
information.  
Findley (1987:166) argues, “Families with low incomes are expected to be more likely to migrate 
than high-income families, because they seek additional income sources or jobs to mitigate their 
poverty. This is consistent with the model of family migration for survival”. Additionally, Family 
Farm Status, in an agrarian setting, and family socioeconomic status is often tied up to its 
landownership position. It is hypothesized that farming, as tenants or landowners, will deter 
migration, but only if farming yields a sufficient income. Family size is hypothesized that the 
greater the household size, the greater the probability that someone in the family will migrate. It 
is also expected that if no one can take over the work of the migrant worker, the family may not 
be able to release that person, despite the expected net gains of migration. A large number of 
dependents in a family can stimulate the migration of other family members, but dependency 
alone may not engender migration.  Studies in Keyna, Mexico and India showed that migrants are 
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more likely to come from large families in which there are other adults who stay behind while the 
prime candidates migrate. 
3.2 Chapter five review of the literature 
 
3.2.1 Determinants of remittances  
 
The literature related to the determinant of remittances is divided into two main schools of 
thought internal and international remittances by using macro or micro-level data sets. The 
macro-level studies only focused on international remittances and its impact on the receiving 
countries (Lartey et. al., 2008), while the studies using micro-level survey data focused on the 
impacts of internal and international remittances on the origin communities (McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2007). The origin of migration studies started from rural to urban areas thereby 
focusing on internal remittances (Todaro, 1969). Over the last two decades academic attention 
has diverted to international remittances due to its size and considerable impact on the receiving 
countries (Garip, 2014).  
The determinants of remittances rages from pure altruism, inheritance-seeking hypothesis, 
insurance, loan repayment, and exchange motive to risk-diversification strategy (Lucas and Stark 
1985; Stark and Taylor (1989). In a similar line of research, many studies have shown that 
remittances reduce poverty in the origin communities (Adams and Page 2005; Massey et al. 
1993) by providing small-scale investment opportunities (Yang, 2008) and helps to accumulate 
wealth in term of land in rural economies (Adams, 1998). Other strands of literature studied the 
relationship between remittances on GDP growth (Barajas et al. 2009; Clemens and McKenzie, 
2014), child participation in education (Yang, 2008), multiplier effects (Taylor et al. 1996) and 
networking effect (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007).  
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There is also a pessimistic view that remittances may create a cycle of dependency among non-
migrant household members if remittances are used only for demonstration effect or solely for 
consumption (Garip, 2014). Remittances are a stable source of capital for developing countries 
(Mohapatra, et al. 2012), but it is unsustainable in the long run due to tougher immigration 
policies and border control (Mills 1999), it can decay or decline over the passage of time 
(Gammage, 2006), it may contribute to brain drain (Adams 2003), can result in the reduction of 
the labour endowment in origin communities (Miluka, et al. 2010), and leads to inequality in 
origin (McKenzie 2006) and inflation in local prices. The recent economic recession proved 
remittances as a resilient source of income for many destitute household in developing countries 
(Martin, 2009), which is tied with the well-being of receiving household to cope with poor local 
economies, labour market failure, and non-existence of insurance markets through its direct and 
indirect effects (Cohen, 2011). Research has strongly suggested that remittances maintain 
connections between migrants and their community through community development 
programmes, dissemination of knowledge for acquiring overseas jobs and supporting friends and 
family member on their arrival in overseas (Heyman, et al. 2009).   
This study contributes to the literature by studying the relationships between participation and the 
amount of remittances in rural Pakistan. Millions of households are the beneficiaries of receiving 
remittances in the world, which is the source of rural livelihood in many developing countries. 
The studies in the rural Pakistan setting find that rural households accumulate land through 
remittances (Adams Jr. 1998), both remittances to origin households and savings retained abroad 
fall with the pre-migration loan (Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999), and international remittances serve as 
transitory income shocks (Alderman, 1996).  
3.3 Chapter six review of the literature 
 
3.3.1 Background 
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Pakistan’s population was 30 million in 1947, which has increased by a factor of 6.2 in 63 years 
to reach approximately 185 million in 2010 (Burki, 2012). At 3.2% the annual population growth 
rate of Pakistan is one of the highest in the world. Historical trends of population growth rate are 
as follows: the average rate of population growth was around 2 percent over two decades 
spanning from 1950 to 1970, and it increased to 3.1 percent during 1970 to 1990. However, it 
slowed down to fall slightly below 2.5 percent in last two decades. This has been coupled with a 
rapid urbanization which led to increased internal migration, creating social and economic 
problems accentuated by inadequate public policies and planning. The United Nations Population 
Division has recorded that the urban population of Pakistan reached 48 million in 2010, double 
that from 2000, and estimated that it is expected to reach around 104 million in 2025. At the start 
of this century, around 33 percent of the population lived in urban areas, a figure that is expected 
to increase to 44 percent in 2025.  The rate of growth of the rural population is expected to 
decline from 1.3 percent in 2000-05 to only 0.28 in 2020-25. This would lead to a migration rate 
(from rural to urban) exceeding the natural rate of growth of the rural population.  
One might suspect that high population growth, urbanization and neglected agriculture (where 
three-quarters of the population live in the rural area) coupled with unemployment, inflation and 
unsuccessful transition from agriculture to the industrial sector (the nationalization of the 
industrial sector in 1971 acted as a big blow to the confidence of investors) led to a high rate of 
migration. Meanwhile, the oil boom in the Middle East provided an escape route to poor 
Pakistani workers. The shortage in the labour force faced by Middle East countries attracted 
many labourers from neighbouring countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s 
diaspora in the Middle East had a great impact on its early economic, political, and social 
development.  
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An estimated 4 to 5 million Pakistani workers were working in the Middle East in the 1970s, 
which resulted in a huge contribution to the economy in the form of remittances. A pool of 
roughly three to four million migrant workers earned higher wages. Most of them had a very high 
propensity to save, because they left their families at home; so then remitted nearly all of their 
savings back to Pakistan. Total remittances were around $25 billion between 1974 and 1988 
through the official banking channels. But there was also a sizeable $10 billion that came through 
unofficial/informal non-banking channels such as friends or Hawala (Hundi). The contribution of 
remittances was almost 10 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product, particularly in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Burki, 2012). This bounty in the form of remittances not only contributed to the 
foreign exchange reserves of the country, but also helped many families to lift out of the vicious 
cycle of poverty.  
This was followed by another important era of international migration where the destinations of 
Pakistanis became the USA, Canada, and the UK, which has remained a traditionally popular 
destination. The migrants to Canada and the United States were comparatively more educated 
than the Middle East bound migrants; and the North American diaspora was also more 
prosperous than the diaspora in the Middle East and Britain. The North American diaspora (more 
skilled migration) contributed more in terms of remittances which, in turn, helped the 
development of the social sector such as health and education in Pakistan.  
But this trend is not unique to Pakistan. The world has become more open for importing foreign 
workers from developing countries in the last two decades; global remittances to developing 
countries have increased manifold from $17.7 billion in 1980 to $30.6 billion in 1990; and further 
to nearly $80 billion in 2002 and $406 billion in 2012. Despite its importance for the receiving 
household, it also emerged as the single biggest source of foreign exchange for poor countries 
overall.  
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The officially recorded flow of remittances to developing countries is now three times larger than 
the amount of official development assistance. Furthermore, according to the international 
migration annual review20, the total number of international migrants throughout the world was 
estimated at 214 million in 2010, compared with 191 million in 2005. According to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the estimated number of internal migrants was 740 
million in 2009. 
The principal beneficiaries are lower middle income countries, where per capita income ranges 
from $736 to $2,935; and remittances were double the amount of foreign aid and ten times higher 
than net private capital transfer (Kapur and McHale, 2003). The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) estimates that 154 million people were living outside their country of birth in 
1990;  increasing to 175 million in 2000 and to 214 million in 2010. Out of that, 60 of percent the 
migrant population resided in developed countries. Oil-exporting Persian Gulf countries 
constitute more than 50 percent of foreign labour.     
3.3.2 Remittances  
 
Remittances are the stable source of income for developing countries unlike other sources such as 
aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) and loans. The remittances have ability in protecting 
households against natural disasters and coping with consequent losses. Evidence from many 
countries confirms this. For example, in Bangladesh per capita consumption was higher in 
remittance-receiving households than in others after the 1998 flood. Ethiopian households that 
receive international remittances rely less on selling assets or livestock to cope with droughts 
(Mohapatra et al., 2009). In addition, remittances provide an opportunity for investment in those 
communities where credit markets are missing or not functioning properly. Furthermore, 
                                                             
 
 
20 For more detail see International Migration Annual Review 2010-2011. 
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remittances offer an opportunity for investment, which is necessary for the development of the 
community above and beyond their basic needs for capital (Kapur, 2003). Remittances have the 
potential to expand productive capacity in receiving communities through reshaping their 
agrarian economy by enabling them to adopt modern techniques of production, such as, fertilizer, 
pesticides, insecticides, hybrid seeds and availability of water. This source of income may be 
channelled into development projects, which include community related small and medium 
enterprises, leading to further employment opportunities for local communities (De Haas, 2010).  
De Haas (2005) writes that the percentage share of international migrants in the global population 
over a century has remained stable between 2.5 percent to 3 percent. This fact reveals that we are 
not living in the era of mass migration. That is to say, ‘globalization’ has not given a specific 
boost to international migration. Secondly, the contribution of   remittances from international 
migrants represents only 1.3% of the total GDP of all developing countries in 2001. Furthermore, 
highly skilled migration may result in useful effects such as counter-flow remittances, 
investments, trade relations, new knowledge, innovations, attitudes and information. Since the 
1970s it is believed that remittances are mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and non-
productive investments such as on houses, flats, cars, clothes and imported consumption goods. 
Many studies have concluded that migration might not lead to passive dependency on 
remittances, but will also result in an increased economic activity and wealth to non-migrant 
households through the positive multiplier effects of remittances. It follows that remittances 
significantly result in a general increase in the well-being of migrant sending areas in the long 
run.  
A study by Massey (1990), stresses that the community level-variables influence household 
migration decisions in various ways. Firstly, the inequality of landholding in different 
communities affects the probability of migration. Secondly, better access to the transportation 
sector in a community may enable individuals to migrate internally first and then internationally. 
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The optimistic view of migration argues that remittances promote good institutions or result in an 
institutional growth. Remittances are used to invest in youth education, farm land, buying of 
commercial land, enhancing agricultural production and generating employment opportunities. 
Alternatively the pessimistic view argues that remittances are wasted: local opportunities for 
production and employment do not expand; forcing others to migrate. Remittances create income 
inequality with the rural communities, giving rise to a sense of relative deprivation among non-
remittance receiving households.  
Kapur (2003) elaborates on five features that contribute to the importance of remittances. Firstly, 
they are a stable source of external financing for developing countries unlike other financial flows 
such as debt, aids and FDI. The remittances of developing countries have emerged as the second 
largest source (after foreign direct investment) of net financial flows, which are contrasted to the 
net official flows (aid plus debt). The developing countries received a total amount of $72.3 
billion as remittances, which was one and half times net Official Development Assistance ($52 
billion) and half the net private flows (FDI plus debt flows) amounting to $153 billion in 2001. 
Secondly, the amount of international remittances does not flow to the poorest countries; half of 
the remittances to developing countries flow to lower middle-income countries, while the 
remaining half are received by upper middle-income countries. Thirdly, remittances have 
developed into either a critical insurance mechanism or the most stable source of financial flow 
for poor countries stricken by natural calamities, economic crisis, political crisis, international 
sanctions and failed states. Fourthly, many small countries such as small islands in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific rely heavily on remittances, often combined with foreign aid and tourism as 
sources of income. Finally, in the case of foreign aid, the net benefits of foreign aid might go into 
the pockets of a corrupt government official, whereas remittances can flow directly or indirectly 
into the pockets of the general public. That said migrant households who receive remittances, 
enjoy a higher living standard than non-migrant households. Remittances may reduce the 
inequality within a region, if they mostly flow to poorer households; but may also increase 
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inequality across different regions because certain communities tend to migrate more than others 
due to the different social networks they belong to.  
Borjas (1987) argues in favour of the negative-selection hypothesis, which states that in poor 
countries, migrants are those with below-average skill levels; and migration usually comes from 
the poor households or relatively deprived households. Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) find evidence 
of a positive-selection hypothesis in the case of migration from Mexico to the United States. 
Regardless of a positive or negative-selection hypotheses, (either migrants drawn from poor or 
relatively rich households) remittances are poor-friendly through their indirect multiplier effects. 
Remittance-receiving households are more likely to have higher propensity to save than other 
households.  In another study, Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) find that remittances are responsible 
for almost 20 percent of the capital invested in microenterprises throughout urban Mexico.     
The importance of remittances for developing countries can be grasped from this paragraph…“In 
contrast to foreign investment or loans, remittances are insulated from the herd behaviour of 
private investors and money managers. In financial terms, remittances are a free lunch. While 
other sources of capital carry a cost for the receiving country, be it interest payments for loans or 
profit repatriation for investments, remittances require no fees or services. Within the 
development community, remittances strike the right cognitive chords. They fit in with a 
communitarian, “third way” approach—neither inefficient socialism nor savage capitalism—and 
exemplify the principle of self-help. People from poor countries can just migrate and send back 
money that not only helps their families but their countries as well” (Kapur and McHale, 2003, 
p.50-51). 
De Haas (2005) highlights the importance of remittances for receiving communities in the 
following way: “What seems essential is that remittances, just like any other source of additional 
income, potentially give migrants, households and communities greater freedom to concentrate 
their activities and to allocate investments to those economic sectors and places that they perceive 
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as most stable and profitable. Thus, depending on the specific development context at the sending 
end, remittances may enable households to retreat from, just as much as to invest in, local 
economic activities." It follows that remittances have an ability to provide a safety net for 
relatively poor and backward rural regions that are most in need of development capital. 
Unfortunately, existing research ignores the selectivity and heterogeneity of the impact of 
migration and remittances on the development of migrant-sending communities and countries. 
This selectivity process in migration ensures that the direct benefits of remittances are also 
selective and do not tend to flow to the poorest members of communities. This implies that 
migration and remittances do not result in economic development of migrant-sending 
communities, and there is a need for linking migration with development policies. 
Moreover, Kapur (2003) accentuates the factors that contribute towards the growth of 
remittances. The most significant factor is the surge in legal or illegal annual flows of migrants, 
particularly to rich countries. Other factors include the economic and financial crisis in 
developing countries in the past two decades, foreign exchange controls and the absence of state 
machinery in developing countries; plus the switching in remittances from informal to formal 
channels. 
3.3.3 Multilevel analysis  
 
Multilevel modelling is used to handle clustered or grouped data. In the multilevel approach, 
random variations between groups are modelled and aggregate patterns of variation are examined. 
Multilevel designs are suitable where individuals are nested within social contexts and for 
observing both contextual effects and the aggregate outcomes. The structure of random effects 
may also have important policy implications (Garip, 2012). Findley (1987) highlighted the use of 
the multilevel model of migration by assuming the household as a basic decision-making unit in 
the Philippines; arguing that inclusion of higher units such as, village and district in the analysis 
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maximizes the chance of intra-unit differences while minimizing the chances of unobserved 
multilevel effects at the smaller level of aggregation. He further argues that if the process of 
migration involves interactions (group characteristics affect the individual behaviour through 
individual or household characteristics), then group characteristics or a community's 
characteristics must be included in the analysis to get consistent estimates.  
In our context, household and community characteristics include: family size, economic status, 
family farm status, family human capital, community socioeconomic development, community 
facilities, community agricultural situation and community migration history. It can be concluded 
that cultural and social integration, labour market structure, existence of an insurance market, 
transport and infrastructure affect the choices a household makes related to migration and 
remittances. We study the community effects at various levels of spatial aggregation. Multilevel 
migration models provide a variety of links between household and community characteristics 
and help identify how they jointly determine remittances. Remittance is an outcome of household 
decisions, which depends on regional socioeconomic conditions. These regional conditions are, in 
turn, affected by political, social and economic structure. Therefore, analyses benefits greatly by 
using multilevel models. 
While adopting a multilevel analysis, we follow the approach of the new economics of labour 
migration (NELM) where the unit of study is a household rather than an individual. Developing 
countries such as Pakistan present a good example for the application of NELM, because here the 
unit of analysis is a household. In a rural setting, a poor household usually does not have access 
to the credit market.  Even the availability of a credit market in rural areas does not ensure that 
poor households will get a loan due to the favouritism practised by formal credit institutions 
towards big landlords. 
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3.4 Chapter seven review of the literature 
 
3.4.1 Background  
 
Migration and Development Brief 21 (2013), issued by the World Bank, noted that the 
developing world received $414 billion (in remittances in 2013 (an increase of 6.3 percent versus 
2012) and this is projected to reach $540 billion by 2016. Globally, the world received $550 
billion in migrant remittances by 232 million international migrants in 2013, and this is projected 
to reach $700 billion by 2016. Since 2009, there has been an increasing trend in remittances. 
Remittances are the second largest source of capital flowing into developing countries after 
foreign direct investment and nearly three times the size of official development assistance. 
During the financial crisis of 2008, remittances seem to be a more resilient source of capital for 
developing countries than foreign direct investment and official development assistance.  
 
Remittance flows to South Asia are projected to reach approximately around $114 billion in 
2013. There are nearly 35 million cross border migrants from the South Asian Region (SAR), and 
about 10 million have migrated within the region. The internal migrants within national 
boundaries are nearly 10 times larger in South Asia. Remittances growth rate was 6.8% in 2013 
after averaging 14.1% in 2011 and 2012 in South Asia Region. The five lowest cost corridors for 
sending $200 in South Asia regions are Singapore to Bangladesh, UAE to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 
to Pakistan, UK to Pakistan, and UAE to Sri Lanka. Similarly, the five highest costly corridors 
for sending $200 in South Asia;  Canada to India, Germany to India, France to India, Singapore 
to Pakistan, and Japan to India. There is a need to reduce the cost of remittances transaction, 
whether promoting competition by avoiding exclusive contacts or effectively utilizing postal 
networks in order to increase the net receipts of the intended beneficiaries, many of whom are 
poor. For example, the remittances flowing from the USA to India were almost $11 billion in 
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2012 with an average transaction cost of around 4.8 %. If this cost is reduced from 4.8% to below 
2% this would have resulted in an additional $333 million going to beneficiaries in India. 
Similarly, from Singapore to Pakistan, such a reduction from the current 15.3% could result into 
an additional $52 million going to beneficiaries in Pakistan. These large sums of money could 
benefit a large number of remittance receiving households in developing countries.   
 
Pakistan is in top ten recipients of officially recorded remittances for 2013 (roughly around $15 
billion). In nearly 14 developing countries remittances are higher than foreign exchange reserves 
and it is almost 137% of the foreign exchange reserves in Pakistan. As many emerging economies 
are facing a deteriorating balance of payments, in this case the remittances are serving as a lender 
of last resort in the form of a permanent source of foreign currency earnings.  
   
Remittances have been a focal point of interest for both the private and public sectors after its 
immense growth through formal channels during the last decade. In the private sector, 
remittances attracted substantial attraction from remittance transmission operators such as, 
Western Union, MoneyGram, Banks, and credits union. Mobile banking is part of other financial 
institutions providing money transaction services in recent years. In the public sector, many 
governments in developing countries have established public sector agencies to direct 
international migrant remittances for national economic development. The Government of 
Pakistan, after realizing its importance as a permanent source of capital unlike other financial 
transfers such as official development assistance (ODA), constituted a formal body to deal with 
oversees remittances in a more productive setting.  The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Ministry of 
Overseas Pakistanis, and Ministry of Finance initiated the Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) in 
2009 to serve as an ownership structure for remittance facilitation in Pakistan. Moreover, its other 
objective includes facilitating and supporting, faster, cheaper, convenient and efficient flow of 
remittances. Example of the other public sector agencies includes India’s Ministry of Overseas 
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Indian Affair (MOIA), El Salvador’s Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad, and Philippine 
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). The actual remittances flows would have been larger 
than those registered in official data sources by taking into account money sent through a variety 
of nonfinancial firms or brokers known as informal channels systems such as hawala, hundi and 
padala. Migration and Development Brief 21 (2013), issued by the World Bank, notes that about 
two-third of remittance recipients in the South Asia Region are using informal channels to make 
transfers, with very few using both informal and formal mechanisms.  
 
The literature in economics has already shed light on issues such as why migrants send 
remittances? What are their motivating factors? The answers to these questions falls between 
altruism, loan repayment, exchange, insurance, investment in small and medium enterprises, 
education, and for consumption smoothing (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Stark, 1995; 
Hoddinott, 1994; and Ilahi and Jafrey, 1999). Even so, other literature in economics focuses on 
the remittances receiving households and countries by using cross-sectional data at the country 
level. Research analyzing the relationship between remittances and economic growth at the 
national level is inconclusive, with some studies find negative relations (Chami et al., 2003) and 
others finding a positive relationship (Faini, 2007). However, research using micro data is more 
conclusive in establishing a better identification by separating consumption or investment 
expenditures to understand remittance impacts in more details on receiving households. Some 
studies find that remittances mainly go to unproductive investment mainly for higher 
consumption (Brown and Ahlburg, 1999); yet other research finds that remittances are mainly 
used for productive investment (Adam, 2003; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). However, Yang 
(2011; 137) writes that “A central methodological concern with existing work that attempts to 
understand the effect of remittances on household consumption or investments is that migrant 
earnings are in general not randomly allocated across households, so that any observed 
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relationship between migration or remittances and household outcomes may simply reflect the 
influence of unobserved third factors”. 
 
Remittances serve as a risk diversification strategy and as insurance for the households, which are 
severely exposed, to natural calamities such as droughts, flooding, storms and earthquakes in 
many developing countries. In that situation, households greatly benefit from remittances, which 
serve as an insurance in the absence of the well-functioning credit market to satisfy their need for 
additional capital for health, education, and daily consumption (Sana and Massey, 2005; Stark, et 
al. 1986). In another study by Ashraf, et al. (2011) using the randomized controlled trial among 
migrants from El Salvador to answer the three basic questions; motivations for migration, intra-
household resource allocation, and what might instigate remittance flows or channel them 
towards more productive uses in migrant source countries? Their study finds that migrants control 
over saving accounts will result in saving accumulation in destination and home country. 
 
3.4.2 Multiplier or Peer effects  
 
Our paper belongs to the literature, which tries to clarify the contribution of social interaction on 
household-level remittances. We are not aware of studies analyzing the influence of neighbors on 
household level remittances decisions. Although, the literature of migration and social network 
highlight the importance of networking which facilitate migration and reduce cost of migration 
(McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). The overall impact of remittances on economic activities for the 
origin communities is still unclear. Whether it induces more investment or consumption and its 
impact on migration decisions of other community members is still an open question. But some 
sort of communication and social interaction between migrants and non-migrants households at 
origin communities exists. The coexistence of migrant versus non-migrant households produces 
“peer pressures”. This kind of interaction in economic literature is also called “knowledge 
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spillover” or “social network” (Cornelissen, et al. 2013). In sociology this kind of social network 
is labelled the cost-reducing factor of migration. Massey and Espinosa (1997) argue that social 
networks play an important role in increasing migration by showing the preferred routes and 
techniques of crossing borders, which will result in the increase of remittances, by creating peer 
pressure for non-migration households at origin. In a similar line of research Munshi (2003) and 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find that households with larger social networks are more likely 
to have a migrant member and find jobs at destination countries more easily, hence resulting in 
lower cost of migration. As a result, net remittances that flow to the origin communities will 
result in multiplier effects. 
 
Our research allows us to examine the multiplier effects of remittances. This research is not 
restricted to direct or indirect effects of remittances detailed above, but is interested in multiplier 
effects of remittances, which are generated through social interaction. Remittances can produce 
multiplier effects through their spending on products and services produced by other community 
members, and other spillover effects. This also includes the social interaction effects of migration 
on the costs and benefits of remittances for other community members. Previous literature has not 
examined the multiplier effects of remittances focusing instead mainly on the effect of 
remittances alone on receiving communities. Similarly, Stark, et al. (1986) analyzed the direct 
effect of remittance income in two villages in Mexico. This study compares the household 
income with and without remittances and finds that remittances reduced inequality in receiving 
villages. If remittances result in reducing inequality, then there is no doubt about the indirect 
effect of remittances in the origin communities. It may be concluded that remittances has an 
ability to produce the multiplier or peer effects. Yang (2011; 130) writes “remittances are more 
readily observable for analysis than other financial intermediaries and are also often asked about 
in household surveys in developing countries. Analysis of remittances has the potential to shed 
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new light on old debates over whether intra-household resource allocations can possibly be 
viewed as made by a unitary decision maker”.        
 
Most of the empirical studies have estimated the social multiplier in a diverse area such as 
schooling performance, financial decision and criminal behavior. Examples include Graham’s 
(2008) study that uses the new method for identifying social multipliers through conditional 
variance restrictions and finds that differences in peer group quality were an important source of 
individual-level variation in the academic achievement of Project Student-Teacher Achievement 
Ratio (STAR). A similar study by De Giorgi, et al. (2010) using the linear-in-means model of 
social interaction and shows that identification is still possible in case where peer groups do not 
overlaps fully to study peer effects in the choice of college major. Their results show that 
individual behavior is influenced by the peer behavior to choose a same major (subject) and peers 
can divert students from majors in which they have a relative ability advantage, with adverse 
consequences on academic performance, entry wages and job satisfaction. In another study by 
Towe and Lawley (2013) examining the contagion effect of residential foreclosures in Maryland 
for the years 2006-2009 based on 13 nearest neighbors, findings indicate strong evidence of 
social interactions to influence on default decisions where the interaction is based on neighbors’ 
behavior in a previous period. They find that a neighbor in foreclosure increases the hazard of 
additional defaults by 18 percent, which further leads to temporary reduction in local house prices 
and a negative social multiplier effect of foreclosures.   
 
The study by Maurin and Moschion (2009) using neighbor children sex mix as an instrumental 
variable find that neighbor labor-force participation has a positive and significant effect on a 
mother’s participation. However, the main finding follows that mother’s labor market 
participation is influenced by the sex composition of her two eldest siblings and also by the other 
mothers living in the same close neighborhood. Additionally, their study also concludes “the 
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precise size of this social effect is difficult to evaluate." Another possibility is that neighborhoods 
matter a lot, but their effects are hard to detect with the methods that have been used. The social 
multiplier literature explores the effect of neighbors on individual decision. The influence of 
neighbors can generate the positive externalities through a small change in the distribution of 
private incentives and resources. This positive externality is known as a “social multiplier” which 
arises from neighborhood effects. Households living in the same close neighborhood influence 
each other participation decisions, whether, due to the same background or knowledge spillover. 
Similarly, this line of research also has been employed to the estimate crime as the outcome 
behavior. Drago and Galbiati (2012) used the 2006 Italian prison pardon to exploit the peer 
effects in criminal behavior and find that the reduction in the individuals’ recidivism due to an 
increase in their peers’ residual sentence is at least as large as their response to an increase in 
their own residual sentences where the social multiplier of crime is equal to two. However, Duflo 
et al. (2011) use a randomized tracking experiment conducted in 121 primary schools in Kenya to 
find that lower-achieving pupils are likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives 
to teach to the top of the distribution.    
Only few have studied the peer effect in the labour market such as one study by Guryan et al. 
(2009) in the field of professional golf tournaments to estimate peer effects in the workplace 
using random assignment. This research finds no compelling evidence that playing partners’ 
abilities affect performance, contrary to recent evidence on peer effects in the workplace from 
laboratory experiments by Falk and Ichino (2006), grocery scanners by Mas and Moretti (2009) 
and soft fruit pickers by Bandiera, et al. (2009). This research is useful in explaining how a social 
multiplier varies across labour markets, and across individuals. These studies differ on the 
selection of outcome variables, but no study has gone beyond the conventional wisdom to study 
the remittances as an outcome variable to estimate the spillover or multiplier effects. Most 
transfer program such as food stamps, government intervention and Medicaid are targeted for 
particular social groups or deprived social groups to uplift their economic conditions through 
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affecting incomes by generating social interaction (Moffitt, 2001). Similarly, remittances are not 
much different from support programs, which too generate spillover effects in receiving 
households through affecting their income.  A question addressed in this chapter is whether there 
is any empirical evidence that remittances have any spillover effects in receiving communities. 
The answer to this question, in turn, leads to an investigation of whether there have been internal 
or international migrations in the past which have had resulted in remittances that have been 
shown to have positive effects. This is the motivating issue for this paper. This study can also be 
seen as a contribution to the literature analysing the variation in remittance outcomes across 
districts or across subgroups of households within the districts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
(ESSAY ONE) 
 
Determinants of Internal and International Migration 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A history of the early contribution to the scientific study of migration begins with influential 
work of Sjaastad’s cost-benefit analysis of migration (1962) and Harris and Todaro’s (1969) 
probabilistic model of migration and unemployment focuses on rural-to-urban migration. As has 
been highlighted in the literature review provided in the chapter three, the key factors behind the 
rural out-migration are the lack of employment opportunities in the rural sector, natural calamities 
(such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and non-existence of a well-functioning capital 
market (e.g. absence of insurance markets). Households in low-income developing countries are 
particularly exposed to various income shocks for the aforementioned reasons, and personal 
saving is often the only way to cope with a downturn risk. Migration provides an opportunity not 
only to escape the rural economic uncertainties, but also to increase lifetime income and savings. 
International migration in particular, allows for a significant jump in income that can help a 
poorer household to come out of a low-income trap, however it also requires a more substantial 
cost of migration. It is well documented that relatively low-skilled workers from developing 
countries are employed in some labour scarce rich countries through international employment 
agencies. Overseas migration is therefore a feasible option for the poor, despite the higher costs 
when compared to internal migration. 
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Over the last two decades there have been some important contributions on international 
migration such as Massey et al. (1993), Massey and Taylor (2004) and Castles et al. (2005). 
Recently, all the positive benefits associated with migration conflict with concern over job losses 
for domestic labour from excessive immigration. This is emphasized by authors such as: Skeldon 
(2006)21 and King and Skeldon (2010). There are not many empirical studies that have 
simultaneously considered both types of migration – internal and international – for a developing 
country in South Asia. Czaika (2012)22 is an important exception and his study concerns internal 
and international migration for India. The existing literature on migration in Pakistan also focuses 
either on internal or international migration, without taking into account both at the same time23. 
For Pakistan, there are some notable studies, relating to internal or international migration, which 
are Nishat and Bilgrami (1993), and Oda (2007). 
In this work we employ a household panel data from 1986-91 that covered four districts from 
three provinces of Pakistan to study location and migration. These provinces are Punjab (districts 
Faisalabad and Attock), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa24 or NWFP (district Dir25) and Sindh (district 
Badin). The dataset is unique in the sense that it contains information on households having an 
                                                             
 
 
21 This study tries to create a stronger link between internal and international migration in the Asian region. Internal 
and international migrations are integrated, and it is necessary to consider them as a unified system rather than in 
isolation. The hierarchical movements link richer and poorer groups together and need to be understood in the context 
of the implementation of programmes for poverty alleviation. By attempting to link internal and international 
migration, this paper emphasises the requirement for a more integrated framework for the study of migration.   
22 This paper uses the National Sample Survey of 2008 to study the likelihood of Indian out-migration (internal plus 
international) through disentangling the concept of relative deprivation by distinguishing feelings of individual and 
collective relative deprivation as sources of individual aspirations. For the likelihood of intra-state movements, both 
individual and collective relative deprivations are strong predictors. However, the likelihood of out-migration towards 
international destinations is significantly higher for households with lower levels of individual and collective relative 
deprivation. Our results are consistent that poor households or relatively deprived households have a stronger 
probability of out-migration either internally or internationally.    
23 As Gazdar (2003) writes in general, there is a need for more in-depth and focused policy-oriented research on both 
internal and international migration in Pakistan." However, Gazdar (2003) provides the compressive review of 
migration issues in Pakistan, although it is not based on the household level data (or empirical), and rather it is more 
descriptive in it nature.  
24 Formally known as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is one of the four provinces 
that comprises Pakistan. In April 2010, the constitution of Pakistan was amended and the former NWFP renamed to 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This paper identifies the province as NWFP because the data was collected under this name.   
25 The district was split into Upper Dir and Lower Dir in 1996. 
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internal migrant or international migrant or not having any migrant at all. It contains information 
on remittances, along with an array of household and individual level characteristics. For most of 
the households, migration decisions were made before the survey was conducted and the 
migration status did not change during the course of study period (1986-1991) when 14 rounds of 
survey were conducted. There were changes in remittances between survey rounds, but the 
landholding of the households did not change much. The initial landholding (recorded at the 
beginning of the survey) is a key measure of initial wealth. For this purpose, we use the pre-
migration initial wealth and post-migration initial wealth, as detailed in the data section. Overall 
the data is rich, and this fact allows us to study the decision to migrate within the country or 
overseas, within one single model, and also to determine how migration might have been 
financed – by taking loans or by selling land. The dataset also contained information on loans and 
farm equipment. 
We first investigate migration as a whole and then look at the more disaggregate spatial choice. 
The results provide evidence that households’ human capital and specific assets are key 
determinants for migration. As a whole, we detect an intriguing size-composition effect on the 
household’s probability of migration: the larger the household, the greater the probability of 
migration; an additional household member increases the likelihood by 2.9%. On the other hand, 
the more dependants a household has (in the form of children and young females), the less likely 
it is to have a migrant member.  The number of children and young women appear to have 
significant and negative effects on the likelihood of migration by 2.5% and 2.9%, respectively.  
 
Also, we see that the lower the pre-migration initial landholding (i.e. landholding observed at the 
beginning of the study period, which we interpret as part of the initial wealth, prior to the decision 
to migrate), the higher the probability of migration. This seems to suggest that poorer and 
desperate families are more likely to migrate, which is consistent with the ‘push’ theory of 
migration or deprivation theory (Stark and Bloom 1985). However, migration is costly even if it 
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is within the country. So how can a very poor family finance migration? It has to either borrow, 
or deplete its landholding to raise the finance. If the borrowing route is most commonly used, we 
should see that the probability of migration is positively related to loans taken. But the coefficient 
of loans is negative and significant - loans seem to have a negative effect on the probability of 
migration. It can therefore be concluded that migration is financed by selling off land, which 
explains the negative relationship between land ownerships and the probability of migration. 
Post-migration initial wealth variables mostly have a positive relationship with migration, but 
post-migration initial money borrowed from informal sources has assumed significance now. 
This might explain that households become more credible for repaying their loan if they have a 
migrant family member.      
  
 We can investigate these relations by separating the internal migrants from the international 
migrants and studying the determinants of these two types of migration. The household 
characteristics (consisting of household size and composition effects) are not similar for both 
types of migration in the size and significance of the coefficients. For internal migration, 
composition effects have a less dominant effect than international migration. We express the 
result in terms of odd ratios. The odd of the international migration is increased by 30% relative 
to a never migrant household with an additional member and it is 19% higher for internal 
migration. 
 
There are also significant differences in the size and significance of the coefficients of pre-
migration initial wealth and post-migration initial wealth. The negative coefficient of pre-
migration initial landholding is larger for international migrants – 0.113 times that of the internal 
migrants. International migration is 11% more likely to occur with every one acre decrease in 
landholding compared to 1% for internal migration. In addition, a loan (informal borrowing) has 
negative and significant effect on the probability of internal and international migration.   
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This suggests that the two types of migrants differ in the way they face informal credit 
constraints. Neither is able to finance their migration cost through borrowing, as we would have 
seen a positive and significant coefficient for informal borrowing if this was the case. As 
migration involves a risk of not returning and not paying off the loans, having an outstanding loan 
adversely affects the probability of migration, possibly because of the local lenders insistence to 
pay off the loan before taking up outside employment. This is particularly so for internal 
migrants, who might not return to the village on a permanent basis. The sign of the loan variable 
is negative and significant. For international migrants the story is slightly different. The risk of 
not returning to the village is very low in this case, because low skilled migrants are not allowed 
to settle abroad. Therefore having an outstanding loan does not affect the chance of migration. A 
local lender here may even not be willing to lend some money toward covering migration costs, 
as the negative sign of the loan variable suggests. However, as the loan variable is significant, we 
can argue that the international migrants also finance their migration cost by selling land. This 
explanation seems to be consistent with the pattern of landholding borne out by the descriptive 
statistics (to be discussed in the next section). The international migrants have the least amount of 
land on average (7 acres of land), while the non-migrant household has the most (8.8 acres on 
average).  
 
The post-migration initial wealth variables are insignificant but have a positive trend for both 
types of migration except for money remitted to relatives. The findings of this study are 
consistent with the fact that rural households face severe credit constraints. It is very difficult to 
secure loans for uncertain activities like migration, where the migrant cannot be directly 
monitored. Hence, household assets determine their capability to send migrants away, especially 
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when the destination of migration is abroad. Our results tally with the findings of two other 
studies for Pakistan, namely Kurosaki (2006)26 and Nabi (1982)27. Kurosaki found that rural 
households in Pakistan dealt with the macroeconomic downturns of the 1990s by depleting 
livestock. Nabi showed that for internal migration at the household level, migration is negatively 
related to landholding in rural Pakistan. In sum, our findings support ‘negative asset-migration 
hypotheses’ rather than the deprivation theory. 
 
However, results for international migration accentuate the importance of the district spatial 
development. For international migration costs can be significant, and financing of foreign travel 
is a major issue. It is therefore reasonable to expect that families who have limited access to 
credit will have to deplete their assets (such as land) to undertake such a migration.  The insights 
of this analysis can be useful in forming public policy. Governments should facilitate greater 
movement of labour by reducing the cost of migration. The rural credit market should also be 
developed so that people can get affordable loans without having to sell land, which is a vital 
asset for survival in rural areas.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the data set and 
descriptive statistics respectively. Section 4.4 introduces the econometric method, and discusses 
the main control variables used in the estimation. Section 4.5 analyses the determinants of 
                                                             
 
 
26 This study analyses the dynamics of assets held by low-income households in three villages in the NWFP during the 
late 1990s in Pakistan. Results show that the size of livestock holding was reduced in all villages hit by 
macroeconomics stagnation, while land holding was reported only in a village with inferior access to market. The 
author mentions the two types of non-agricultural sectors employment activities that have been growing; short-term 
migration (both internal and international) and rural non-agricultural activities in villages. Our concern is that the 
depletion of livestock and landholding may be used to finance initial migration cost, which is consistent with our 
finding and also to finance the non-agriculture activities. 
27 The four villages Khunda, Jatli, Mehdiabad and Chak in the Punjab province of Pakistan are studied in the analysis. 
This study tries to establish relationships between size, tenure, internal migration and input use and find a positive 
correlation between fertilizer use and migration. This may indicate that remittances from migration may be an 
alternative to borrowing in the village capital markets for purchasing these new inputs.   
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internal and international migration in Pakistan and the final section draws some conclusions 
from this analysis. 
 
4.2 Data set 
 
The data set relates to four rural districts of Pakistan (Faisalabad, Attock, Dir, and Badin). The 
data were obtained from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and is a 
longitudinal survey of households in rural Pakistan in the five years between July 1986 and 
October 1991 over 14 rounds of interviews with 927 households. The four selected districts were 
Faisalabad and Attock in Punjab, Badin in Sindh, and Dir in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which were 
chosen using the district ranking methodology of Pasha and Hassan (1982). The selected districts 
in the survey were the poorest districts of Pakistan, except for Faisalabad, a prosperous district, 
which was chosen as a reference district. Within each district, three markets (Mandi) were chosen 
and areas selected in relation to their proximity to these markets, firstly those within five 
kilometres of the market, secondly those within ten kilometres and finally those between ten and 
twenty kilometres. The villages and households in each district were picked randomly from these 
three areas. 
With the objective of studying poverty, employment opportunities and migration decisions, the 
survey collected a wide range of information, such as household characteristics (including the 
composition and size of the households and the members’ education details), occupation, wealth, 
asset, income and financial details. Types of landholding, whether irrigated or rain-fed (barani) 
were also recorded. At the community level, it includes information on local infrastructure, 
markets (Mandi) and services.  
A household is considered as migrant if at least one of his members is working away from home 
or travelling at the time of the survey (around 33 per cent of the sample). We further define a 
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household as internal migrant household, if at least one household member is traveling in the 
country or working away from home within the country (about 24 per cent of the sample). We 
label a household as international migrant household if at least one of its members is working or 
traveling abroad (9 per cent of the sample). If a household has both internal and international 
migrant members, we consider that household as an international migrant household.  
Our dataset is longitudinal and the variable migration varies over time and households (like few 
other variables). During the interim period some families stop being migrant just as some turn 
from non-migrant to migrant. Thus, the household migration outcome is not time invariant.  
Given that the outcome of migration is either binary (when migration is defined as a whole) or 
takes at most three different values in its more disaggregated version, we employ empirical 
models that are suitable for this type of discrete outcome data to answer our research question. 
Specifically, we employ a logit model to analyse migration and a multinomial logit model to 
evaluate the type of migration. For the logit model we assign zero to a non-migrant household (67 
per cent of the households) and 1 to the migrant household (33 per cent of the households covered 
in the survey). Our second model is a multinomial logit model. Here we associate zero to the non-
migrant household (67 percent of the household), 1 to an internal migrant household (24 percent 
of the households), and 2 to the international migrant household (9 per cent of the households). 
Finally, for estimation we pool the cross-sectional data. 
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the geographical data for the 927 households, which were 
distributed as follows: 380 households from Punjab province distributed between two districts: 
180 from Faisalabad (covering 1-6 villages) and 200 from Attock (covering 7-14 villages), 275 
from Sind province, which includes Badin district (covering 21-40 villages), 272 from NWFP 
which includes Dir district (covering 41-52 villages). During the survey each household was 
visited up to 14 times spanning the five years from 1986-87 to 1990-91. The fourteen rounds 
were distributed within five years as follows: the first six rounds were covered in first year (1986-
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87), three rounds from 7 to 9 covered in the second year (1987-88), a further three rounds from 
10 to 12 covered in the third year (1988-89), one round 13 was covered in fourth year (1989-90) 
and the last around 14 was covered in fifth year (1990-91). 
Table 4.1 Households distribution by region 
 Province District Households 
number 
 
 
 
Punjab 
Punjab 
Sindh 
NWFP 
Faisalabad 
Attock 
Badin 
Dir 
180 
200 
275 
272 
Total    3   4         927 
 
In this study, income data sets were collected at the year basis and remaining data sets relating to 
household characteristics were collected on the round basis. For this reason, we transform our 
data on a year basis. The year (1986-87) is used to construct initial wealth variables in order to 
establish causality between migration and initial wealth by representing it as period 0. Similarly, 
period 1 represents the year (1987-88), period 2 represents the year (1998- 99) and so on. For the 
regression analysis, period 1 represents the base category and wealth variables will be constructed 
from period 0. Period 0 (1986-87) is only used to construct initial condition variables and is then 
excluded from the regressions. The actual periods used in the analysis are four years (1987-88, 
1988-99, 1999-1990, and 1990-91). 
This chapter focuses on determinants of migration, and while several factors are important, the 
focus is on the impact of wealth on migration. Is wealth and migration causally related or just 
correlated? If they are causally related, could the relationship be bi-directional (for instance could 
previous migration by a household member affect the current wealth)? The primary interest is in 
measuring the impact of household (HH) level initial wealth, i.e., wealth pre-migration, on 
decision of a HH member to migrate (internally within Pakistan or overseas), while controlling 
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for other HH level and regional factors. To this end, first a binary logit model is estimated --
migrate or not being the dependent variable --followed by a multinomial model --not migrate, 
migrate internally, and migrate externally. 
The problem in the data set is that actual migration at HH level by some member may have taken 
place prior to the first observed period, and an event which might have affected the wealth in the 
first period (positively or negatively due to remittances, or loans, or selling of land). In that case, 
if unexplained factors that led to earlier migration were also correlated with the first period 
wealth, then the estimates from the logit and multinomial logit model would be biased. To 
overcome this difficulty, we construct two separate variables of wealth and call them pre- and 
post-migration wealth. They are constructed as follows. We generate a dummy equal to one if any 
HH member has migrated in the first observed period (1986) and set to zero otherwise. The 
variable is time invariant and is household-specific. We interact wealth with that variable and call 
the variable post-migration wealth and then interact wealth with one minus the dummy variable 
and name the new variable `pre-migration wealth’.  
The scope of generating two separate variables for wealth (pre- and post-migration) is to 
demarcate the observations where wealth might have changed as a result of by migration via 
remittances (post-migration wealth) and wealth observed prior to migration (pre-migration 
wealth). Under the assumption that the error term on the structural equation of the migration 
outcome is uncorrelated with the pre-migration variable, and only correlated with the post-
migration variable, our empirical analysis is valid.  
One possible option is to restrict the empirical estimation to the sub-sample of households that 
migrated after 1986.28 In this case the problem is that the estimates based on the sub-sample of 
                                                             
 
 
28 This point was suggested by the examiners. 
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later migrant households may differ from that of the initial migrant households, limiting the 
external validity of the approach. We have preferred to include both variables and in the 
explanation of the results concentrate our attention on the pre-migration wealth only, provided the 
biased effect of the other measure of wealth is minimal. Furthermore, the inclusion of both 
variables in the estimates is useful to observe the direction, and entity, of the bias. As robustness 
check, we have included in the appendix a separate estimation of migration for the subsample 
of initial migrants and for the subsample of non-initial migrants (see tables A.3 and A.4). The 
significance and sign of the wealth variables confirm the results discussed in results section.  
 
The problems of reverse causality, measurement error, and unobservable household 
characteristics are well known. There is a possibility of reverse causality between migration and 
wealth, which we have largely discussed in the previous two points.  
Survey data usually raise some concerns about measurement error, which can arise for several 
reasons29.  Quoting Cameron and Trivedi (2005; p. 899) “There are virtually no models discussed 
in this book that are protected from the problem of measurement errors”. Similarly, also in our 
data one can expect that some variables suffer of measurement error, possibly not at random. 
When measurement error occurs in the explanatory variables, it can lead to biased estimated 
coefficients. While one needs to be cautious in interpreting the results, very little can be done to 
fix the problem given the data availability.  
Searching for proxy variables that act as instruments to solve the issue of endogeneity caused by 
the simulation error is not a viable task with the kind of data we have access to. Clemens and 
                                                             
 
 
29 For more detailed discussion see Angrist and Krueger (2000) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005). The former provides 
a comprehensive empirical strategies example from labour economics. However, later provides a detailed discussion 
of the series of endogeneity issues related to empirical work. 
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Mackenzie (2014; p.17) provide an explanation of the issue of under-reporting of remittances, 
“An alternative source of data on remittances comes from household surveys in the remittance- 
receiving countries. These surveys directly ask households how much they have received as 
remittances. They have the advantage of capturing remittances through both formal and informal 
channels. Potential concerns are that households may misreport. Furthermore nationally 
representative surveys may contain relatively few households with migrants. Nevertheless, there 
is no reason to strongly suspect these potential issues change sharply over time, and so even if 
household surveys understate the levels of remittances, they may provide a reasonably accurate 
picture of it. Unfortunately few developing countries have frequent household income and 
expenditure surveys that extend back to the 1990s, and not all of those that do ask separately 
about remittances”. 
Hence we opt for the alternative solution, which is to acknowledge that due to measurement error 
some of the estimated coefficients may be biased. The level of bias depends on the severity of the 
measurement error. Next, we wish to acknowledge that we have estimated the model using a 
pooled methodology, which works fine if the unobserved heterogeneity at the household-level is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If that is not the case, again we meet the problem of 
endogeneity and estimation biased. There are solutions that can be adopted which rely on panel 
data solutions to remove the endogeneity caused by the unobserved heterogeneity. For example 
random effects with Mundlak correction is an option that one can investigate for nonlinear model 
as the ones that we have estimated in the relevant chapters.  
Table 4.2 shows that the 927 households’ participation in the survey over the span of five years. 
We observe that 722 households are interviewed all year, which is around 78% of the total 
observation. Similarly, 90 households have observations for only the first year and this accounts 
for nearly 10 % of the total surveyed households.          
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Table 4.2 Household participation in survey over time 
Household 1, 2, …..,975 year 1, 2, ……,5 
 Household Pattern Proportion 
 722 11111 77.89 
 90 1…. 9.71 
 40 111.. 4.31 
 24 1111. 2.59 
 17 111.1 1.83 
 14 1.1.. 1.51 
 14 11… 1.51 
 5 1.11. 0.54 
 1 1..1. 0.11 
Total 927  100.00 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.3 The proportion of different type of the Household by districts 
Districts Never 
Migrant 
Households 
Internal 
Migrant 
Households 
International 
Migrant 
Households 
Total 
Faisalabad 
(Punjab) 
548 
(20%) 
242 
(25%) 
31 
(8%) 
821 
(20%) 
Attock 
(Punjab) 
584 
(21%) 
227 
(24%) 
48 
(13%) 
859 
(21%) 
Badin 
(Sindh) 
1,054 
(39%) 
157 
(16%) 
3 
(1%) 
1,214 
(30%) 
Dir 
(NWFP) 
539 
(20%) 
323 
(34%) 
301 
(78%) 
1,163 
(29%) 
Total 2,725 
(67%) 
949 
(24%) 
383 
(9%) 
4,057 
(100%) 
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Table 4.3 shows the household status of different migration choices by the four districts of 
Pakistan. The ‘never-migrant’ households constitute 67% of the households whereas the internal 
migrant households are 24% and international migrant households are 9%30.  
Table 4.4 presents summary statistics for comparable covariates of three types of households with 
mean and standard deviation of key household level characteristics. All financial values are 
reported in the Pakistani currency (PKR) called ‘Rupees’ and wealth variables descriptive 
statistics are reported for the initial year as discussed earlier. Overall, 46 years is the average age 
for the never migrant head of the household, and it increases to 50 years for internal and 
international migrant head of households, which is not contrary to the conventional wisdom 
accentuated by migration theories. Also, the table summarizes the covariates by the maximum 
educational attainment (in years) of all head of households by their status of migration. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, household heads average education for different types of households is 
almost three years, except for international migrant household head, whose average is four years. 
There are opposing effects of household head education for the three competing choices of 
household. Characteristics that can affect migration behaviour differ between never migrant 
households, and internal and international migrant households. Firstly, the international migrant 
households are more likely to live in a household with a higher average number of children 
between the ages of 0 to 11 years (about five children compared with four children for other 
competing choices). Household composition does not differ much for the number of females aged 
12 to 30 years for different types of households; on average, only one female for no migrant 
members, two for internal and three for international migrant households. International migrant 
households have more males aged 12 to 30 years (an average of five males compared with four 
                                                             
 
 
30 The international migrant household consists; firstly, household has both member already working abroad and 
member traveling abroad (around 4 percent) and secondly, household has only one kind migrant either already 
working abroad or traveling abroad (around 5 percent). Due to few observations, we generated the variable 
international migrant household consisting of these two types of migrant that add up to 9%. If a household has both 
internal and international migrant, in that case, our dominating category is international migrant household.  
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males for internal migrants and three males for never migrant households). International migrant 
households have more family in the home country than internal migrant households and never 
migrant households: the average household size for international migrants is 13 people 
(statistically different from the mean household size of 11 people for internal migrants and 9 
people for never migrant households). Another piece of conventional wisdom, that more 
education at the household level is more likely to produce a migrant, is also supported by the 
descriptive statistics. Average education for internal and never migrant households is around two 
years, and an additional year’s education changes the status to international migrant households.   
We construct initial wealth covariates to measure household economic status prior to their three 
competing choices. However, there is considerable heterogeneity regarding initial wealth between 
the different types of household. Concentrating on the descriptive statistics in Table 4.4 for land 
holding (in acres), a typical international migrant household has on average 7 acres of land 
holding. An internal migrant household owns on average 8.5 acres and never migrant households 
own an average of 8.8 acres of land holding. On average, maximum landholdings for never 
migrant household are 200 acres, whereas they are 162 acres for internal migrant and 88 acres for 
international migrant households. Comparatively internal and international migrant households 
own less land than never migrant households, which might be interpreted as another motivating 
factor for migration. However, it seems that most of the households are small landowners, and 
relatively deprived household in terms of average landholding are either internal or international 
migrant households. Interestingly the above summary statistics confirm the intuition that 
households in the rural area rely more heavily on landholding as a source of insurance against 
natural shocks due to non-existence or under developed financial sector. This also confirms the 
New Economics of Labour Migration approach which identifies that rural households use 
migration as a strategy to overcome failures in markets in their home communities.  
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On average, international migrant households borrow around PKR 2,067 from informal sources 
such as friends, relatives and so on. Internal migrant households borrow an average of PKR 
2,037. The initial money borrowing is slightly relatively higher among international migrant 
households than internal ones. Households rely on their land holding to finance their migration 
cost in the event it is substantial and cannot be accomplished from the informal sector. The use of 
destination country data is pivotal for answering the questions set in this work. This kind of 
survey can tell us which households have an international migrant, and receive remittances, but 
cannot inform us about their destination country and whether migrants have moved abroad with 
their whole family.  
Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics by district. In Faisalabad district, on average a typical 
household head is a 51-year-old who has 3.5 years of education, 3 children, 3 males, and 1.5 
females with a family size of around 9 people and 5 acres of landholding. Comparably, in Attock 
district on average a typical household head is 46-year-olds with 4 years of education with 2 
children, 2.5 males, and 1 female and has family size of 7.5 people with 13.5 acres of 
landholding. In Badin district, on average a typical household head is a 42.5 year-old who has 1.8 
years of education and has 4 children, 3 males, and 1.5 females with family size of around 10 
people and 11 acres of landholding.  Finally, in Dir district on average a typical household head is 
a 50-year-old who has 2.6 years of education with 5 children, 4 males, and 2 females and has a 
family size of 12.5 people with 5 acres of landholding.  
There is a considerable level of heterogeneity amongst household between different districts in 
rural Pakistan that makes it interesting to study the determinants of migration.   
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Table 4.4 Household level characteristics by their status of migration 
 Never 
Migrant 
Households 
Internal 
Migrant 
Households 
International 
Migrant 
Households 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Household Head Education in years 3 4 0 16 3 4 0 14 4 4.5 0 14 
Household Head Age (years) 45.5 13 13 85 50 14 18 90 50 15 16 85 
Number of Children age 0 to 11 years 3.5 3 0 28 4 3 0 21 5 3 0 20 
Number of Male age 12 to 30 years 3 2 0 15 4 2.5 0 15 5 3 0 13 
Number of Female age 12 to 30 years 1.5 1 0 7 2 1 0 8 2.5 1.5 0 9 
Household Size  9 4 1 42 11.5 5 3 42 13 5 4 37 
Household average age in years 19 9 0 73 20 8 6 62.5 18 6 3 44 
Household SD age in years 18 6 0 44 18 6 0 40 17 5 1 33 
Household average Education in years  2 2 0 10 2 2 0 10 3 1.5 0 7 
Household SD Education in years 2 1.5 0 7 3 1.5 0 7 3 1.5 0 7 
Land Holding (in acres)31 8.8 21 0 200 8.5 17 0 162 7.0 11 0 88 
                                                             
 
 
31 The land holding, borrow formal, borrow informal and so on are based on their initial values.  
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Remit Relative (Pakistani Rupees ) 43 292 0 9000 63 450 0 9000 31 138 0 1000 
Loaned Other (Pakistani Rupees ) 259 2163 0 90000 479 5169 0 90000 776 4944 0 90000 
Borrow Formal (Pakistani Rupees ) 1167 11160 0 200000 1099 6929 0 90000 2068 17554 0 154400 
Borrow Informal (Pakistani Rupees ) 2034 3597 0 30000 2038 3681 0 30000 2219 4176 0 20000 
Animal Sale (Pakistani Rupees ) 688 2036 0 30000 406 1226 0 15000 226 1221 0 12000 
Machine Sale (Pakistani Rupees ) 18 531 0 16000 34 734 0 16000 0 0 0 0 
 
                                Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics by District 
Variable            Faisalabad Attock Badin Dir 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Head Age (years) 50.71 14.12 46.11 12.94 42.55 13.13 49.72 13.87 
Household Head Education in years 3.40 4.29 4.02 4.53 1.87 3.19 2.61 4.09 
Number of Children age 0 to 11 years   3.01 2.37 2.17 1.81 4.06 2.85 5.30 3.23 
Number of Male age 12 to 30 years       3.24 2.14 2.68 1.89 2.89 2.16 4.30 2.78 
Number of Female age 12 to 30 years      1.55 1.31 1.33 1.07 1.56 1.15 2.11 1.52 
Household Size 8.92 3.66 7.66 2.80 9.63 4.95 12.42 5.68 
Land Holding (in acres) 4.07 7.50 13.55 30.00 11.15 20.57 5.21 10.45 
Remit Relative (Pakistani Rupees ) 167 673 0.93 19.28 40 189 1.28 25.37 
Loaned Other (Pakistani Rupees ) 104 1170 277 1700 288 1142 674 6023 
Borrow Formal (Pakistani Rupees ) 3890 20877 166.47 1296 779 8531 630 6441 
Borrow Informal (Pakistani Rupees ) 2499 3743 1497 2610 1971 3378 2232 4459 
Animal Sale (Pakistani Rupees ) 1061 2984 304 957 874 1862 129 654 
Land Sale (Pakistani Rupees ) 189 1855 22 226 32 274 3632 22393 
Machine Sale (Pakistani Rupees ) 97 1245 0 0 2.05 32.3 0 0 
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4.4 The econometric regression and main determinants 
 
We aim to explore the empirical linkage between pre and post-migration initial wealth and 
migration with the help of a logit and multinomial logit model. Later on in the next chapter we 
will also look at the determinants of remittances with the help of a Box-Cox double hurdle model, 
which accounts for the zeroes. 
The regression estimates address two questions: first, what is the probability of a household 
having a migrant (logit estimation) and second, what is the probability of a migrant choosing an 
internal or international destination with reference to a never migration (Multinomial Logit 
model)?  
The first regression logit predicts, the observed probability of out-migration of a member of the 
household at the time t, conditional on the household head characteristic, household 
characteristics, pre- and post-migration initial wealth, with respect to the reference group of 
households with no migrants and a vector of other covariates. 
Based on model estimates, odds ratio of the probability of out-migration of a household member 
are calculated for each explanatory variable with respect to the reference group – the never 
migrant household. 
For the second regression (Multinomial logit model) the discrete outcome variable for out-
migration is set to zero if the household is neither internal nor international migrant, set to 1 if the 
household is an  internal migrant household and set to 2 if the household is an  international 
migrant household, which is estimated by a multinomial logistic regression. Based on the model 
estimate, relative risk ratio (RRR) on the probability of the out-migration of the household is 
calculated for each explanatory variable with respect to the reference group – the never migrant 
household. The explanatory variables are the same as described for the first regression. 
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We need to explain why a multinomial model is proposed to analyse the migration decisions as 
opposed to a nested logit model. One reason is data availability. For a nested logit model, one 
needs individual characteristics that vary by outcome. As we do not have such dataset, we have 
opted for an alternative multinomial logit model. Also, it is not clear whether a tree structure of 
migration and non-migration is the right approach. From an individual point, the type of 
migration is an integral part of the migration decision. 
Migration involves a discrete or dichotomous choice between two or more alternatives. A 
multinomial logit (MNL) specification is fairly common in the migration literature (Chiswick and 
Miller, 2009; Mora and Taylor, 2006; and Banerjee, 1984), whereas, Nested Logit (NL) models 
have been used in transportation mode choice (Wen and Koppelman, 2001), consumer durable 
choice (Dubin, 2014) and household energy demand choice (Scarpa and Willis, 2010) literatures. 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005; p. 507) write,  “An unordered multinomial model such as 
multinomial logit is appropriate, when there is no clear ordering of the outcome variable. Nested 
logit is the obvious model to use if there is an obvious nesting structure, but usually there is no 
obvious structure”. 
The multinomial model offers the important advantage of being computationally feasible, even 
for the relatively large choice sets. That feasibility is, however, obtained by assuming that error 
terms associated with the various alternatives follow a multivariate normal distribution (Hoffman 
and Duncan, 1988). A second alternative is the nested logit model, which retains the 
computational virtues of the multinomial logit model, but selectively relaxes the independence 
assumption by assuming a set of ‘nested’ choice sets (Koppelman and Bhat, 2006). It follows that 
in MNL model, there exists a unique optimum for the set of parameters, but the parameters of an 
NL model may include multiple optima.  
The MNL model has been widely used for labour market and migration-related choices due to its 
simple mathematical form, easy to estimate and interpret, and the flexibility to add or remove 
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choice alternatives. On the other hand, MNL model has been criticised for an assumption of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. This IIA property allows to add or 
remove of an alternative from the choice set without affecting the structure or parameters of the 
model, an inappropriate assumption in many choice situations. An extreme example of this 
problem is the classic “red bus/blue bus paradox (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1994).”  
The other limitations of the MNL approach include the following. The order is not taken into 
account (where it is relevant) and correlation between error terms is assumed away. Similarly, NL 
model limitations may include the following. For some choices, there is natural tree structure and 
for others, there may be none (Greene, 2003). Further, sequential (two-step) estimators are not 
efficient, and different nests can produce very different results (unobserved factors are correlated, 
and relative odds are independent of other alternatives). 
The multinomial regression procedure allows a comparison of relative risk ratios for the set of 
explanatory variables across different statuses of household variables. For both regression logit 
and multinomial logit our core explanatory variables of the interest are the pre and post-migration 
initial wealth of the household and the household characteristics32.  
A household’s initial wealth can affect the household willingness to participate in risky migration 
activities and secure financing for these activities. Furthermore, the initial wealth of a household, 
including land controls for resource availability is seen as a migration-enabling factor. However, 
at the same time, land owned can have a migration-reducing effect if the land is the main source 
of income. We distinguish between different kinds of wealth.  
                                                             
 
 
32 There are households which include more than one migrant either working internally or international. In our 
analysis, we selected only one migrant from each household.   
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As mentioned earlier, the important explanatory variable in our migration function is the total 
landholding of the household because this variable is closely related to the wealth of the 
household and allows us to test for the familiar argument that migration may result from a fall in 
the landholding of the household, especially for poorer households. 
The decision of a household to have one of its members migrate is assumed to be explained by a 
whole set of household, socio-economic and geographical factors. Among the household controls, 
we use the number of household members (household size) as proxy for the importance of an 
economic intra-household risk diversification strategy (Stark and Levhari, 1982). The head of 
household’s age provides a proxy for household head’s work experience. As such, it gives some 
indication of the earning potential of the household head. As there are typically diminishing 
returns to experience, a quadratic formulation is appropriate. Similarly, the household members 
average age references the idea of work experience. Household head education also provides the 
earnings potential of the prospective household and as educational attainment rises, the 
propensity to migrate is expected to increase.  
The demand for capital is difficult to model but it is related to a variety of indicators included in 
our statistical model. Considerable work suggests that the acquisition of initial wealth constitutes 
the primary motivations for migration. If members of households migrate for this reason, then 
those who already own a home, land, or a business should have less need of capital and, hence, 
lower need of migration. In rural areas in absence of well-functioning and well-connected capital 
markets, land could be the potential source of a liquid asset. Similarly, the relationship between 
migration and landownership has mixed results, some studies find a positive relationship for 
landlessness and others find a negative effect of landholdings on migration.  
DaVanzo (1981: 45) writes “The concepts of location-specific capital (assets that are more 
valuable in their current location than they would be elsewhere) and information costs provide 
powerful explanations for the migration”. In rural areas landholding is an important factor in 
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determining the social status of the households. The higher the landholding in the village implies 
a higher status in the village, so poor households may encourage their members to migrate either 
internally or internationally. Similarly, higher landholding may discourage migration in another 
way: households that have a large landholding provide greater employment opportunities for 
family members as farm supervisors. On other hand, if the households have small landholdings 
and surplus labour due to large household size, that may encourage migration. It could be argued 
that migrants are more likely to come from households with smaller land holdings as they are in 
general need of additional income, on the other hand, it may be characterised by surplus labour 
which may encourage migration.  
We have also included the control variable for the indebtedness of households in our analysis. For 
this reason, we include the variable household borrowed any amount of money either from 
informal or formal sources prior to migration as additional covariate. In addition, we add the 
money received from the sale of livestock and machinery (tractors and tube wells). It is quite 
reasonable to expect that migration decisions, whether internal or international will be positively 
correlated with the household indebtedness to meet travel and job search costs. At the same time, 
it is hard to ignore the biased behaviour of the informal sector towards poor households and the 
non-existence of formal credit sources in rural Pakistan. In this situation, any correlation between 
them is too difficult to be captured by our results. Ultimately, land serves as a lender of last resort 
for most households in rural areas and migration as a hope and blessing in terms of remittances.   
We also take into account the influence of regional factors, and control for likely differences in 
migration of various regional groups. We account for households that belong to either one of the 
three poorest districts of Pakistan (i.e. Attock, Badin or Dir) and our reference district Faisalabad, 
which is relatively rich. The comparison between different rural districts of Pakistan will enable 
us also to test the argument that different regions play a significant role in explaining migration 
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choices. Additionally, the year effects are incorporated in the model to capture general shifts in 
out-migration behaviour, which occurred after controlling for the other influences. 
Children between the ages of 0 and 11 years and females at between 12 and 30 years proxy for 
dependency and one would expect that migration would fall as the number of dependants in the 
households rose. Adam (1998) argues that the life-cycle models suggest that children provide a 
good proxy for dependency status of households. The male members between the ages of 12 and 
30 years represent adults available to execute household-farm duties, and household 
landholdings. Landholdings may be an indication of the demand for labour on the household 
farm, especially where limited land rental markets exit, as in rural Pakistan (land-reform), 
assuming that households allocate their members’ time so as to maximise utility.  
4.5 Results and discussion 
4.5.1 Logit regression result 
 
We are interested in testing the relative importance of a household’s initial wealth in explaining 
out-migration propensities. Hence, we investigate whether the decision about out-migration is 
influenced by ‘initial wealth’ or other household characteristics. Firstly, the logit model is used 
for binary outcome variable ‘migrate’ or ‘not migrate’. Secondly, the multinomial logit model is 
used for discrete outcome variable—‘never migrate’, ‘internal migration’, and ‘international 
migration’—to investigate whether which type of migrants have greater migration propensity -- 
internal or international migrants.  
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Table 4.6 shows the regression results of the logit model33 with odds ratio of out migration for the 
key variables. The chi-squared statistics, testing the null hypothesis that all regressors are jointly 
zero, is strongly rejected. As we see certain household characteristics and pre-migration initial 
land holding are the most important determinants of migration. The age of the household head 
reduces the probability of migration, but the age squared has an opposite effect. The coefficient of 
children aged 0 to 11 years, which is of the proxies for dependency, is negatively related with 
migration, and it is significant at 5%. Similarly, the number of females aged 12 to 30 is also 
statistically significant and it discourages migration. Once again the dependency argument holds.  
The major finding of this study is consistent with the New Economic of Labour Migration 
(NELM); that pre-migration wealth plays a significant role in explaining the out-migration in the 
absence of well-developed credit and insurance markets in rural Pakistan. Even though household 
level factors, including regional effects may be more powerful to explain out-migration, key 
factors for us remain the pre-migration initial landholding. We find pre-migration landholding is 
statistically significant and negatively related to migration.  
We find pre-migration landholding is statistically significant and negatively related to migration. 
The money received from livestock sales is negatively related to migration. In rural Pakistan most 
of the households derive income from farming and diversify their income generation activities 
into livestock farming and nonfarm occupations. One possible reason for this could be sell land or 
livestock to finance migration.  
 
 
                                                             
 
 
33 The logit regression coefficients give the change in the z-score or logit index for a one unit change in the predictor. 
A positive coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to an increase in the predicted probability. A 
negative coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to a decrease in the predicted probability. 
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Table 4.6 Determinants of migration (Logit Regression) 
Variables Coefficient Odds Ratio 
 
Constant 
 
-1.472** 
(0.705) 
 
-- 
Household head’s education 0.007 
(0.017) 
1.007 
(0.017) 
Household head’s age -0.040 
(0.025) 
 
0.998 
Household head’s age squared 0.0004 
(0.0002) 
(0.008) 
Number of children aged 0 to11 years -0.158** 
(0.073) 
0.854** 
(0.062) 
Male at age12-30 0.126 
(0.080) 
1.134 
(0.091) 
Number of females aged 12 to 30 years -0.130* 
(0.080) 
0.878* 
(0.070) 
Household size 0.188*** 
(0.062) 
1.207*** 
(0.075) 
Pre-migration Initial wealth34 
Landholding in acres -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.983*** 
(0.005) 
Money Loaned to other -0.050** 
(0.024) 
0.951** 
(0.023) 
Money borrowed from formal source  -0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.980* 
(0.010) 
Money borrowed from informal source  -0.071*** 
(0.021) 
0.931*** 
(0.019) 
Money received from sale of animals -0.163*** 
(0.047) 
0.850*** 
(0.039) 
Post-migration Initial wealth   
Landholding in acres 0.011 
(0.007) 
1.011 
(0.007) 
Money remitted to Relative 1.695* 
(1.012) 
5.447* 
(5.512) 
Money borrowed from formal sources 0.011** 
(0.006) 
1.011** 
(0.006) 
District (reference category is Faisalabad)   
District Attock 0.248 
(0.173) 
1.281 
(0.222) 
District Badin -0.935*** 
(0.201) 
0.393*** 
(0.079) 
District Dir 0.772*** 
(0.181) 
2.164*** 
(0.392) 
Other controls Yes  
Year effects Yes  
Observations 3130  
Pseudo R2 0.2699  
Clusters in household 837  
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The extended version of Table 4.6 is 
in Appendix A.1. 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
34 Amount in Pakistani Rupees. 
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However, this study should not be taken as representative of the whole of Pakistan, yet future 
research should endeavour to test the implications further by examining the costs of migration 
and variables that are likely to be correlated with it. The concepts used here offer an explanation 
for migration based on pre-migration wealth and information costs. The members of the 
household to migrate internally or internationally based only on the expected benefits and costs 
partly explain the true motivation behind it. Instead, it is more or less a risk diversification 
strategy by households as accentuated by NELM. Furthermore, with imperfect information, it is 
not easy for households to correctly weigh the advantages and disadvantages in deciding whether 
and where to move. Migration is not costless, and at a minimum involves sociological costs 
(subject to the limited information that is available). 
The other finding that money loaned to others and money borrowed from formal and informal 
sector is statistically significant and negatively related to migration. In the context of missing or 
incomplete markets, only well-off households have the ability to secure the loan from either 
formal or informal sectors due to their credibility to return loans when they are mature. However, 
negative influences of loans on migration suggest that migration may lead households to diversify 
less when household can raise finances in difficult times. It may follow that household diversify 
their risks through migration due to missing and incomplete markets. However, if these markets 
are accessible to household, then there is less need for migration.        
The finding from post-migration initial wealth suggest only money borrowed from formal sources 
are positive and significant. This positive interaction effect illustrates the importance of migration 
for securing loan. The earlier study on the spatial pattern of international migration in Pakistan 
finds that less developed districts have a high propesity to migrate and a low propensity to return, 
while the more properous districts (by industrial base and agricultural productivity) have a low 
propensity to migrate and a high propensity to return (Altaf and Obaidullah, 1992). In our study, 
the poor district of Sindh (Badin) is characterized by negative migration when compared with a 
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base category of the more developed district. This district has the common feature of large 
landholdings and high tenancy ratios (high feudal districts). However, it might follow that the 
land tenure system in Sindh (Badin) has a significant effect on out-migration in explaining the 
spatial pattern of internal as well as international migration. We also see that compared to the 
relatively prosperous district of Faisalabad (our base category), the probability of migration is 
lower for a poor district like Badin, but higher for Dir. This suggests that the level of regional 
development is not a clear cut driver of migration. Perhaps historical practices and existing 
migration networks are more important than just regional development. 
Table 4.6 also shows the odds ratio of out migration. An odds ratio (OR) is defined as the ratio of 
the odds of an event occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in another group, or to a 
data-based estimate of that ratio. A one child increase in children in the age group 0 to 11 years 
and a female in the age group 12 to 30 years will produce a 2.5% and 2.0% decrease in the 
probability of migration respectively. This finding is not contrary to the conventional wisdom 
accentuated by migration theories that the more dependants a household has, the lower 
probability of migration will be. These findings suggest that migration decision outcomes in rural 
Pakistan are governed in part by general family norms and specific marital roles restricting 
migration.  
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that each additional household 
member increases the probability of migration by about 2.9%. Furthermore, households that have 
a larger household size are in better position to diversify their human resources in order to cope 
with uncertainties and vulnerabilities exposed with agricultural activities. In Pakistan's context, 
the literature generally suggests that large household size is associated with wealth and prestige 
and more male members in a family is associated with greater influence and power in rural areas.   
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The findings observed in this study mirror those of studies that have examined the effect of 
migration on household land ownership. In predicting the probability of migration as a function 
of pre-migration land ownership, when all other covariates are at their mean value, ten-acres 
lower land holding leads to 3% increase in the probability of migration. The evidence from this 
study suggests that land acts as source of wealth that facilitates migration but it effects is 
marginal. In a similar case for Mexico and Thailand, VanWey (2005) identified that the effect of 
landownership on out-migration, whether international or internal, is negative for the vast 
majority of households. The evidence presented thus far supports the idea that the opportunity to 
invest in the purchase or improvement of land sustains migration. The other finding is that PKR 
10,000 (Rupees) loaned to others, money borrowed from the formal sector and money borrowed 
from the informal sector will lead to an 8%, 3% and 3% reduction in migration, respectively. 
 
The year’s effect is included in the estimation to capture the general shift in migration behaviour, 
which occurred after controlling for the other influences captured by the model. Other than year 3 
(1999-1990) and 4 (1990-1991), the results suggest that there was no general shift in mobility 
patterns over the 1987-1991 period covered by the data: with year 1 (1987-1988) as the base 
category. There is a substantial evidence of a downward shift in out-migration in years 3 and 4. 
The predicted probability of migration is 30.6% less for migrant households in year 3 and 4.5% 
less in year 4, than for households in the year 1.  
 
There are two districts (Badin and Dir) that are statistically significant. The odds ratio for Badin 
tells us that, for two hypothetical households with all other covariates at their mean level, the 
predicted probability of migration is 13.7% less for the migrant households in Badin than for the 
households in Faisalabad district. The odds ratio for Dir tell us that, the predicted probability of 
migration is 13.8% greater for the migrant households in Dir than for the households in 
Faisalabad district. These results confirm the earlier overviews of the district discussed in the 
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section 2.5 of the study area that Dir district has higher out-migration tradition in Pakistan 
through the nature of the area in which they reside. 
  
4.5.2 Multinomial logit regression result       
     
While the binary outcome aforementioned is informative, the discussion and conclusion on the 
implications for internal and international migration has still to be addressed. Table 4.7 shows the 
result of the multinomial logit regression. The outcome measure in this multinomial logit 
regression analysis is the migration status (migration) that is ‘0’ for never migrant households, ‘1’ 
for internal migrant households and ‘2’ for International migrant households. The relative risk 
ratio (or odd ratios) for multinomial logit is also reported in table 6. Standard interpretation of the 
relative risk ratios is for a unit change in the predictor variable, the relative risk ratio of outcome 
‘y’ relative to the referent group is expected to change by a factor of the respective parameter 
estimate given the variables in the model are held constant. We will relate this categorical 
variable to household head characteristics, household characteristics, pre-migration and post-
migration initial wealth, time effects and regional characteristics35. 
Our new model also does not captures a significant role of household heads in terms of education 
and age, same to the earlier finding of the logit model. Household heads in rural Pakistan are less 
likely to engage in international migration, but more likely to engage in internal migration. The 
result no doubt reflects differences in opportunity costs between internal and international 
migration for household heads. For heads of household, responsibilities include administrative 
                                                             
 
 
35 The first iteration (called iteration 0) is the log likelihood of the "null" or "empty" model; that is, a model with no 
predictors.  At the next iteration, the predictor(s) are included in the model. The log likelihood decreases because the 
goal is to minimize the log likelihood. When the difference between successive iterations is very small, the model is 
said to have "converged", the iteration stops and the resulted log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model 
which is -1858.93 in our model. 
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duties on the family farm and other obligations in the districts which generally create 
opportunities for international migration networking, which typically involves a large 
commitment of both time and capital. However, our results for household head characteristics are 
not different with the finding of other authors, such as Stark and Taylor (1991).  
 
Internal and international migration is negatively associated with the indicator of dependent 
children. A possible explanation for this result may be that the more dependent households have 
more care responsibilities. The odd ratios show that if the internal migrant household relative to 
the never migrant household were to increase, one dependent child would be expected to decrease 
internal migration by 11%, whereas the odd ratios for international migrant households show a 
much larger decrease of around 28%.  
 
Larger families tend to favour both internal and international migration, but with different 
probabilities. The odd ratio shows an increase in internal migration to around 19% but 
comparatively the international migrant household shows an increase of around 30% with an 
additional household member. Every additional member in the household will result in a higher 
probability of international migration. However, the presence of females discourages only 
internal migration may be due to the care-giving responsibilities for rural females. This indicator 
taps different aspects of family relationships and responsibilities of the rural female. In addition, 
the multinomial logit estimate for females is statistically significant and shows that if the internal 
migrant households were to increase by one female the multinomial odds for internal migrant 
households relative to never migrant households would be expected to decrease by 20%, while 
holding all other variables in the model constant.   
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Table 4.7 Determinants of migration: (Multinomial Logit Regression) 
Base category for Migration     = “0” Never Migrant 
                                                  = “1” Internal Migrant 
                                                  = “2” International Migrant 
Variables Internal 
Migration 
Relative Risk 
Ratio 
International 
Migration 
Relative Risk 
Ratio 
Constant -1.695*** 
(0.678) 
-- -4.134*** 
(1.521) 
 
Household head’s education -0.009 
(0.017) 
0.991 
(0.017) 
0.047 
(0.036) 
1.048 
(0.038) 
Household head’s age -0.025 
(0.0250) 
 
0.999 
-0.052 
(0.047) 
 
0.998 
Household head’s age squared 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
(0.008) 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
(0.154) 
Number of children aged 0 to11 -0.118* 
(0.070) 
0.888* 
(0.062) 
-0.323** 
(0.143) 
0.724** 
(0.104) 
Male at age12-30 
 
0.175** 
(0.077) 
1.191** 
(0.091) 
-0.067 
(0.156) 
0.935 
(0.146) 
Number of females aged 12 to 30 -0.226*** 
(0.077) 
0.798*** 
(0.062) 
0.145 
(0.147) 
1.156 
(0.170) 
Household size 0.177*** 
(0.058) 
1.194*** 
(0.070) 
0.259** 
(0.120) 
1.296** 
(0.156) 
Pre-migration Initial wealth36 
Landholding in acres -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.987*** 
(0.004) 
-0.113* 
(0.065) 
0.893* 
(0.058) 
Money Loaned to other -0.063 
(0.050) 
0.939 
(0.047) 
0.007 
(0.066) 
1.007 
(0.067) 
Money borrowed from formal sources 0.002 
(0.006) 
1.001 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
1.016 
(0.012) 
Money borrowed from informal sources -0.059*** 
(0.022) 
0.943*** 
(0.021) 
-0.119** 
(0.053) 
0.887** 
(0.047) 
Money received from sale of animals -0.168*** 
(0.042) 
0.845*** 
(0.035) 
-1.181 
(0.772) 
0.307 
(0.237) 
Post-migration Initial wealth 
Landholding in acres 0.009 
(0.007) 
1.009 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
1.016 
(0.011) 
Money remitted to Relative 1.939** 
(0.941) 
6.955** 
(6.546) 
3.112 
(2.069) 
22.472 
(46.486) 
Money borrowed from formal sources 0.002 
(0.006) 
1.001 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
1.016 
(0.012) 
District (reference category is Faisalabad)  
Attock 0.158 
(0.170) 
1.171 
(0.199) 
1.023* 
(0.565) 
2.781* 
(1.572) 
Badin -0.968*** 
(0.193) 
0.380*** 
(0.073) 
-1.837 
(1.276) 
0.159 
(0.203) 
Dir 0.060 
(0.185) 
1.061 
(0.196) 
2.727*** 
(0.518) 
15.28*** 
(7.92) 
Other controls Yes 
Year effects Yes 
Observations 3130 
Pseudo R2 0.2993 
                                                             
 
 
36 Amount in Pakistani Rupees. 
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Log pseudo-likelihood -1858.93 
Wald Chi2 (58) 785.27 
Clusters in household 837 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The extended version of 
Table 4.7 is in Appendix A.2. 
Also, only pre-migration initial landholding needs to be depleted for both types of migration. In 
addition, the multinomial logit estimate for household pre-migration initial landholding is 
statistically significant and shows that if the internal migrant households were to decrease 
household landholding by one acre, the multinomial odds for internal migrant households relative 
to never migrant households would be expected to increase by 1%, while holding all other 
variables in the model constant. Similarly, the multinomial logit estimate for a one-acre decrease 
in landholding for international migrant households relative to never migrant households given 
the other variables in the model are held constant would be expected to increase by 11%. Both 
internal and international migration has negative associations with pre-migration initial 
landholding, but the effect of international migration is much greater. Our results for post-
migration initial wealth did not capture any significant effect of wealth on either internal or 
international migration.     
 
However, now there are some additional variables that assume significance. Loans taken from 
informal sources and money raised by selling animals are now important; but they negatively 
affect internal migration and international migration. The multinomial logit estimate for a one 
thousand Rupees increase in money borrowing from informal sources for internal migrant 
households relative to never migrant households shows that the multinomial odds for internal 
migrant households in this scenario relative to never migrant households would be expected to 
decrease by 6% while holding all other variables in the model constant. On the contrary, the 
multinomial logit estimate for a one thousand Rupees increase in money borrowed from the 
informal sector for international migrant households relative to never migrant households would 
be expected to decrease by 11%. It seems that people who have taken more loans or have sold 
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animals are probably in a debt trap and therefore unable to migrate. This argument favours our 
already stated assumption that relatively deprived households compared to richer households may 
migrate internationally to accumulate investible surplus and diversify risk. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that wealthy households are able to overcome liquidity and risk constraints on 
production without participating in migration (Rozelle, et al. 1999).   
 
Our result for year’s effect in context of internal and international migration confirms the earlier 
finding of logit regression. Other than year 2 (1998-1999), the results suggest there was a general 
shift in internal and international mobility patterns over the 1987-1991 periods covered by the 
data. The odd ratio estimate for Badin relative to Faisalabad is 62% lower for being an internal 
migrant household relative to ‘never migrant’ households. For international migrants, two 
districts are significant and only Badin is insignificant. Similarly, for district Attock and Dir the 
odd ratios (relative to Faisalabad) are 2.781 and 14.28 units higher respectively for being in 
international migrant households relative to never migrant households. The district Badin has 
fewer odds of internal as well as for international migration compared to the more prosperous 
district Faisalabad.  This suggests a weak link may exist between Badin district and Faisalabad 
district in term of internal and international migration. A positive correlation was found between 
Dir, Attock and the reference category Faisalabad district for only international migration.   
 
The regional indicators suggest that households in the Badin district are less likely than 
households living in the Faisalabad District to migrate internationally. Only households in the Dir 
and Attock district are more likely than those in the Faisalabad District to migrate internationally 
for work. Our results confirm that regional differences clearly discriminate between internal and 
international migration in rural Pakistan, while the empirical results indicate that international and 
internal migrant pre-migration landholdings have a negative influence on both international and 
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internal migration. The analysis has assumed that pre and post-migration landholding play a 
similar role regardless of their location within those general destinations.  
4.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we made use of a unique panel data set of 1986-1991 for rural Pakistan to   analyse 
internal and international migration within a common framework. However, with the control of 
household head characteristic, household level characteristics, wealth along regional fixed effects 
and year effects, the results generally indicate significant differences between internal migration 
and international migration. This outcome does not run contrary to the conventional wisdom on 
the benefits of internal and international migration as a household risk diversification strategy in a 
local restrictive environment. Typically, the more dependants a household has (in the form of 
children and young females), the less likely it is to have a migrant among its members. But at the 
same time, we also see that the larger the household, the greater the likelihood of sending a 
member to work within the country or abroad. More importantly, we see that the selling of land is 
an important way of financing international migration. This is consistent with other authors’ 
findings and the conventional wisdom. Overall, the motivation for a household member migration 
is to find better opportunities in a new location and is associated with the local social conditions, 
political exclusion and economic deprivation. Whether the internal or international migration in 
question is due to ‘push factors’ or ‘pull factors’, the sole objective is the same since the net 
effect of migration is an improvement in the well-being of the households. In our case, the 
linkage between pre and post-migration initial wealth and internal or international migration is 
negotiated through sacrificing through the landholding. However, migration provides 
opportunities for upward economic mobility to many households in rural Pakistan.     
The insight of this analysis can be useful in making public policies. Government should facilitate 
greater movement of labour by reducing the cost of migration. The rural credit market should also 
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be developed so that people can get affordable loans without having to sell land, which are vital 
assets for survival in rural areas. Other costs such as documentation costs, passports and work 
visas, health examination, criminal checks and other formalities should be charged nominally. 
Promoting cooperation between governments to simplify recruitment and reduce the scope of 
exploitation of workers by unscrupulous intermediaries and contractors.  The other sets of 
government policy failure in rural areas of Pakistan include numerous development constraints 
directly linked with inadequate infrastructure, tenancy agreement (sharecropping versus fixed rent 
tenancy), undeveloped financial markets, non-existence of insurance markets, non-involvement 
of the private sector and targeted intervention by the state.    
There are several limitations of the study. First is the time period of the study. Although the data 
set is detailed, it relates to a time period that might be useful for policy formulation now, as the 
Pakistani economy has changed significantly and the flow of international migration has 
increased in recent years. The second problem is that the data was not rich enough to find 
migrant-specific information, though the household level information is very detailed. We hope 
to overcome these limitations to some extent in the next two chapters where we will be using a 
more recent data set. 
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 Appendix: 
     
Table A.1 Determinants of migration: (Logit Regression) 
VARIABLES Migration  Odds Ratio 
1-Household Head Characteristics  
Constant -1.472** 
(0.705) 
--- 
Household Head Education 0.007 
(0.017) 
1.007 
(0.017) 
Household Head Age -0.040 
(0.025) 
 
0.998  
Household Head Age2 0.0004 
(0.0002) 
(0.008) 
2-Household Characteristics  
Children at age 0-11 -0.158** 
(0.073) 
0.854** 
(0.062) 
Male at age12-30 0.126 
(0.080) 
1.134 
(0.091) 
Female at age12-30 -0.130* 
(0.080) 
0.878* 
(0.070) 
Household size 0.188*** 
(0.062) 
1.207*** 
(0.075) 
Household Average Age 0.005 
(0.011) 
1.005 
(0.011) 
Household SD Age 0.022* 
(0.012) 
1.022* 
(0.012) 
Household Average education 0.127** 
(0.056) 
1.135** 
(0.064) 
Household SD education -0.013 
(0.061) 
0.987 
(0.060) 
3- Pre-Migration Initial Wealth37  
Landholding in acres -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.983*** 
(0.005) 
Money remitted to Relative  0.257 
(0.239) 
1.293 
(0.309) 
Money Loaned to other  -0.050** 
(0.024) 
0.951** 
(0.023) 
Money borrowed from formal sources  -0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.980* 
(0.010) 
Money borrowed from informal sources  -0.071*** 
(0.021) 
0.931*** 
(0.019) 
Money received from sale of animals  -0.163*** 
(0.047) 
0.850*** 
(0.039) 
4- Post-Migration Initial Wealth 
Landholding in acres 0.011 
(0.007) 
1.011 
(0.007) 
Money remitted to Relative  1.695* 
(1.012) 
5.447* 
(5.512) 
Money Loaned to other  0.007 
(0.007) 
1.007 
(0.007) 
Money borrowed from formal sources  0.011** 
(0.006) 
1.011** 
(0.006) 
Money borrowed from informal sources  0.029 
(0.029) 
1.029 
(0.030) 
Money received from sale of animals  0.135 
(0.100) 
1.021 
(0.102) 
                                                             
 
 
37 All amount in thousand Rupees 
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5-Time Effects: ( base category Year1)  
Year2 -0.135 
(0.100) 
-0.874 
(0.087) 
Year3 -2.198*** 
(0.140) 
0.111*** 
(0.016) 
Year4 -0.253** 
(0.119) 
0.092** 
(0.092) 
6-Regional Characteristics: ( base category Faisalabad)  
Attock 0.248 
(0.173) 
1.281 
(0.222) 
Badin -0.935*** 
(0.201) 
0.393*** 
(0.079) 
Dir 0.772*** 
(0.181) 
2.164*** 
(0.392) 
Observations 3,130 
Pseudo R2 0.2699 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Clusters in household 837 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2 Determinants of migration: (Multinomial Logit Regression) 
Base category for Migration = “0” Never Migrant 
                                             = “1” internal Migrant 
                                             = “2” International Migrant 
 
 1 Relative Risk 
Ratio 
2 Relative Risk 
Ratio 
VARIABLES Internal Migrant Internal Migrant International 
Migrant 
International 
Migrant 
1-Household Head Characteristics 
Constant -1.695*** 
(0.678) 
 -4.134*** 
(1.521) 
 
Household Head 
Education 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
0.991 
(0.017) 
0.047 
(0.036) 
1.048 
(0.038) 
Household Head Age -0.025 
(0.0250) 
0.976 
(0.024) 
-0.052 
(0.047) 
0.949 
(0.045) 
Household Head Age2 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
1.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
1.0005 
(0.0005) 
2-Household Characteristics 
Children at age 0-11 -0.118* 
(0.070) 
0.888* 
(0.062) 
-0.323** 
(0.143) 
0.724** 
(0.104) 
Male at age12-30 0.175** 
(0.077) 
1.191** 
(0.091) 
-0.067 
(0.156) 
0.935 
(0.146) 
Female at age12-30 -0.226*** 
(0.077) 
0.798*** 
(0.062) 
0.145 
(0.147) 
1.156 
(0.170) 
Household size 0.177*** 
(0.058) 
1.194*** 
(0.070) 
0.259** 
(0.120) 
1.296** 
(0.156) 
Household Average 
Age 
0.012 
(0.011) 
1.012 
(0.011) 
-0.023 
(0.034) 
0.977 
(0.033) 
Household SD Age 0.017 
(0.012) 
1.017 
(0.013) 
0.038 
(0.030) 
1.039 
(0.031) 
Household Average 
education 
0.155*** 
(0.057) 
1.168*** 
(0.066) 
0.094 
(0.122) 
1.098 
(0.134) 
Household SD 
education 
-0.063 
(0.061) 
0.939 
(0.058) 
0.118 
(0.129) 
1.126 
(0.145) 
3- Pre-Migration Initial Wealth38 
Landholding in acres -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.987*** 
(0.004) 
-0.113* 
(0.065) 
0.893* 
(0.058) 
Money remitted to 
Relative 
0.194 
(0.179) 
1.214 
(0.218) 
1.648 
(1.264) 
5.197 
(6.571) 
Money Loaned to 
other 
-0.063 
(0.050) 
0.939 
(0.047) 
0.007 
(0.066) 
1.007 
(0.067) 
Money borrowed from 
formal sources 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
0.987 
(0.010) 
-0.350 
(0.372) 
0.705 
(0.262) 
Money borrowed from 
informal sources 
-0.059*** 
(0.022) 
0.943*** 
(0.021) 
-0.119** 
(0.053) 
0.887** 
(0.047) 
Money received from 
sale of animals 
-0.168*** 
(0.042) 
0.845*** 
(0.035) 
-1.181 
(0.772) 
0.307 
(0.237) 
4- Post-Migration Initial Wealth 
Landholding in acres 0.009 
(0.007) 
1.009 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
1.016 
(0.011) 
Money remitted to 
Relative 
1.939** 
(0.941) 
6.955** 
(6.546) 
3.112 
(2.069) 
22.472 
(46.486) 
Money Loaned to 
other 
0.005 
(0.004) 
1.005 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
1.003 
(0.009) 
                                                             
 
 
38 All amount in thousand Rupees. 
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Money borrowed from 
formal sources 
0.002 
(0.006) 
1.001 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
1.016 
(0.012) 
Money borrowed from 
informal sources 
0.009 
(0.026) 
1.009 
(0.026) 
0.051 
(0.046) 
1.052 
(0.049) 
Money received from 
sale of animals 
0.130 
(0.096) 
1.139 
(0.110) 
0.217 
(0.162) 
1.242 
(0.201) 
4-Time Effects: ( base category Year1) 
Year2 -0.129 
(0.106) 
0.879 
(0.093) 
-0.120 
(0.129) 
0.890 
(0.114) 
Year3 -4.185*** 
(0.358) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.555*** 
(0.206) 
0.574*** 
(0.083) 
Year4 -0.322*** 
(0.127) 
0.724*** 
(0.092) 
0.054 
(0.167) 
1.056 
(0.177) 
5-Regional Characteristics: ( base category Faisalabad) 
Attock 0.158 
(0.170) 
1.171 
(0.199) 
1.023* 
(0.565) 
2.781* 
(1.572) 
Badin -0.968*** 
(0.193) 
0.380*** 
(0.073) 
-1.837 
(1.276) 
0.159 
(0.203) 
Dir 0.060 
(0.185) 
1.061 
(0.196) 
2.727*** 
(0.518) 
15.28*** 
(7.92) 
Observations 3130 
Pseudo R2 0.2993 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Clusters in household 837 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3 Determinants of migration for the subsample of initial migrant households: (Logit regression) 
VARIABLES Migration  
1-Household Head Characteristics 
Constant -0.157 
(1.70) 
Household Head Education 0.066** 
(0.033) 
Household Head Age -0.051 
(0.060) 
Household Head Age2 0.0001 
(0.0006) 
2-Household Characteristics 
Children at age 0-11 -0.223* 
(0.124) 
Male at age12-30 0.057 
(0.141) 
Female at age12-30 -0.050 
(0.133) 
Household size 0.134 
(0.110) 
Household Average Age -0.018 
(0.023) 
Household SD Age 0.017 
(0.027) 
Household Average education 0.127 
(0.085) 
Household SD education -0.092 
(0.107) 
3- Post-Migration Initial Wealth39 
Landholding in acres 0.003 
(0.007) 
Money remitted to Relative  0.551 
(1.034) 
Money Loaned to other  0.006 
(0.007) 
Money borrowed from formal sources  0.010 
(0.009) 
Money borrowed from informal sources  -0.020 
(0.022) 
Money received from sale of animals  0.230 
(0.102) 
4-Time Effects: ( base category Year1) 
Year2 -0.176 
(0.218) 
Year3 -2.287*** 
(0.215) 
Year4 -0.488** 
(0.241) 
5-Regional Characteristics: ( base category Faisalabad) 
Attock 0.725** 
(0.325) 
Badin -1.017*** 
(0.426) 
Dir 1.676*** 
(0.302) 
Observations 904 
Pseudo R2 0.2512 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Clusters in household 249 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
                                                             
 
 
39 All amount in thousand Rupees 
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Table A.4 Determinants of migration for the subsample of non-initial migrant households: Logit regression 
VARIABLES Migration  
1-Household Head Characteristics 
Constant -2.210** 
(0.741) 
Household Head Education -0.022 
(0.021) 
Household Head Age -0.004 
(0.029) 
Household Head Age2 0.00001 
(0.0003) 
2-Household Characteristics 
Children at age 0-11 -0.094 
(0.086) 
Male at age12-30 0.149 
(0.101) 
Female at age12-30 -0.154 
(0.099) 
Household size 0.179** 
(0.074) 
Household Average Age 0.010 
(0.013) 
Household SD Age 0.023 
(0.014) 
Household Average education 0.119* 
(0.073) 
Household SD education -0.032 
(0.077) 
3- Pre-Migration Initial Wealth40 
Landholding in acres -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Money remitted to Relative  0.234 
(0.241) 
Money Loaned to other  -0.028 
(0.024) 
Money borrowed from formal sources  -0.014 
(0.010) 
Money borrowed from informal sources  -0.033 
(0.021) 
Money received from sale of animals  -0.177*** 
(0.040) 
4-Time Effects: ( base category Year1) 
Year2 -0.151 
(0.124) 
Year3 -2.770*** 
(0.274) 
Year4 -0.207 
(0.147) 
5-Regional Characteristics: ( base category Faisalabad) 
Attock 0.070 
(0.201) 
Badin -0.987*** 
(0.227) 
Dir 0.043 
(0.228) 
Observations 2,226 
Pseudo R2 0.1939 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Clusters in household 588 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
                                                             
 
 
40 All amount in thousand Rupees 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
(ESSAY TWO) 
A Box-Cox Double Hurdle Model of Remittances 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The migration in the literature has been identified as a phenomenon of life improvement for many 
poor households in the developing countries that creates social and financial benefits not only for 
migrants but also for their families in the origin countries. If the migration route is from 
developing to developed countries, whether it is due to cost and benefits analysis or wage 
differential, it will lead to ‘brain gain’ for migrants. However, the resulting ‘brain drain’ due to 
human capital loss for migrant families in home countries is compensated by the remittances sent 
by migrants. The remittances received by many households increase consumption and investment 
in local economies (where capital is scarce) and will result in a multiplier effect. At the macro 
level, in many developing countries, this unrequited transfer in the form of remittances has a 
positive effect on the balance of payment. It is also an important source of foreign exchange, 
which covers a substantial portion of the trade balance. At the micro level, migration and 
remittances enable financial and social inclusion for many rural households. Similarly, the World 
Bank (2014) estimated that the flow of remittances to developing countries are expected to grow 
by  7.8%  from $404 billion in 2013 to reach $436 billion in 2014, and further grow to $516 
billion in 2016. Given this historically unprecedented benefit of migration and remittances on the 
household economy in many countries, it is important to understand the factors that promote 
migration or leads to remittances. 
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The determinant of remittances has been studied in the literature of migration to understand the 
underlying motivation to remit. The new economics of labour migration (NELM) has already 
highlighted the combination of factors ranging from altruism (Lucas and Stark, 1985), self-
interest (Carling, 2008), micro-enterprise or investment (Yang, 2008), loan repayment (Ilahi and 
Jafarey 1999) to inheritance (Hoddinott, 1994) that determine this flow of remittances from 
migrants to their extended family. The role of remittances differs from one household to another 
household and from one region to another region depending on the underlying motives of the 
migration. The analysis of remittances enables us to understand the complexity of the household 
arrangement involved in migration.   
Although there is extensive research on the issue of migration and remittances only a few of them 
is focused on this aspect in Pakistan, which comes in the world top ten remittance receiving 
countries. We fill this gap in the literature by analysing the determinants of remittances by 
employing the double-hurdle model using the panel data of Pakistan.  
If one wishes to model remittances, they have to be aware of the large number of zeroes in the 
data. The motivation behind using the Box-Cox double hurdle model in remittance studies is that 
there is a large cluster of zeroes denoting households receiving no remittances. Due to the 
presence of zero-s OLS yields inconsistent estimates, and we need to consider an alternative 
estimation approach. Next, we need to recognize the fact that some migrants may not remit at all, 
and it is only those who decide to remit that choose an optimal amount to remit. For this reason, 
we employ a double-hurdle model to study the determinants of remittances. In this model, the 
household decisions on whether and how much is to receive are split. In light of this, our paper 
tries to analyse the factors that play an important role in determining the probability, and the 
amount of remittances received by households from the migrants who are currently abroad. We 
use the panel data set from rural Pakistan to approach our research question from the receiving 
household perspective. Thus, our empirical model include the determinants of remittances in 
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terms of household head characteristics, household composition, household level wealth, loan 
variables and regional characteristics suggested by existing theories of remittances, which 
influence the incidence and amount of remittances received by household.  
Our results clearly differentiate between the probability to remit, and the level of remittances 
received by the household. It is noted that there exist opposing effects of probability to receive 
remittances and the level of remittances at a district level. We find that the determinant of 
remittances in terms of the participation and the level of remittances received by a household is 
different. A combination of household level observed characteristics and regional variables are 
key to explaining the remittance behaviours in rural Pakistan.  
 
We find that internal migrants and international migrants have a positive impact on both the 
probability to remit and also on the level of remittances. The square term for international and 
internal migration confirms that the number of members traveling internally and internationally 
both exhibit positive relationships, but with diminishing marginal returns. The remittances rise 
with the number of migrants travelling in the household, but it increases at a decreasing rate. This 
result confirms that households that have sent migrants outside, are improving their welfare by 
receiving greater welfare, but that depends on the household wealth and its capacity to send 
multiple members outside. In short, the richer families receive greater remittances. Although, 
money loans to others has a positive impact on the level of remittances but not on the probability 
to remit. Finally, our district variable Attock and Dir with base category Faisalabad is only 
significant for the first hurdle ‘likelihood to remit’. Similarly, district Dir and Badin are only 
significant for the second hurdle ‘level of remittances’.     
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 explains the data and provides sample 
description. The research methodology is presented in section 5.3 while the discussion and results 
are presented in Section 5.4. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter.  
    
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Continuing with the same data set as in the previous section, but making use of the remittances 
information, we estimate the Box-Cox double hurdle model proposed above. The data panel 
contains information on 975 households for five years. But it has one limitation that it does not 
distinguish between internal versus international remittances. By using support information on 
the migration status – internal or international—we could have distinguished between the sources 
of remittances, however, we have not done so.  
In our data, remittances are measured at the household level and we include a vector of household 
characteristics representing household head characteristics, the number of male and female 
members, dependant in the households, wealth status of the household, members traveling within 
and outside of a country and district level fixed effects. Table 5.1 presents a summary of the 
remittances received by households at the district level. On average Dir district received around 
11,510 Pakistani Rupees (PKR) per annum (with a standard deviation of 35,448 PKR), which is 
the highest amongst the surveyed districts.  This finding is consistent with the previous chapter’s 
descriptive statistics that Dir district has the highest share of internal and international migrants. 
Similarly, remittances received by district Faisalabad stands on average at 4,135 PKR with a 
standard deviation of 18,029 PKR. On average remittances received by Attock and Badin district 
are 3,557 PKR and 1,205 PKR respectively, which is comparatively lower than others.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of remittances at District level 
District Average Std. Dev. Observations 
Faisalabad 4135 18029 821 (20%) 
Attock 3557 12983 859 (21%) 
Badin 1205 4262 1214 (30%) 
Dir 11510 35448 1163 (29%) 
Total  5250 21995 4057 
 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the household level characteristics of whether or not a household receives 
remittances. The sample is restricted to households with at least a migrant away, but few of 
the household might receive remittances from friends, and relatives. Recalling from last 
chapter that there are 33% of the migrant’s household. The household receives remittances 
consists of 35%. These 2% of the households might receive remittances from friends, and 
relatives.   
We present summary statistics for overall household economic status by including landholding 
and other wealth proxies. By concentrating on the remittance receiving households in the first 
part of Table 5.2, we see that on average the age of a household head is around 48.5 years, with 
three years of education, a household size of 10.19 members and receives remittances of 14,771 
PKR per annum with 7.5 acres of landholding. The number of household members traveling 
abroad ranges from 0 to 7, while the number of the household members traveling internally 
ranges from 0 to 5.  In contrast, analysing households who do not receive remittances in the 
second part of the table 5.2 we see that the typical age of a household head is around 46 years, 
with three years of education, a household size of 9.5 members and 8.65 acres of land holding. 
Similarly, the number of household members traveling internally is from 0 to 9 and traveling 
abroad is from 0 to 3. In our data set, 36% of the households received remittances while the 
remaining 64% of households do not receive remittances. The data set is informatively rich 
enough to study the determinants of remittances.  
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics of households receive and do not receive remittances 
 Household receives remittances 
(Observation = 1442) 
Household not receive 
remittances 
(Observation = 2615) 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Remittances 14771 34943 0 600000 - - - - 
Head Education  2.91 4.13 0 16 2.82 4.04 0 16 
Head Age  48.45 14.19 13 85 46.22 13.69 13 90 
Number of Children  3.67 2.86 0 21 3.87 2.97 0 28 
Number of Males  3.73 2.46 0 15 3.10 2.32 0 15 
Number of Females  1.79 1.34 0 9 1.60 1.30 0 8 
Household Size 10.19 4.92 2 42 9.69 4.89 1 42 
Travelling in a 
country41  
0.50 0.88 0 5 0.29 0.70 0 9 
Travelling abroad42  0.22 0.60 0 7 0.037 0.23 0 3 
Land Holding  7.5 16.75 0 200 8.65 19.10 0 200 
Remit Relative  87.21 522 0 10000 64.36 486 0 15000 
Loaned Other  951 5547 0 100000 1792 22279 0 900000 
Borrow Formal  862 9746 0 220000 506 6162 0 200000 
Borrow Informal  2335 8688 0 212000 2168 13324 0 400000 
Animal Sale  1415 3770 0 54700 2214 10239 0 422000 
Land Sale  889 9130 0 236000 1549 16689 0 350000 
 
The comparison of the households that receive remittances with the households that do not 
receive remittances shows that there is a substantial variation between these two types of 
household in rural Pakistan. All these descriptive statistics give us an incomparable socio-
economic picture of the household that is essential to understand their remittance behaviour. 
                                                             
 
 
41 These are the internal migrant member of the household traveling in a country  
42 These are the international migrant member of the household traveling outside a country 
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5.3 Research Methodology  
 
5.3.1 Historical evolution of double-hurdle Model  
 
This paper studies the determinants of remittances using Pakistan's panel data set. Sinning (2011) 
explains that conventional literature of migration and remittances apply Tobit's (1958), but 
Vuong-test reveals that the double-hurdle model is the correct specification rather than Tobit's 
model for analysis of migration and remittances. Flood and Grasjo (2001) explain Heckman’s 
(1978) generalisation of Tobit's model (Tobit type II), which is an extension of the standard Tobit 
model (Tobit type, I). Furthermore, the Jones (1989) double-hurdle model is further an extension 
of Heckman’s model. The Heckman’s (1978) model was the first to study the participation. 
The standard Tobit’s model (Tobit type, I) can be written as following.  
Structural equation: 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥1𝑖 𝛼 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                      
Threshold structural equation: 𝑦𝑖 = {
𝑦𝑖
∗   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0 
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒           
                                               
 𝑦𝑖
∗ represents the latent or unobserved variable, and  𝑦𝑖 represents a corresponding observed 
variable. However, 𝑥1𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables and 𝛼 is a vector of parameters. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that  𝑥1𝑖 and 𝜖𝑖 is uncorrelated.  
Similarly, Heckman’s generalised Tobit's model (Tobit type II) includes a structural equation, an 
index equation, and threshold equations along with a stochastic specification. 
Structural equation: 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥1𝑖 𝛼 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                      
Index equation:        𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                      
Threshold index equation: 𝑑𝑖 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0 
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
                                                        
Threshold structural equation: 𝑦𝑖 = {
𝑦𝑖
∗   𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1 
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒           
                                                
Stochastic specification: 𝜖𝑖 , 𝜇𝑖 ~ 𝑁 (0,0, 𝜎
2, 1 , 𝜌 )                                                  
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𝑦𝑖
∗ represents the latent or unobserved variable, and  𝑦𝑖 represents a corresponding observed 
variable. Similarly, 𝑑𝑖
∗ represents a binary censoring latent or unobserved variable, and 𝑑𝑖 
represents a corresponding observed variable. However, 𝑥1𝑖 and 𝑥2𝑖 are vectors of explanatory 
variables, similarly,  𝛼 and 𝛽 are vectors of parameters. It is assumed that 𝑥1𝑖 and 𝑥2𝑖 are 
uncorrelated with 𝜖𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 respectively. Heckman used a two-stage method known as Heckit 
rather than a maximum likelihood function for estimation. Heckman’s estimation involves binary 
regression to get estimates of  𝛼 and 𝛽.  
The double-hurdle model is simply an extension of Heckman’s model, which censored y at 0.   
Structural equation: 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥1𝑖 𝛼 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                          
Index equation:        𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                         
Threshold structural equation: 𝑦𝑖 = {
𝑦𝑖
∗       𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0 
0                              𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒           
                          
Stochastic specification: 𝜖𝑖 , 𝜇𝑖 ~ 𝑁 (0,0, 𝜎
2, 1 , 𝜌 )                                                   
The double-hurdle model estimation is based on the maximum likelihood function, which based 
on Jones’s double-hurdle model, is the following. 
 
𝐿 = ∏ {1 − Φ(
𝑥2𝛽 , 𝑥1𝛼
𝜎, 𝜌⁄ )}𝑦=0  ×  ∏ {Φ(
𝑥2𝛽+
𝜌
𝜎
(𝑦−𝑥1𝛼)
√1−𝜌2
) 
1
𝜎
𝜙(
𝑦−𝑥1𝛼
𝜎
)}𝑦>0                     
 
The likelihood function above only used the information that y=0 and y>1, and it does not use 
Tobit censoring (d=1 and y=0). The following likelihood function uses Tobit censoring at (d=1 
and y=0). 
𝐿 = ∏ {Φ(−𝑥2𝛽)}𝑑=0  ×  ∏ {Φ(𝑥2𝛽, − 𝑥1𝛼 𝜎, 𝜌⁄ )}𝑑=0,𝑦=0  ×  
∏ {Φ(
𝑥2𝛽+
𝜌
𝜎
(𝑦−𝑥1𝛼)
√1−𝜌2
) 
1
𝜎
𝜙(
𝑦−𝑥1𝛼
𝜎
)}𝑦>0      
 
The extension of the double hurdle model for panel is provided in the next section. 
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5.3.2 A Box-Cox double hurdle approach 
 
It has long been recognised that when dealing with censored data some information will be lost if 
the data relating to the non-observed outcome is discarded. Throwing away these observations 
will lead to inconsistent OLS estimates. Also treating such cases as a corner solution as was done 
by Tobit (1958) may also not be appropriate (Sinning, 2011). The double hurdle approach 
proposed by Cragg (1971), overcomes these and other econometric problems that arise when the 
dependent variable takes a value of zero in a logarithmic regression, which is the case with non-
remitters in our model.  
Typically a double-hurdle model has two parts. In our case the first part estimates a migrant’s 
decision43 to remit as a function of a set of covariates, using the entire sample. The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable of 1 for remitters and 0 otherwise. The second part of the 
regression uses only a part of the sample, for which remittances are positive (Cameron and 
Trivedi; 2005). Given that our data set is a panel, we need to consider a Box-Cox panel double-
hurdle model, similar to Moffatt (2005)44 and Jones and Yen (2000)45. A somewhat similar 
approach was taken by Bettin, et al. (2012) in the context of remittances.  
The only difference between the double hurdle model and Box-Cox double hurdle model is the 
transformed dependent variable in Box-Cox, and the relaxation of the normality assumption of an 
unobserved error. This transformation of a dependent variable involves the estimation of one 
more parameter 𝜆. If an estimate of the parameter  𝜆 is close to zero this indicates that the model 
                                                             
 
 
43 The decision is taken by the migrant household member. 
44 The double-hurdle model with dependence is extended by incorporating the Box-Cox transformation, in case of hurdle model of 
loan default 
45 Box-Cox hurdle model of US beef consumption 
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should be estimated with the dependent variable logarithmic transformed. A value of 𝜆 close to 
one means no logarithmic transformation is necessary (Muller 2010).  
It is assumed that two hurdles should be passed for a positive contribution to be observed. The 
first hurdle explains why a migrant is a remitter or a non-remitter. If a migrant or member does 
not pass the first hurdle it means that he/she is a non-remitter type and his/her contribution 
throughout the analysis will be null. Similarly, if a member passes the first hurdle, the second 
hurdle determines whether the member’s remittances are positive or zero. The first hurdle is 
denoted as “participation” which is a censoring mechanism and the second hurdle is denoted as 
“remittances intensity” which is the outcome or the level of remittances. 
The model in the general form can be written as follows. The first hurdle (participation) is 
assumed to be time invariant: 
𝑑𝑖
+ = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛼 + 𝜀1,𝑖           𝑖 = 1,… . . , 𝑛                     
𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖
+ > 0; 𝑑𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                                                                        
𝜀1,𝑖 ~ 𝑁 (0, 1). 
In the above di is an outcome variable (remits or does not remit) which is determined by di
+ which 
in turn depends on a number of covariates denoted by the  row vector 𝑧𝑖
′. The second hurdle 
(intensity) draws for time variation and is written as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
++ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀2,𝑖𝑡           𝑡 = 1, … . , 𝑇   
𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ = 𝑅𝑖𝑡
++𝑖𝑓  𝑅𝑖𝑡
++ >  0;                                                                                                         
                                  = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
In the above index i represent households and t represents time. 
𝜀2,𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2); 𝑢𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)   𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖  , 𝜀1,𝑖) =  𝜌 
The random variables ui and ε1,i  are assumed to be independently distributed. 
 
 
133 
 
The observed remittances are given by the following equation (which combines both hurdles): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖  ×  𝑅𝑖𝑡
+                                                                       
Rit is the amount of remittances of households’ i at time t and 𝑧𝑖
′ be the vectors of characteristics 
of households’ i which explains whether households pass the first hurdle. Furthermore, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is the 
vector of characteristics of household i at time t that are relevant for remittances.  
The observed dependent variable is transformed according to the Box-Cox hurdle model: 
?̃?𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜆−1
𝜆
  𝑖𝑓 𝜆 ≠ 0
ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡)  𝑖𝑓 𝜆 = 0
 
The Box-Cox double model is then given by  
?̃?𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  >
1
𝜆
 𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑑𝑖
+ > 0
0    𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑡
+  ≤  
1
𝜆
  𝑜𝑟       𝑑𝑖
+ ≤ 0
 
The estimation method is the maximum likelihood estimation which maximizes the following 
log-likelihood function. 
log 𝐿 =  ∑𝑙𝑛
0
[(1 − Φ(𝑧𝑖
′𝛼))Φ(
1
𝜆 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽
𝜎𝑖
)]   +  ∑𝑙𝑛
+
[Φ(𝑧𝑖
′𝛼)𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜆−1 1
𝜎𝑖
ϕ(
?̃?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽
𝜎𝑖
)] 
The above model has been used in different applications such as the household consumption of 
cheese by Yen and Jones (1997), household expenditure on a prepared meal by Newman et al. 
(2003), loan default by Moffatt (2005), and labour market studies by Zaiceva and Zimmermann 
(2014). 
5.4 Results and discussions 
 
Table 5.3 provides the estimates for the participation equation and the level equation of the Box-
Cox double hurdle model. The second column of Table 5.3 reports the results of the model to 
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determine the probability of receiving remittances using a binary dependent variable for receipt 
for only the last year (D=1 if the household received remittances and 0 otherwise), while column 
three shows the continuous choice of the amount of remittances received (?̃?𝑖𝑡 , conditional for 
those household that receive remittances). The explanatory variables considered both for 
participation and the level equation in the analysis of remittance behaviours include household 
head characteristics (age, years of education), household level characteristics representing the 
structure of the migrant household in the origin country (number of children aged less than 11 
years, the presence of males and females age between 12 and   30 years and household size), and 
the wealth status of the household (landholding in acres, money received from sale assets, and 
money borrowed from formal and informal sources). Further, it includes the future migration 
status of the household members (travelling outside and within a country), and the regional fixed 
effect. 
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Table 5.3 MLEs for Box-Cox double hurdle model 
 (Dependent variable: amount of remittances) 
Variables D (First hurdle) ?̃?𝑖𝑡(Second 
hurdle) 
Constant 0.262 
(0.469) 
-43.12 
(51.05) 
Household Head Education -0.010 
(0.013) 
2.294* 
(1.368) 
Household Head Age -0.003 
(0.018) 
-2.428 
(1.981) 
Household Head Age-squared 0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.036* 
(0.200) 
Children at age 0-11 0.097** 
(0.043) 
-4.735 
(4.570) 
Male at age12-30 0.072 
(0.052) 
12.83** 
(5.322) 
Member travelling in a country (internal migrant) 0.253** 
(0.122) 
36.49*** 
(10.66) 
Member travelling in a country-squared -0.071** 
(0.035) 
-6.375** 
(3.198) 
Member travelling outside a country (international 
migrant) 
1.296*** 
(0.323) 
226.80*** 
(17.86) 
Member travelling outside a country-squared -0.307** 
(0.126) 
-29.83*** 
(5.198) 
Land Holding (in Acres) -0.008 
(0.006) 
0.424 
(0.589) 
Land Holding-squared  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Money loaned to others (in thousand) 0.062 
(0.044) 
8.655*** 
(1.161) 
Attock  (base category Faisalabad) 0.455*** 
(0.153) 
12.62 
(15.27) 
Badin 0.009 
(0.146) 
-25.50* 
(15.87) 
Dir -0.669*** 
(0.146) 
68.60*** 
(16.02) 
𝜎 - 189.91 
(0.019) 
𝜎𝑢 - 68.317 
(6.054) 
𝜌 - 0.115 
(0.019) 
Sample size (n) 927 3094 
Log L -538.44 -10689.69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, and ***P<0.01 (The extended version of Table 5.3 is 
in the Appendix B.1) 
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5.4.1 The Participation Equation  
 
Analysing column two of Table 5.3, we observe that the maximum age of the household head is 
approximately 55 years to receive remittances. In the presence of a quadratic term for the 
household head age, we cannot interpret household head age in isolation. However, we did not 
find any significant impact of the household head education in years on the probability to receive 
remittances. It seems the household participation to receive remittances in the presence of more 
or less educated household head matters less in rural Pakistan.  
The variable capturing the strength of ties between the migrant and the household is the presence 
of the number of children aged less than 11 years. This variable captures the household 
dependence on the additional resources for expenditure related to better education of children. A 
number of research reports find that remittances enable households to afford better education for 
their children (Edwards and Ureta, 2003). We find that the participation of the household in 
receiving remittances also increases with the number of children in the household. It may 
suggests a possible contractual agreement between the household and the migrant to exchange 
child care for remittances (Garip, 2014; Banerjee, 1984). 
Both variable relating to members travelling in a country and members travelling abroad have a 
quadratic term, and are highly significant. Our results confirm that it is more likely to receive 
remittances if a household member travels within a country. Interestingly, the positive coefficient 
of the members travelling in a country and the negative coefficient of its square, confirm that the 
extent of remittances increase with a decreasing rate. The relationship between household 
members travelling in a country and remittances share an inverted U-shape. However, we also 
find that the maximum number of members travelling within a country is 2 for the household to 
participate in receiving remittances. Remittances are a positive function of migration, and the 
remittances income further helps in the migration of the other family members in rural China 
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(Taylor et al. 1999). This results support the NELM hypothesis that migrant remittances relax 
capital constraints for household to cover up migration costs such as information, the job search 
and other related expenses.  
Similarly, we find that the household members travelling abroad have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of remittances. The members travelling abroad also share an inverted-U relationship. 
This suggests that remittances decrease with the presence of more than two migrants in the 
household.     
The first hurdle also includes the district fixed effects to capture the key differences in the 
likelihood of receiving remittances by households. The base category for the district fixed effect 
is Faisalabad, which is the relatively better-off district. We find that there are statistically 
significant differences for probability of receiving remittances and the level of remittances 
received by the households in different districts. However, residing in Dir district has a strong 
negative effect in terms of participation when compared with the base category of Faisalabad 
district. This is consistent with the presence of a weaker sharing norm pressure in a more remote 
locality in comparison with those living in Faisalabad. On the other hand, for Attock district, the 
coefficient is positive and strongly significant for participation in remittances. This is indicative 
of the effect that Faisalabad and Attock district are from the same province, so both districts share 
the same norms. These norms can be enforced by the similar geographical neighbourhood of the 
same province and have a positive impact on the probability of receiving remittances.    
Thus, with regard to the probability to receive remittances, the result from the Box-Cox double 
hurdle model suggests that the variation in remittances in Pakistan can be explained by the age of 
household head, the number of children aged less than 11 years, member traveling within and 
outside of the country and the district level fixed effects. From these factors, it can be concluded 
that household level characteristics, and regional factors are the important determinants for the 
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probability of remittances and no other variable (that we have information on) plays any 
significant role in the decision to remit. 
 
 5.4.2 The level Equation  
 
Column 3 of Table 5.3 shows the results for the second hurdle (level of remittances), that is 
conditional upon the first hurdle (participation for the remittances). Our result in Table 5.3 
confirms that in the case of rural Pakistan the two hurdles – participation and level of remittances 
- are independent. We find the determinants that affect the probability to receive remittances are 
different when compared to the level of remittances.  
Contrary to the earlier findings household education (in years) assumes significance for the level 
of the remittances, conditional on the participation. Each additional year of education increases 
the amount of remittances, and it appears to be the important determinant for the level of 
remittances. Similarly, the maximum age of household head is around 33 years for the level of 
remittances. The relationship between the age of the household head and remittances is an 
inverted U-shape. It is interesting to note that household head education and age (in years) appear 
to affect the level of remittances, unlike the participation results.  
The expected level of remittances is significantly related to the number of male members in the 
household. If the migration is the contract between the migrant and household, then households 
receives more remittances even in the presence of male members of  the household (Hoddinott, 
1994). Secondly, if the household wants to diversify its human resources in order to overcome 
market imperfections, in that situation, it needs more additional resources (Taylor et al. 1996). 
Interestingly for both members travelling within and outside of the country, there are two effects: 
one is a positive occurring linear effect and the other is a negative occurring through the quadratic 
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term exerting a level effect. The relationship between household members travelling within and 
outside of the country and remittances is an inverted U-shape.   Interestingly, the positive 
coefficient of the members working within and outside of the country, and the negative 
coefficient of it square, confirm that the extent of the remittances increase with a decreasing rate. 
Comparing the impact across the incidence and the amount of remittances received by the 
household, we find that both members traveling within and outside of the country are the 
important determinant for both hurdles. This suggests that for richer families remittances increase 
slowly and eventually fall. This is consistent with the general view that the poor migrants remit 
more than the rich or educated migrants. More importantly, remittances will bear an inverted-U 
relationship with a family’s human resources or access to better labour market opportunities (such 
as members working within and outside of the country). This indicates that as the family’s wealth 
position improves its need for additional remittances falls and after a point it is weaned off. 
Our model does not capture any wealth effects on the incidence and the amount of remittances 
received by a household. For both hurdles landholding in acres is not statistically significant 
although it is positively related to the remittances, but earlier research by Adam (1998), using the 
same data set, finds that remittances contribute to asset accumulation in rural Pakistan. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between money 
borrowed from informal and formal sources. It may be possible that households in rural areas 
cannot raise finances through the formal money channels due to the absence of a credit market, 
but households can easily raise finances through the informal sector.  
Moreover, the money loaned (in thousand rupees) positively affects only the amount of 
remittances, but for participation, it is not statistically significant. This suggests that remittances 
also serve as an insurance mechanism for other households in rural Pakistan. In addition to the 
above, we also include the districts fixed effect to identify the key differences and how the 
amount of remittances varies between districts. 
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The district Badin has a negative effect on the level of remittances when compared with the base 
category of Faisalabad district. On average, households in Badin district receive a relatively lower 
amount of remittances than the Faisalabad district. However, the Badin district is not statistically 
significant for probability of receiving remittances. It is noted that there exists an opposing effect 
of probability to receive remittances and the level of remittances at a district level. On the other 
hand, for Dir district, the coefficient is positive, and statistically significant for the level of 
remittances, contrary to earlier findings with negative impact for the participation of remittances. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that the decrease in participation does not translate 
into a significant decrease in the level of remittances in Dir district. There are substantial regional 
differences between the districts included in this study. The migrant households from Attock 
district show a higher participation in remittances, whereas the migrant households from Dir 
constitute a larger level of the remittances. A substantial portion of the indirect effect of 
remittances at a household-level may reflect these regional differences. 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
We used the panel data from rural Pakistan to study the variables that determine the propensity to 
receive remittances and the amount of remittances by using the Box-Cox double hurdle model. 
The Box-Cox double hurdle model is more appropriate and superior for considering the non-
remitter in the analysis of remittance determinants. Thus, our empirical model included the 
determinants of remittances in term of household head characteristics, household composition, 
household level wealth, loans variables and regional characteristics suggested by the existing 
theories of remittances. We find that the determinant of remittances in terms of the participation, 
and the level of remittances received by household is different, a combination of household level 
observed characteristics and regional variables are key in explaining the remittances behaviour in 
rural Pakistan.  
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The empirical analysis reveals that the age of household head is an important determinant for 
participation and level of remittances. Moreover, household head education in years is only a 
significant determinant for the level of participation. The number of children turns out to have a 
significantly positive impact only for household participation in receiving remittances, indicating 
a possible contractual agreement between the household and the migrant to exchange child care 
for remittances. If the migration is a contract between the migrant and household, then the 
household receives a greater level of remittances even in the presence of male members of the 
household.  In addition, we find that presence of male members of the household is only 
determinant in the level of remittances in rural Pakistan. 
At the same time, the members traveling within and outside of a country, determines both the 
participation and the level of remittances. The relationship between household members traveling 
within and outside of the country and remittances is an inverted U-shape. Interestingly, the 
positive coefficient of the members working within and outside of the country, and the negative 
coefficient of it square, confirm that the participation and the extent of remittances increase with 
a decreasing rate. There is a substantial regional differences between the districts included in this 
study. The migrant households from Attock district show a higher participation in their 
remittances, while migrant households from Dir comprise a larger level of the remittances. A 
substantial portion of the indirect effect of remittances at a household level may reflect these 
regional differences. 
These results imply that migration motives are in line with the risk diversification strategy of the 
rural households for receiving remittances to their origin countries (Stark and Taylor 1989). It 
may be concluded that migration affects household income through remittances and also helps 
reallocation of the labour supply.   
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Appendix:  
  
Table B.1 MLEs for Box-Cox double hurdle model; 
 (Dependent variable: amount of remittances received) 
 
Variables D (First hurdle) ?̃?𝑖𝑡 (Second hurdle) 
Constant 0.262 
(0.469) 
-43.12 
(51.05) 
Household Head Education -0.010 
(0.013) 
2.294* 
(1.368) 
Household Head Age -0.003 
(0.018) 
-2.428 
(1.981) 
Household Head Age-squared 0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.036* 
(0.200) 
Children at age 0-11 0.097** 
(0.043) 
-4.735 
(4.570) 
Male at age12-30 0.072 
(0.052) 
12.83** 
(5.322) 
Female at age12-30 0.075 
(0.057) 
-5.189 
(5.819) 
Household size -0.053 
(0.039) 
-2.058 
(3.987) 
Member travelling in a country (internal migrant) 0.253** 
(0.122) 
36.49*** 
(10.66) 
Member travelling in country-squared -0.071** 
(0.035) 
-6.375** 
(3.198) 
Member travelling outside a country (international migrant) 1.296*** 
(0.323) 
226.80*** 
(17.86) 
Member travelling outside country-squared -0.307** 
(0.126) 
-29.83*** 
(5.198) 
Land Holding (in Acres) -0.008 
(0.006) 
0.424 
(0.589) 
Land Holding-squared  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Money remitted to relative (in thousand) 0.113 
(0.171) 
12.76 
(13.40) 
Money loaned to others (in thousand) 0.062 
(0.044) 
8.655*** 
(1.161) 
Money borrowed from formal sources (in thousand) -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.392 
(0.514) 
Money borrowed from informal sources (in thousand) -0.015 
(0.013) 
1.954 
(1.360) 
Money received from sale of animals (in thousand) 0.004 
(0.027) 
1.108 
(2.703) 
Money received from sale of land (in thousand) 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.057 
(0.373) 
Attock  (base category Faisalabad) 0.455*** 
(0.153) 
12.62 
(15.27) 
Badin 0.009 
(0.146) 
-25.50* 
(15.87) 
Dir -0.669*** 
(0.146) 
68.60*** 
(16.02) 
𝜎 - 189.91 
(0.019) 
𝜎𝑢 - 68.317 
(6.054) 
𝜌 - 0.115 
(0.019) 
Sample size (n) 927 3094 
Log L -538.44 -10689.69 
Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.10, **P<0.05, and ***P<0.01 
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CHAPTER SIX 
(ESSAY THREE) 
Household Heterogeneity and Hierarchical Decision-Making 
for Remittances 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Remittances are an essential source of income in reshaping the countries of the developing world. 
In the last three decades, they are quietly transforming societies and regions through the notion of 
“self-help” undertaken by poorer households all over the world. This phenomenon has been 
called “Mother’s milk for poor nations” (Kapur, 2010).  According to the recent World Bank 
Migration and Development Brief46 the officially recorded remittances to developing countries 
reached $406 billion in 2012 compared to the $381 billion recorded in 2011 an increase of 6.5%. 
This is uptrend expected to steadily grow at the rate of 8% and 10% in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. Pakistan is a country in the top 5 by population amongst all developing countries 
and in the top 10 recipients of remittances among these countries.  
An important question is whether the remittance pattern can be explained only by household 
characteristics, or also by heterogeneity at the community level, such as the village or district 
levels, which may capture different cultural environments or different agro-economic climates.  
With the aim of addressing the above question we consider a 2001-02 dataset from the Household 
Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) of Pakistan, covering all four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, 
                                                             
 
 
46 For more detail see World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 19 published November 20, 2012. 
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NWFP and Balochistan), and consisting of 14,831 households from 1,050 villages nested into 
147 districts. We highlight the relative importance of different remittances (internal or 
international), paying particular attention to the random unexplained heterogeneity at district and 
village level. 
We use a three-level logistic model, which allows estimation of coefficients associated with 
random household and community effects on two types of remittances: internal remittances and 
international remittances. One key focus of our work is examining the extent to which remittance 
related behaviour is correlated within the village or within the districts.  
The benefits of adopting a multi-level model are as follows. Firstly, it allows us to measure 
random unobserved heterogeneity at different levels. Secondly, it takes into account the clustered 
structure, when observations are clustered into higher-level units (such as at the district or 
provincial levels). Thirdly, the random effects (unobserved heterogeneity) estimated from the 
multilevel model help retrieving the various level of the total variance and covariance associated 
with the outcome variable.  
We find, for the internal remittances, the age of the household head and the gender and number of 
dependants all exert positive and significant effects, whereas adult male household members 
(aged 15-30 years) and landholding exert negative and significant effects. This is consistent with 
conventional wisdom. If there are more male members at home, or the household owns 
significant land, then the need for sending remittances back home is less. On the other hand, if 
there are more elderly people or children, remittances rise. Generally speaking, the effects of 
household characteristics tend to vary between internal and international remittances, and they 
too get further modified when we introduce regional fixed effects. We find that the presence of 
female members in the household determines only internal remittances. However, land holding in 
acres positively related the international remittances. The household size is a more robust 
determinant of international remittances rather than internal remittances.         
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We also study the village and district level unobservable heterogeneities. For this purpose we 
calculate the odd ratios of two randomly selected households’ prospects of receiving internal and 
international remittances, in two distinct cases – in one, the two households are located in same 
village within the same district, and in the other, they are located in two different villages within 
the same districts.  It is worth noticing that the odds ratios are higher for international remittances 
than the internal remittances, which is not surprising. But the fact that the odds ratio of comparing 
two households from the same village within the same district are generally higher than the odds 
ratio of two households from different village within the same district is  not in line with 
conventional wisdom. Households in close proximity should have higher odds of receiving 
remittances. It suggests that inter-village variations are significant. These results are useful to 
understand the importance of the village level network for information gathering and seeking 
insurance from each other.   
In line with the conventional wisdom, the odd ratios for the same village within the same district 
are generally higher than the odds ratios for different villages within the same district. 
Households in close proximity should have similar odds of receiving remittances. It is, however, 
clear that inter-village variations are significant, and the occurrence of migration is more 
widespread in same villages than the different villages in Pakistan. 
In general regional policies, infrastructure and village networks all play important roles in both 
fostering migration and encouraging remittances. What we see is that the decision to send 
remittances is a complex one. Not only do the household characteristics matter, but the village 
and district level heterogeneities also play some role.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 presents the data set. Section 
6.3 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 6.4 introduces the research methodology. 
Furthermore, section 6.5 analyses the determinants of internal and international remittances in 
Pakistan. The conclusion is presented in Section 6.6. 
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6.2 Data set 
 
Despite the importance of remittances to the country’s political, economic, and social standing 
very little academic attention has been paid to this area. Why is this so? The answer may lie in an 
argument made by Massey (1990), who said that a complete account of remittances requires 
specific kinds of data, that enable us to link large social structures with individual and household 
decisions, connect micro and macro levels of analysis, and relate causes to consequences over 
time. The development of such a data set would enable empirical research to take into account the 
different individual, household and community factors. Further it would require the multilevel 
model for an appropriate analysis. The multilevel model is capable of investigating the different 
link between individual, household, and community characteristics and pondering how they 
jointly determine remittances.  
Past academic research into the issues of migration and remittances for Pakistan has been limited 
due to the shortage of data. The only panel data set that includes information on migration, and 
remittances goes back to 1986-91. It was originally collected to study poverty. Another data 
source is the “Household Integrated Economic Survey” (HIES), which was started in the 1990s 
and collected information on a range of variables. The sample for every HIES survey is drawn 
independently from the population every period, so it is impossible to ensure that the same 
household is selected in every year to form a panel. As a result, most Pakistani studies were either 
macro studies or very descriptive. There has previously been no link to carry out a systematic 
analysis on remittances both at the micro and macro-level. 
This study uses national cross sectional survey data to study the internal and international 
determinants of remittances; paying particular attention to the unexplained heterogeneity at 
village and district level, using the aforementioned multilevel modelling. In addition to household 
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characteristics, remittances may also be influenced by the community structure such as 
landholding, savings and loans. These interconnections among households and community-level 
factors determine remittances at each level. Most work on migration and remittances is based on 
the single level of analysis; however, less work has been done on interrelationships between 
levels. This analysis includes community characteristics that condition the effect of household 
variables to the remitter’s decision. 
This study provides evidence on how much random unexplained heterogeneity in remittances is 
explained at the village and district level in Pakistan. Despite the massive migration from 
Pakistan that resulted in immense remittances the research is rather limited on how it has affected 
either rural migrant-sending communities or remittance-receiving communities.  
Pakistan's Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES 2001-02) data is used for this chapter. 
The Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) Pakistan collects survey data at provincial and district 
levels through the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement survey (PSLM) and the 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES). The PSLM collects data on social indicators at 
district levels, whereas the HIES collects data on social and economic indicators such as income 
and consumption at provincial levels in alternative years. The PSLM data collection is based on 
several rounds to have information at both the individual and the household level on different 
aspects such as income, expenditure, education, health and access to basic services. The PSLM 
survey covers both urban and rural areas. The urban area consists of either cities or towns and is 
further divided into enumeration blocks. Each enumeration block consists of 200 to 250 
households. However, each enumeration block can also be divided into three income categories: 
high, middle and low income groups. The population census organization published the list of 
villages in rural areas in 1998, which is used to collect data.  
The provincial (HIES) has a sample size of around 17,600 households containing 1,252 
enumeration blocks and villages.  The district (PSLM) has a sample size of around 79,600 
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households containing 5,563 enumeration blocks and village47. The data collection methodology 
of HIES is based on a two-stage stratified sample design. Stage one is Primary Sampling Units 
(PSUs) and stage two is Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs). The former includes enumeration 
blocks and villages in urban and rural areas respectively. The latter includes households, which 
are selected (16 for rural areas and 12 for urban areas) using a systematic sampling technique 
with a random start.   
In rural communities, information is also collected on a range of attributes such as employment, 
income, local infrastructure and provision of services such as health and education. The 
probability of each household residing in different parts throughout the country differs. This 
sampling weight, used for different households, is weighted by a factor that is inversely 
proportional to their probability of selection in the survey sample.  
The data set also provides information on transfer payments received and paid-out by households. 
For the transfer payments received, it includes remittances received by households within 
Pakistan (internal remittances) and remittances received by households outside of Pakistan 
(international remittances). For the transfer payments paid-out, it includes remittances paid-out by 
households within Pakistan and remittances paid-out by households outside of Pakistan.  
However, the data set does not include any information about the actual migrant. The only 
available information is the amount of remittances from a member to the family. The household 
which does not receive remittances is either due to not having a member migrated or having a 
member migrated but not receiving remittances. The information on dwelling consists of type of 
dwelling, occupancy status, rooms, electricity, and gas and telephone connection. Moreover, data 
identifies ownership of agricultural land, non-agricultural land, residential buildings and 
commercial buildings. Further information is collected by questions such as, did any members 
                                                             
 
 
47 For more details see  http://www.pbs.gov.pk 
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own or previously own any property? Is this property currently owned? If yes, how much 
agriculture land is there in acres? Finally, agricultural activity includes information of the 
household's total operational land owned. The total land holding is further divided into two types 
irrigated and rain-fed (barani) and also into cultivated and uncultivable.  Information is also 
available on household borrowing, lending, net current savings, and the total value of 
sold/purchased gold, securities and dividends.  
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The definition of a household includes either a single person (or more than one person) who live 
and eat together under the same roof and have no other usual place of residence elsewhere. 
Absent members of the household, whether internal or international migrants, are not considered 
members of the household. If these members are present in the household at the time of the 
survey, then their income is included as remittances received. Similarly, if the household has a 
member recorded as internal and another as international (few cases) we treat it as an 
international migrant household. Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics of selected variables at 
the household (level-one), village (level-two) and district level (level-three). A total of ten 
household level variables are selected from the first wave of the HIES (2001-02) survey data set; 
eight of these ten variables are documented at the village-level and district-level. The data set 
consists of 14,831 households (level-one) nested within 1,050 villages (level-two) which are 
further nested in 147 districts (level-three) into two region (rural versus urban) and four 
provinces. Table 6.1 displays the averages at the household level (level-one) of these 14,831 
clusters are similar to those at the village and district level.  The table includes household specific 
variables, such as the proportion of female heads of households, the age of the head of household, 
household size, and the number of children aged less than 11 years of age, females aged 16 to 26 
years of age, land holding in acres, the amount of loan expressed in Rupees, the amount of 
savings in Rupees and loan paid back in Rupees. A female head of household represents 7% of 
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the total sampled households. At the household level the age of the household head varies 
between13 years and 97 years. The head of household average and standard deviation ages are 45 
years and 14 years, respectively.   
The female head of the household role is more common, if the husband or male members of the 
household are migrants. We expect the probability of receiving either internal or international 
remittances to be higher for a female head of the household. The age of household head provides 
a proxy for experience, networking and interaction with other members of the community. A 
higher average age of the household head is associated with higher probabilities of receiving 
remittances. The household size is associated with a risk diversification strategy for the 
household. A larger household size is linked with a higher probability of remittances and vice 
versa. We have selected different age brackets for the children aged less than 11 years, males 
aged 15 to 30 years and females aged 16 to 26 years. More dependency in terms of children and 
female will result in more remittances. The presence of males aged 15 to 30 years in the 
household show that alternative human resources are available, so more males in the household 
will result in a lower probability of receiving remittances. 
The household size at the household level varies from 1 to 44 members with an average of 7 
members and a standard deviation of approximately 3 members. Whereas, the village level 
average household size varies from almost 4 to 13 members, at the district level the average 
household size varies almost 5 and 10 members48. The village level household size shows wider 
variation than the district-level. At a household level, children less than 11 years of age vary from 
0 to 24 children, the average is 2.40 and a similar average is present at village and district level. 
The district and village level averages of other explanatory variables (number of females aged 16 
to 26 years, males age 15 to 30 years, landholding in acres and the amount of loan and saving in 
                                                             
 
 
48 They are integers because level 2 and level 3 represent averages of these variables at village- and district-levels, 
respectively.   
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Rupees) shows minimal variation between them. At the household-level; landholding in acres 
varies from 0 to 7 acres, and average landholding is around 0.62 acres.  
Table 6.1 Summary statistics 
Variables  
Households level  (level-1) 
Average  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1-Proportion of Female headed Households  0.07  0 1 
2-Age of Household Head 45.62 14.22 13 97 
3-Household size 7.21 3.60 1 44 
4-Number of children aged 11 or less 2.40 2.07 0 24 
5-Number of females aged 16 to 26 years 0.79 0.92 0 7 
6-Number of males aged 15 to 30 0.82 1.10 0 9 
7-Landholding in Acres 0.62 1.15 0 7.25 
8-Amount of Loan in Rupees (‘000) 2.85 4.55 0 15.42 
9- Amount of Saving in Rupees (‘000) 0.83 2.87 0 14.85 
10- Loan paid back in Rupees (‘000) 0.73 2.56 0 15.38 
Village level averages (Level 2)     
1-Household size 7.19 1.48 3.92 13.17 
2-Number of children aged 11 or less 2.38 0.85 0.08 5.5 
3-Number of females aged 16 to 26 years 0.80 0.29 0 2 
4-Number of male aged 15 to 30 0.82 0.37 0.06 2.42 
5-Landholding in Acres 0.62 0.67 0 3.52 
6-Amount of Loan in Rupees (‘000) 2.85 2.24 0 9.75 
7- Amount of Saving in Rupees (‘000) 0.83 1.54 0 9.69 
8- Loan paid back in Rupees (‘000) 0.73 0.98 0 6.47 
District level averages (Level 3)     
1-Household size 7.25 0.97 4.88 10.06 
2-Number of children aged 11 or less 2.42 0.60 0.67 4.00 
3-Number of females aged 16 to 26 years 0.80 0.15 0.33 1.38 
4-Number of males aged 11 to 30 0.82 0.21 0.27 1.40 
5-Landholding in Acres 0.63 0.52 0 2.02 
6-Amount of Loan in Rupees (‘000) 2.85 1.71 0 7.65 
7- Amount of Saving in Rupees (‘000) 0.83 0.99 0 4.80 
8- Loan paid back in Rupees (‘000) 0.73 0.59 0 3.17 
Observations 14,831    
 
 
Table 6.2 shows the household distribution by region and province - 5,613 households live in the 
urban area and 9,218 in the rural area.  The distribution of households among provinces is the 
following: the Punjab province includes 2,599 households in the urban area and 3,796 in the rural 
area which make a total of 6,395 household. Sindh province includes 1,534 households in the 
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urban area and 2,174 in the rural area for a total of 3,708 households. NWFP 49 province records 
857 households in the urban area and 1,842 household in the rural area, amounting to 2,699 
households. Finally, Balochistan province covers 623 households in urban area and 1,406 in 
urban area, totalling 2,029 households. Similarly, Table 6.2 shows the percentage distribution of 
households among two regions and four provinces. Overall, 38% of households live in urban area 
and 68% in rural areas. The percentage distribution of households among different provinces is as 
follows: In Punjab and Sindh, approximately 40 percent of households live in urban areas and the 
remaining 60 percent in rural areas. The provinces of NWFP and Balochistan share the same 
approximate distribution of households in rural areas (32%) and urban areas (68%).  
                               
Table 6.2 Household Distribution by Region and Province 
Region 
Province Urban Rural Total 
Punjab 2,599 
(40%) 
3,796 
(60%) 
6,395 
Sindh 1,534 
(41%) 
2,174 
(59%) 
3,708 
NWFP 857 
(32%) 
1,842 
(68%) 
2,699 
Balochistan 623 
(31%) 
1,406 
(69%) 
2,029 
Total 5,613 
(38%) 
9,218 
(62%) 
14,831 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
49 Stand for North-West Frontier Province, now it is called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. 
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Table 6.3 is only restricted to internal and international remittances receiving households. It 
shows the percentage distribution of internal and external remittances for regions and provinces - 
28% of internal remittances belong to urban areas and the remaining 72% to rural areas. Internal 
remittances are characterised by a more unequal distribution among regions versus international 
remittances. The share of internal remittances amongst Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan are 
52%, 4%, 41% and 3%, respectively. The percentage frequencies of international remittances 
between urban and rural areas are 47% and 53%, respectively. The percentage share of 
international remittances between Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan are 47%, 6%, 41% and 
8%, respectively.   
 
Table 6.3 Internal and International remittances by Region and Provinces 
 Internal 
Remittances 
International 
Remittances 
Region    
 Urban  471 
(28%) 
278 
(47%) 
 Rural 1,211 
(72%) 
317 
(53%) 
Total  1,682 595 
Province    
 Punjab 882 
(52%) 
267 
(45%) 
 Sindh 63 
(4%) 
33 
(6%) 
 NWFP 694 
(41%) 
246 
(41%) 
 Balochistan 43 
(3%) 
49 
(8%) 
Total  1,682 595 
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6.4 Research Methodology 
 
The econometric regression that we estimate relies on a five-level hierarchical model, however, 
of these five levels we postulate that only three have unobserved random heterogeneity. Hence, 
we name the model a 3-level nested model. The dependent variable that we wish to estimate is 
the binary variable – whether a household is receiving remittances or not. We will report the 
analysis both for internal and international remittances. The historical multilevel modelling in 
binary data has been used in different fields, characterised by discrete events such as child 
immunization, voting behaviour, student drop outs of high school, giving birth, divorcing and 
marrying (Guo and Zhao, 2000). The multilevel hierarchical structure is depicted in Figure 1: a 
household (level 1) is nested in a village (level 2), and in turn the village is a nested in a district 
(level 3).  The discussion in this section follows that of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008). We 
use the three-level models, to study the determinants of internal and international remittances in 
Pakistan employing data from the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES-2001-02), and 
also account for the two additional deterministic levels of province and region. Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal (2006: 809) write “Since there is usually unobserved heterogeneity between clusters 
even after conditioning on the covariates, responses tend to be correlated within clusters. This 
dependence must be taken into account."  
In three-level models, the clusters are nested in the higher cluster to form a hierarchical structure.  
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Figure 2.19 Three-level model; Sources: Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008: 431)   
Districts 
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Measurements within the same district are correlated as well as measurements within the same 
village. We expect the correlation at the village level to be larger. It seems reasonable to assume 
that measurements within the same district are more similar than those across different districts. 
This intra-district heterogeneity (level-3) is modelled by introducing the district-level random 
intercept 𝜁 𝑘
(3)
 , where k stands for a district. Similarly, the intra-village inter-district heterogeneity 
(level-2) is modelled by introducing another random intercept 𝜁 𝑗𝑘
(2)
 for each combination of 
village and district, where j is the notation used to denote a village. 
With the help of the above notation a simple three-level model without any covariate can be 
formulated as: 
𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛 
= 𝛽1 + 𝜁𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛
(2) + 𝜁 𝑘𝑚𝑛
(3)
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  
The indices are i=1…I; j=1…J; k=1…K;  𝑚=1, 2 and 𝑛=1, 2, 3, and 4. Where, subscript i 
represent the household, j represent (as mentioned above) the village and k the district. We then 
indicate with the additional deterministic levels the region and province with the letters m and n, 
respectively. The asterisk on y denotes a latent variable. As discussed earlier the term  𝜁 𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛
(2)
 is 
the random intercept for the village j in district k in region m and province n; whereas the term 
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𝜁 𝑘𝑚𝑛
(3)
 is the random intercept for district k in the same region and province. 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  is a pure 
idiosyncratic iid error term. In our study the random effect for a village nested within districts 
takes on a different value for each combination of village and district.  A more complete model 
including covariates (x and z), with random intercepts and (uncorrelated) error term can be 
expressed as:  
𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛 
= 𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  𝛼 + 𝑧 𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  𝛾 + 𝜔𝑘𝑚𝑛  𝛿 + θm + 𝜑𝑛 + 𝜁𝑗𝑘
(2) + 𝜁 𝑘
(3)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  
                                                                                                                                     ⏟
Fixed part
                                     ⏟
    Random part
      
We assume the random intercepts satisfy the following properties: 
   𝜁𝑗𝑘
(2) | 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛   , 𝑧 𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  , 𝜔𝑘𝑚𝑛  , θm , 𝜑𝑛, 𝜁 𝑘
(3) ~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜓(2)) .  
Its conditional distribution (conditional on covariates and the higher hierarchical level) has a zero 
mean and a constant variance.  Similarly, the random intercept varies over the districts (level 3) 
as follows: 
 
𝜁
 𝑘
(3)
 | 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛   , 𝑧 𝑗𝑚𝑛  , 𝜔𝑘𝑚𝑛  , θm 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑛  ~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜓
(3)) . 
The random effects 𝜁𝑗𝑘
(2)  and 𝜁 𝑘
(3)
 are assumed to be independent of each other and across clusters 
and 𝜁𝑗𝑘
(2)
 is assumed independent across units as well.   
The assumption for the idiosyncratic error term is: 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  | 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  , 𝑧 𝑗𝑚𝑛  , 𝜔𝑘𝑚𝑛  , θm , 𝜑𝑛, 𝜁𝑗𝑘
(2) , 𝜁 𝑑
(3)
   (assumed to have a logistic distribution with 
constant variance  𝜋2 3⁄ ). We observe the binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛 which relates to the latent 
variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛
∗  as: 
   𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  =  {
1 𝑖𝑓  𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛 
> 0
0        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
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The covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛   , 𝑍𝑧 𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛  , 𝜔𝑘𝑚𝑛  ,  represent household level characteristics, averages of 
village-level characteristics and the averages of district level characteristics. The fixed effects for 
region and provinces are written as θm and 𝜑𝑛 , respectively.  
6.4.1 Intra-class Correlations 
The different types of interclass correlations for the latent responses of two households of two 
households residing in the same village (and obviously the same district)  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘.. and  𝑦𝑖′𝑗𝑘.. and 
different villages 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘.. and  𝑦𝑖′𝑗′𝑘.. in the same district can be calculated as follows50: 
Where,  𝜓(2) is random part observed heterogeneity at village level and  𝜓(3) is random part 
observed heterogeneity at district level.   
𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)  ≡ C𝑜𝑟 (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘..,  𝑦𝑖′𝑗𝑘..| 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠) =   
𝜓(2) + 𝜓(3)
𝜓(2) + 𝜓(3) + 𝜋2/3
 
and 
𝜌(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)  ≡ C𝑜𝑟 (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘..,  𝑦𝑖′ 𝑗 ′𝑘..| 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠) =   
𝜓(3)
𝜓(2) + 𝜓(3) + 𝜋2/3
 
The correlation across different districts is zero. The above correlation coefficients are called the 
intra-village and inter-village correlation, respectively. We expect that   𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) >
 𝜌(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡).  It is due to the fact that households in a given village (and district) are more similar 
than households in the same district, but from different villages. This is because the estimated 
variance of the random intercepts is positive, 𝜓(2) > 0 and 𝜓(3) > 0 leading to 
𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) >  𝜌(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡).   
6.4.2 Odds ratios 
 
                                                             
 
 
50 The two dots refer to the region and province.   
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The unobserved heterogeneity can be quantified by taking into consideration the odds for the 
pairs of randomly sampled unit households having the same covariate values, where the units 
with the larger random intercept are compared with the unit with the smaller random intercept. 
The odds of the two randomly selected households of the same villages and obviously the same 
district can be calculated as follows: 
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒.𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) = exp  { 𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)} 
Similarly, by comparing two randomly selected households of different villages in the same 
districts we get: 
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) = exp  {𝜌(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) }  
The odds ratio of the two households from same village and same district relative to the two 
households from different villages and same district can be calculated as follow:  
OR = exp  { 𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)}/ exp  {𝜌(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) }  
A multi-level modelling approach is used to study the three-level variance-component model for 
internal and international remittances received by households of the different regions within the 
four provinces of Pakistan. In our case, the measures of variation are important to understand the 
significance of specific settings for different household remittance outcomes. Comparatively, the 
measures of association does not inform on the multilevel distribution of remittances. A major 
advantage of the multilevel approach is the ability to explore effects of group-level predictors, 
while accounting for the effects of unobserved group characteristics. Two separate analyses are 
covered with data from the HIES (Households Integrated Economic Surveys 2001-02) survey: 
one for internal remittances and the other for international remittances. The first binary outcome 
variable (dependent variable) is households receiving international remittance: the variable is set 
to 1 for households receiving international remittances and 0 otherwise. The second binary, 
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outcome variable (dependent variable) is households receiving internal remittance: it equals 1 for 
households receiving internal remittances and 0 otherwise. The data set used in the three-level 
model contains the following subset of covariates; 
For level one (household) 
- Indicator variable for households receiving remittances (Internal and International, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑛) 
- Age of the Household head  
- Gender of the Household head  
- Number of Children aged less than 10 years in the household 
- Number of Females aged between 16 and 26 years in the household 
- Number of Males aged between 15 and 30 years in the household 
- Household size 
- Log of landholding in acres 
- Log of loans in rupees 
- Log of savings in rupees 
- Log of loans paid in rupees 
For level-two (village) and level-three (district) 
- The mean age of Children  aged less than 10 years  
- The mean age of Females aged between 16 and 26 years 
- The mean age of Males aged between 15 and 30 years 
- The mean Household size 
- Log of the mean landholding in acres  
- Log of the mean loan in rupees 
- Log of the mean saving in rupees 
- Log of the mean loan paid in rupees 
A dummy that is 0 for urban region and 1 for rural region captures the region fixed effect. 
Provinces fixed effect is made by a dummy for each province. The multilevel modelling used in 
this paper is restricted to study the determinants of remittances of households in villages and in 
districts, controlling for deterministic regional and province effects.   
6.5 Results and Discussions  
 
We run two separate logistic regressions for internal and international remittances as discussed in 
the previous section. The explanatory variables such as household loans in Rupees, household 
savings in Rupees and household total land holding in acres are log-transformed. The estimates of 
the logistic regressions are given in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 for internal and international remittances, 
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respectively. They include estimates with and without regional fixed effects. Table 6.4 and 6.5 
present the multilevel logistic regression results for internal and international remittances without 
and with regional fixed effects, respectively. The models present the probability of receiving 
internal and international remittances with odd ratios for each covariate. The odd ratios are 
calculated by exponentiation of each covariate. The binary outcome logistic model is better 
understood by comparing the odds of an event occurrence (remittances) to the non-realisation of 
the event. When the probability of receiving the remittance is greater than the probability of not 
receiving, the odds are greater than one.     
In Table 6.4, the results for internal remittances without regional effects show that the odds of 
receiving internal remittances are 11.03 times greater if the household head is female than male. 
Similarly, the odds ratio for the age of the head of the household is 1.02. Thus, there is a 2% 
increase in the odds of receiving internal remittances for every one year increase in the age of the 
household head. This finding is consistent with the New Economic of Labour Migration (NELM) 
that household head characteristics are a key determinant for receiving remittances in the origin 
countries. It is worth noting that in our case the household head and sex emerge as key 
determinants of remittances. The female head of the household resulted in substantial odds of 
receiving remittances. Household composition in terms of the number of female and male adults 
is an important determinant of internal remittances. However, household size is not a significant 
determinant for receiving internal remittances.  
There is a 23% decrease in the odds of receiving internal remittances as the number of males in 
the household (age between 15 to 30 years) increases by one. The probability of receiving 
remittances is lower in the presence of a young male in the household. It may be possible that 
presence of a male in the household provides a shield against any unforeseen circumstances or 
change in the economic condition at the origin. Another reason may follow that they can 
participate in the labour market for an additional income for the household.  On the contrary, the 
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presence of an additional female member in a household results in a 19% increase in the odds of 
receiving internal remittances. Similarly, when other variables are held constant, there is an 18% 
decrease in the odds of receiving internal remittances if a household increases its landholding by 
one acre and household saving in thousand rupees also resulted in 3% decrease in the odds of 
receiving remittances.  
At a village-level only land holding in acres and the male population (aged 15-30 years) is 
statistically significant. Opposite to the earlier finding at the household level, the landholding is 
positively related to the internal remittances at the village level, which shows a 21% increase in 
the odds of receiving internal remittances. Similarly, one additional male member results in a 
32% decrease in the odds of receiving internal remittances at a village-level. At a district level, 
only male members of the household are significant and have a negative relationship with 
probability of internal remittances. However, the odds of receiving internal remittances are 
substantially reduced by 90% with an additional male member, which is the largest among the 
different levels of clustering. Similarly, every additional acre of land holding results in a 52% 
decrease in the odds of receiving internal remittances. The household composition and wealth 
appeared to be important determinants of internal remittances in Pakistan at the different levels of 
clustering. 
In Table 6.4, once controls for regional and provincial effects are introduced, the predicted 
probabilities of internal remittances at a household level, village level and district level do not 
differ much from the results discussed. However, the estimates are more refined with the 
introduction of the regional effect. Now some additional variables assume the significance at the 
household level, such as household size. At a village and district-level, only mean land holding in 
acres and mean male age in years are statistically significant.  
The provincial level result for internal remittances shows that, the odds of receiving internal 
remittances are 2.30 times greater for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province than for the base 
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category of Punjab province. Similarly, there is 78% and 47% decrease in the odds of receiving 
internal remittances for Sindh and Balochistan province, respectively. Table 6.5 presents the 
determinants of international remittances with and without regional effects. First we will discuss 
the results without regional effects. At a household level, holding all other covariates constant, 
the household head characteristics show that the odds of receiving international remittances are 
10.8 times greater if the household head is female. The odd ratio for the age of the head of the 
household is 1.01. Thus, there is a 1% increase in the odds of receiving international remittances 
as the age of the household head increases by one year. Similarly, the household composition 
shows there is a 20% decrease in the odds of receiving international remittances as the number of 
males in the household (aged between 15 to 30 years) increase by one. However, there is a 12% 
increase in the odds of receiving international remittances if the household size increases by one. 
Contrasting to internal remittances, the odds of receiving international remittances is 14% higher 
for every additional acre of land.  
At a village level only, land holding in acres is statistically significant. The odds ratio for land 
holding in acres is 0.53. Thus, there is a 47% decrease in the odds of receiving international 
remittances as the land holding in the village increases by one acre. Furthermore, at a district 
level, there is 57% and 40% increase in the odds of receiving international remittances as the 
loans in Rupees and savings in Rupees increases by one Rupee. Once controls for regional effects 
are introduced, the predicted probabilities of international remittances at a household level, 
village level and district level don’t differ from the results discussed earlier. At a district level 
only loans and savings in rupees are not statistically significant when the regional and provincial 
effect is introduced. The provincial level result shows that, the odds of receiving international 
remittances are 4.63 times greater for the NWFP province than for the base category of Punjab 
province. Similarly, there is 90% and 74% decrease in the odds of receiving international 
remittances for Sindh and Balochistan provinces, respectively, compared to the base category of 
Punjab province. 
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Table 6.4 Maximum likelihood estimates for three-level logistic random-intercept model 
Parameters Internal Remittances Internal Remittances 
(without fixed effect) (with fixed effect) 
Odds ratios = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐸𝑠𝑡) Odds ratios = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐸𝑠𝑡) 
Est 𝑆𝐸 OR (95%      CI) Est 𝑆𝐸 OR (95%      CI) 
Fixed Part         
Household level         
𝛽1, [Constant] -8.3*** (2.10)   -7.11 (1.74)   
𝛼1, [H Head sex] 2.42*** (0.09) 11.3 (9.50, 13.4) 2.38*** (0.09) 10.85 (9.14, 12.9) 
𝛼2, [H Head age] 0.02*** (0.01) 1.02 (1.02, 1.03) 0.02*** (0.01) 1.02 (1.02, 1.03) 
𝛼3, [Child age 0-10] -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 (0.93, 1.06) -0.01 (0.03) 0.99 (0.93, 1.06) 
𝛼4, [Female 16-26] 0.17*** (0.04) 1.19 (1.09, 1.29) 0.17*** (0.04) 1.18 (1.09, 1.30) 
𝛼5, [Male 15-30] -0.2*** (0.05) 0.77 (0.70, 0.84) -0.26*** (0.46) 0.77 (0.70, 0.84) 
𝛼6, [H size] 0.001 (0.02) 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 0.01*** (0.02) 1.00 (0.96, 1.05) 
𝛼7, [Log Land
51] -0.2*** (0.04) 0.82 (0.76, 0.88) -0.20*** (0.04) 0.82 (0.76, 0.90) 
𝛼8, [Log Loan
52]  0.01 (0.01) 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 0.01 (0.01) 1.01 (0.99, 1.02) 
𝛼9, [Log Saving] -0.03** (0.01) 0.97 (0.95, 1.00) -0.03** (0.01) 0.97 (0.95, 0.99) 
𝛼10, [Log Loan Paid] 0.02* (0.01) 1.02 (1.00, 1.04) 0.02* (0.01) 1.02 (0.99, 1.04) 
Village Averages         
𝛾1, [Child age 0-10] -0.01 (0.17) 1.00 (0.72, 1.37) -0.01 (0.17) 1.00 (0.71, 1.37) 
𝛾2, [Female 16-26] 0.08 (0.23) 1.08 (0.70, 1.69) 0.07 (0.23) 1.08 (0.69, 1.68) 
𝛾3, [Male 15-30] -0.38* (0.22) 0.68 (0.44, 1.05) -0.38* (0.22) 0.68 (0.44, 1.05) 
𝛾4,  [H size] -0.03 (0.11) 0.97 (0.79, 1.19) -0.03 (0.11) 0.97 (0.79, 1.20) 
𝛾5[Log Land] 0.21* (0.11) 1.23 (0.99, 1.54) 0.21* (0.11) 1.24 (0.99, 1.54) 
𝛾6, [Log Loan]  0.01 (0.03) 1.00 (0.95, 1.06) 0.01 (0.03) 1.00 (0.95, 1.06) 
𝛾7, [Log Saving] -0.06 (0.05) 0.95 (0.86, 1.04) -0.06 (0.05) 0.95 (0.86, 1.04) 
𝛾8, [Log Loan Paid] 0.01 (0.06) 1.00 (0.90, 1.12) 0.01 (0.06) 1.01 (0.90, 1.12) 
District Averages 
𝛿1,[Child age 0-10] -0.44 (0.75) 0.64 (0.15, 2.81) -0.42 (0.64) 0.66 (0.19, 2.32) 
𝛿2,[Female 16-26] 0.68 (0.95) 1.96 (0.31, 12.5) 0.72 (0.80) 2.06 (0.43, 9.80) 
𝛿3,[Male 15-30] -2.7*** (0.94) 0.07 (0.01, 0.42) -1.85** (0.81) 0.16 (0.03, 0.77) 
𝛿4 , [H size] 0.38 (0.47) 1.46 (0.59, 3.65) 0.35 (0.40) 1.42 (0.66, 3.06) 
𝛿5, [Log Land] -0.7*** (0.26) 0.48 (0.29, 0.80) -0.50* (0.30) 0.61 (0.34, 1.08) 
𝛿6, [Log Loan]  0.20*** (0.07) 1.22 (1.07, 1.40) 0.01 (0.07) 1.01 (0.89, 1.15) 
𝛿7, [Log Saving] 0.08** (0.11) 1.08 (0.90, 1.35) -0.09 (0.11) 1.00 (0.73, 1.14) 
𝛿8 ,[Log Loan Paid] 0.35** (0.17) 1.42 (1.02, 1.97) 0.08 (0.17) 1.08 (0.78, 1.50) 
Provinces (base Punjab) 
𝜑𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑ℎ     -1.51*** (0.26) 0.22 (0.13, 0.36) 
𝜑𝐾ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 Pukhtoonkhwa     0.84*** (0.30) 2.30 (1.30, 4.10) 
𝜑𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛     -0.63* (0.37) 0.53 (0.26, 1.10) 
Region (base Urban)         
𝜃𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙     0.32 (0.26) 1.37 (0.83, 2.28) 
Random Part 
𝜓𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
(2)
(stage2) 0.36** (0.07)   0.36** (0.07)   
𝜓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
(3)
(stage3) 0.62** (0.12)   0.33** (0.08)   
Log Likelihood 3843.6        
𝜌𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡  0.23**    0.17**    
𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 0.15**    0.08**    
𝑂𝑅𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡    1.26**    1.19**  
𝑂𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡    1.16**    1.08**  
                                                             
 
 
51 Land holding in acres. 
52 Loan, saving and loan paid are in Rupees. 
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Table 6.5 Maximum likelihood estimates for three-level logistic random-intercept model 
Parameters International Remittances International Remittances 
(without fixed effect) (with fixed effect) 
Odds ratios = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐸𝑠𝑡) Odds ratios = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐸𝑠𝑡) 
Est 𝑆𝐸 OR (95%      CI) Est  𝑆𝐸 OR 95%       CI) 
Fixed Part         
Households level         
𝛽1, [Constant] -8.85*** (3.07)   -7.55*** (2.80)   
𝛼1, [H Head sex] 2.39*** (0.12) 10.88 (8.53,  13.8) 2.33*** (0.12) 10.31 (8.10, 13.1) 
𝛼2, [H Head age] 0.01*** (0.01) 1.01 (1.01, 1.02) 0.01*** (0.01) 1.01 (1.01, 1.02) 
𝛼3, [Child age 0-10] -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 (0.86, 1.05) -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 (0.86, 1.05) 
𝛼4, [Female 16-26] 0.06 (0.06) 1.06 (0.94, 1.20) 0.06 (0.06) 1.06 (0.94, 1.20) 
𝛼5, [Male 15-30] -0.23*** (0.06) 0.80 (0.70, 0.90) -0.23*** (0.06) 0.80 (0.71, 0.90) 
𝛼6, [H size] 0.11*** (0.03) 1.12 (1.05, 1.20) 0.11*** (0.03) 1.12 (1.05, 1.20) 
𝛼7, [Log Land
53] 0.14** (0.06) 1.15 (1.02, 1.30) 0.14** (0.06) 1.15 (1.02, 1.30) 
𝛼8, [Log Loan
54]  -0.10*** (0.01) 1.00 (0.90, 0.93) -0.09*** (0.01) 0.91 (0.88, 0.93) 
𝛼9, [Log Saving] 0.08*** (0.01 1.10 (1.05, 1.11) 0.08*** (0.01) 1.08 (1.05, 1.11) 
𝛼10, [Log Loan Paid] 0.04* (0.02) 1.04 (0.99, 1.08) 0.03 (0.02) 1.03 (0.99, 1.08) 
Village Averages         
𝛾1, [Child age 0-10] 0.12 (0.26) 1.13 (0.68, 1.86) 0.12 (0.26) 1.13 (0.68, 1.86) 
𝛾2, [Female 16-26] -0.11 (0.34) 0.89 (0.46, 1.75) -0.09 (0.34) 0.91 (0.47, 1.79) 
𝛾3, [Male 15-30] 0.37 (0.33) 1.45 (0.76, 2.79) 0.37 (0.33) 1.44 (0.75, 2.76) 
𝛾4,  [H size] -0.16 (0.17) 0.85 (0.62, 1.18) -0.15 (0.17) 0.86 (0.62, 1.19) 
𝛾5[Log Land] -0.64*** (0.20) 0.53 (0.35, 0.79) -0.63*** (0.21) 0.53 (0.35, 0.79) 
𝛾6, [Log Loan]  -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 (0.90, 1.09) -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 (0.90, 1.09) 
𝛾7, [Log Saving] -0.02 (0.06) 0.98 (0.87, 1.11) -0.01 (0.06) 0.99 (0.88, 1.13) 
𝛾8, [Log Loan Paid] -0.08 (0.10) 0.92 (0.75, 1.12) -0.06 (0.10) 0.93 (0.77, 1.15) 
District Averages 
𝛿1,[Child age 0-10] -0.05 (1.14) 0.95 (0.10, 8.84) 0.23 (1.04) 1.25 (0.16, 9.69) 
𝛿2,[Female 16-26] 0.11 (1.42) 1.12 (0.07, 18.14) -0.27 (1.27) 0.76 (0.06, 9.25) 
𝛿3,[Male 15-30] -0.04 (1.43) 0.97 (0.06, 15.9) 0.94 (1.31) 2.56 (0.20, 33.5) 
𝛿4 , [H size] 0.02 (0.71) 1.02 (0.26, 4.08) -0.07 (0.64) 0.93 (0.27, 3.26) 
𝛿5, [Log Land] -0.62 (0.43) 0.54 (0.23, 1.25) 0.20 (0.53) 1.22 (0.43, 3.45) 
𝛿6, [Log Loan]  0.45*** (0.11) 1.57 (1.26, 1.95) 0.12 (0.12) 1.12 (0.89, 1.42) 
𝛿7, [Log Saving] 0.33** (0.16) 1.40 (1.01, 1.93) 0.02 (0.18) 1.03 (0.72, 1.46) 
𝛿8 ,[Log Loan Paid] -0.51* (0.28) 0.60 (0.35, 1.04) -0.92*** (0.30) 0.40 (0.22, 0.72) 
Provinces (base Punjab) 
𝜑𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑑ℎ     -2.27*** (0.45) 0.10 (0.04, 0.25) 
𝜑𝐾ℎ𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 Pukhtoonkhwa     1.53*** (0.52) 4.63 (1.67, 12.8) 
𝜑𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛     -1.02* (0.59) 0.36 (0.12, 1.14) 
Region (base Urban)         
𝜃𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙     -0.32 (0.44) 0.73 (0.31, 1.73) 
Random Part         
𝜓𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
(2)
(stage2) 0.76** (0.15)   0.75** (0.15)   
𝜓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
(3)
(stage3) 1.37** (0.30)   0.913** (0.22)   
Log Likelihood -1876.52    -1855.01    
𝜌𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 0.39**    0.25**    
𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 0.34**    0.18**    
𝑂𝑅𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡    1.48**    1.28**  
𝑂𝑅𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡    1.40**    1.20**  
 
                                                             
 
 
53 Land holding in acres. 
54 Loan, saving and loan paid are in Rupees. 
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From each regression we obtain the correlation coefficients for two randomly selected households 
from the same village and the same district (denoted 𝜌(𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)) in terms of the 
probability of receiving remittances (internal or international) and the correlation coefficients for 
two randomly selected households residing in two different villages within the same district 
(denoted 𝜌 (district)). See the rows fourth and third from the bottom in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.  
We collect these data and for the benefit of discussion place them in Table 6.6. Note that we are 
referring to them as ‘Intra-class’ correlations.  These correlation coefficients are obtained with 
and without regional fixed effects. Not surprisingly, intra-class correlation of the two randomly 
selected households from the same village and the same district are higher than intra-class 
correlations of the two randomly selected households of different villages from the same district. 
This relationship makes sense since, measurements from the same village are more correlated 
than from different villages which are less correlated. Also with regional fixed effects, the 
correlation is refined and thus it becomes smaller. It is worth mentioning that if the intra-class 
correlation (IC) approaches 0 then the grouping by villages (or districts) are of no use and 
multilevel modelling is unsuitable for analysis. If the IC approaches 1 then there is no variance to 
explain at the village or district level. 
After discussing the overall results detailed in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, we explain the measures of 
internal and international remittance variations (for example, intra-class correlation) in Table 6.6. 
Such measures have been underused in the literature of remittances as compared with the more 
traditional measures of association or regression coefficient in the study of determinants of 
remittances. 
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Table 6.6 Intra-class correlations of the proportion of households receiving international and internal 
remittances and respective odds ratios 
 Number of 
households 
Intra-class 
correlations of 
two randomly 
selected  
households 
from the same 
village and 
obviously the 
same district  
Odds of two 
randomly 
selected  
households 
from the 
same village 
and obviously 
the same 
district 
Intra-class 
correlations of 
two randomly 
selected  
households 
from  different 
villages within 
the same 
district 
Odds of two 
randomly 
selected  
households 
from different 
villages 
within the 
same district 
Odds ratios 
of two 
households 
pick from the 
same village 
and same 
district versus 
the two 
households 
pick from the 
different 
villages and 
same district    
International Remittances  
Without 
regional 
effect 
595 0.39 1.48 0.25 1.28 1.16 
With 
regional 
effect 
595 0.34 1.40 0.18 1.20 1.17 
Internal remittances  
Without 
regional 
effect 
1682 0.23 1.26 0.17 1.19 1.06 
With 
regional 
effect 
1682 0.15 1.16 0.08 1.08 1.07 
 
 
In Table 6.6 the intra-class correlation (IC=0.39) without regional fixed effect of two randomly 
selected households from the same village and obviously the same district, showing that 39% of 
the total household differences in receiving international remittances occur at the village and 
district level and might be related to the village or district level factors or to the different 
composition of areas. By contrast, with regional effects the IC correlations is refined, and thus it 
reduces to 34%, a decrease of 5%, which further confirms our finding. Similarly, the IC 
correlations are 25% and 18% for the receipt of international remittance for two randomly 
selected households of different villages without and with regional effects, respectively. This 
latter IC correlation is substantially lower than the former one. It is institutive that households 
from the same area may be more similar to each other in relation to their socio-economic status, 
peer pressure, and sharing similar networks than to households from other areas. This related fact 
expresses itself as clustering of household migration status within area.  
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On the other hand, in this essay we also study the IC correlations for the internal remittances with 
and without regional effects. Firstly, without including a regional fixed effect, the IC correlation 
is 23% for the two randomly selected households from the same village. However, the IC 
correlation between two different villages is 17%. Secondly, with the inclusion of the regional 
fixed effect, the IC correlation results in a more refines estimate. The IC correlation for the intra-
villages is 15% and it is 8% for the inter-villages. This proportion of the differences in internal 
and international remittances between households from distinctive villages and the same village 
may be attributable to the areas in which they reside. The more the migrant household residing 
within a neighbourhood are alike, as compared with households in other neighbourhoods, the 
more likely it is that the determinants of either internal or international remittances are directly 
related to the particular region or neighbourhood, which is the geographical segregation is taking 
place. It may be concluded from the IC correlation that the household propensity to receive 
remittances is statistically dependent on the area of the residence. These comparisons suggest that 
in the presence of controls for socioeconomic characteristics, the household probability of 
receiving internal rather than international remittances is less marked within regions.     
Now the correlation coefficients can be used to compare the odds of a two households receiving 
remittances (internal or international) residing in the same village or in different villages. The aim 
of the odds is to translate the area level variances as in our case village and district level 
variances. In this study, we consider two different cases, one with weak variations between areas 
(inter-village), and the other with very strong variations (intra-village). This is called the odds 
(see the previous section for the formula). In Table 6.6 columns 4 and 6 show the odds for the 
two different scenarios explained above. For example, if the odds is equal to one, there would be 
no differences between the areas in the probability of receiving internal or international 
remittances. If there is an area level difference, the odds would be greater than one and the area of 
residence would be relevant for understanding variations of the household probability for 
receiving remittances.        
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In the estimation, if we ignore the regional effect, the odds of receiving international remittance is 
1.48 for intra-village, which shows that the unexplained heterogeneity between areas increases by 
1.48 times the household odds of receiving international remittances when randomly picking out 
two households from the same village. The odds of receiving international remittances is 1.28 for 
inter-village, which shows that the unexplained heterogeneity between areas increases by 1.28 
times, when we randomly pick two households from different villages. As expected, the 
estimated odds of inter-villages are comparatively less than from the intra-village. With the 
introduction of the regional effects, the odds became more precise and concise. The intra-villages 
odds is 1.40, and inter-villages odds is 1.20. This means that between villages, odds variation is 
significantly low. The odds of same village receiving international remittance is greater than that 
of a different villages.  
The odds' ratio (OR) for receiving international remittances is calculated by dividing the odds of 
an intra-village with the odds of an inter-village. Without the regional effect, the odds’ ratio of 
two households from same village versus the two households from the different village is 1.16. 
With the regional effect, the odds’ ratio between intra-village and inter-village is 1.17.  
In the same way, we can derive the odds for internal remittances for intra-village and inter-
village, with and without regional effects are in Table 6.6. For example, without regional effects 
the household odds of receiving internal remittances for intra-village is 1.26, whereas the odds of 
internal remittances for inter-village is 1.19. On the other hand, in the presence of controls for 
regional effects, the odds for receiving internal remittances for intra-village is 1.16 and for inter-
villages is 1.08.  
The odds' ratio (OR) for receiving internal remittances without the regional effect between two 
households from same village versus the two households from the different village is 1.06. With 
the regional effect, the odds’ ratio between intra-village and inter-village is 1.07.  
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The results for both internal and international remittances in term of IC and odds indicate that 
households are at least more likely to receive international than internal remittances, once other 
factors are held constant. Not surprisingly, the internal remittances are less clustered within 
villages and more between villages than for international remittances, probably because of their 
differences in payoff and economic gains. These results, combined with the much larger 
magnitude of the intra-village correlation when compared to the inter-village correlation, suggests 
that residence in a particular village may be a more important determinant of receiving 
remittances in rural Pakistan rather than membership in a particular household. 
It may be concluded that the role of community migrant networks is an important determinant in 
the household probability of receiving remittances. In Pakistan’s rural areas communities create 
very close ties in terms of loyalties, rights and obligations through exchange of remittances and 
information. The migrant networks link migrants and non-migrants households to form a 
sustained migration system which further help to gain access to that system. There are competing 
views related to the impact of remittances on the origin areas; however, remittances serve as an 
equalizing phenomenon in disparity of wealth, improving living standards and stimulating 
community development. 
Results of IC and odds support the notion that migrants remit less to households that are from 
different villages rather than the same village. This may be due to the networking, which is 
theorized to be associated with access to information within or outside the country regarding 
employment opportunities.  
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined the determinants of international- and -internal remittances at the 
different level of clustering by using the multilevel logistic model in Pakistan. The results of 
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multilevel logistic model reveal that household level characteristics, such as,  the age and gender 
of the household head, the number of males age between 15 and 30, the number of females age 
between 16 and 26, household size, landholding in acres and saving in Rupees are all 
significantly associated with  international and internal remittances. Village level and district 
level characteristics, such as land holding in acres and males aged between 15 and 30 are also 
significantly associated with international and internal remittances. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province is more likely to receive internal and international remittances when compared to the 
Punjab province. Similarly, Sindh and Balochistan provinces are less likely to receive both types 
of remittances when compared with the base category of Punjab province. The determinants of 
international remittances are somewhat different from the determinants of internal remittances. 
We find some key differences between the two competing choices that the presence of a female 
member in the household determines only internal remittances. However, land holding in acres is 
positively related to the international remittances and negatively related to the internal 
remittances. The household size is a more robust determinant of the international remittances 
rather than internal remittances.         
It is worth noticing that the odds ratios are higher for international remittances than for internal 
remittances, which is not surprising. But the fact that the odds ratio of comparing two households 
from the same village within the same district are generally higher than the odds ratio of two 
households from different villages within the same district is in line with conventional wisdom. 
Households in closer proximity should have higher odds of receiving remittances. It suggests that 
inter-village variations are significant. The three-level variance-component model regression 
estimates discussed above suggest that household level characteristics, along with some village 
and districts level characteristics, are strongly associated with international and internal 
remittances.  These results are useful to understand the importance of the village level network 
for information gathering and seeking insurance from each other. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
(ESSAY FOUR) 
 
Multiplier or spillover Effects of Remittances 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Social sciences have a long history of looking for social interaction effects. The interaction based 
model, which usually looks into the role of interactions in economic outcomes, has attracted the 
attention of researchers over the last two decades. Social interaction studies include both 
theoretical and empirical literature, and assume that individual attainment (in any sector of the 
economy) depends on the behavior or characteristics of community members (Brock and Durlauf, 
2001). Glaeser, et al. (2003; 3) writes “the presence of positive spillovers or strategic 
complementarities creates a ‘social multiplier’ where aggregate coefficients will be greater than 
individual coefficients”. Social multiplier models are based on an analysis that provides an 
explanation of group behaviour, which arises from the interactions across individuals. In 
economics such studies are largely based on the schooling performance, financial decision, 
criminal behaviour and neighbourhood decision. Such economic outcomes vary substantially 
across observationally similar groups (Graham, 2008). Usually, social multiplier models consider 
that each individual behaviour is a function of the characteristics or average behaviour of others 
in the group and then study what aggregate behaviours arise in the population. If the individual 
behaviour is affected by the group behaviour characteristics or both due to excess variation across 
the group, then we have a social multiplier. This excess variance (group-level heterogeneity) is 
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perhaps easy to be understood, but it is difficult to empirically identify (Durlauf and Tanaka, 
2008). It is often referred in empirical literature as an identification problem. This major issue has 
been recognized in the field for many years, as noted by Manski (1993) with a prominent paper 
that highlights the difficulty in separating the endogenous effects from exogenous and correlated 
effects.   
 
Consider for the purpose of this work district-level remittances, if (other things being equal) 
household level-remittances tend to vary with the average district-level remittances, we have an 
endogenous effect. However, if household level remittances vary with the socio-economic 
composition of the district we have an exogenous effect. Finally, if the household in the same 
district tends to receive remittances because it has the similar family background or norms when 
compared to others, then we have a correlated effect. Only endogenous effects generate the 
‘social multiplier’. However, the endogenous effect could be identified if attributes defining 
reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related. A variance 
contrast method is used to segregate the above-mentioned effects. 
 
It is believed that remittances, like many other economic activities, have social interaction, which 
is often labelled as a neighborhood or multiplier effects. In this chapter, we use the term 
‘multiplier effects’. However, despite the economic importance of multiplier effects, empirical 
evidence for such effects on remittances is yet to be fully understood. A handful of studies on the 
labor market provide evidence of multiplier effects in the workplace due to the knowledge 
spillover (Cornelissen, et al. 2013). Still it is unclear to what extent these findings can be 
extended to remittances.  
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The remittances literature tackles a variety of questions such as the following. How do 
remittances affect receiving households, which in turn affect economic activities in countries? 
Are they primarily uses for productive investment, or only used for consumption? Do remittances 
serve as insurance in bad economic conditions in-migrant sending communities? Is there any 
multiplier or spillover effect of remittances in receiving communities? In this chapter, we are 
interested in answering the last question, which hasn’t captured the attention of researchers for a 
long time. We first review the overall magnitude of remittances multiplier or spill-over effects 
and then turn to what our research reveals about the motivation for migrant remittances and what 
effect they have on receiving households.  
 
In this paper, we go beyond the existing literature to investigate multiplier effects triggered by 
remittances in rural households by using the data set of Household Integrated Economic Survey 
of 2007-08. Our unique data in the context of Pakistan allows us to compare the magnitude of 
multiplier effects across different districts in rural areas, while taking into account household-
level characteristics along with previous measures of asset holding. It thus provides an 
opportunity to investigate whether the multiplier effects uncovered in existing literature are 
confined to the specific households or districts receiving remittances. At the same time, our 
comparison of the magnitude of multiplier effects across different districts of Pakistan provides 
new evidence on possibility of multiplier effects of remittances in rural areas. Our empirical 
analysis relies on the effect of remittances measured by the average remittances at district level to 
uncover the multiplier effect. This paper follows Graham’s (2008) method for studying the 
presence and magnitude of a social multiplier based on conditional variance restrictions, which is 
due to district-level heterogeneity and/or sorting, which occurs when households sort across 
districts according to their wealth and preferences for public goods, social characteristics, and 
community opportunities.  
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Debate continues about the best strategies to deal with sorting (i.e. that the migrant households 
may sort into high migrant groups or districts in our case). We condition for an extensive set of 
fixed effects (for districts) and include district fixed effects to account for the potential sorting. 
Then, we incorporate the asset holding of households for potential sorting by ability to migrate 
and send remittances. Finally, Graham’s (2008) method takes into account unexplained group-
level heterogeneity as well as sorting to calculate the exact magnitude of the multiplier effect. 
Since the mean remittances at district-level are likely to be correlated with error term, we employ 
an instrumental variables strategy to isolate it.  
 
Using annual average rainfall and the number of hospitals as an instrumental variable (IV), our 
estimates find a social multiplier of remittances, which is equal to approximately 1.12, suggesting 
sizable spillovers. Our result suggests that a social multiplier in terms of remittances contributes 
to the rural household of Pakistan.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 presents the data set. Section 
7.3 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 7.4 introduces the research methodology. 
Furthermore, section 7.5 analyses the determinants of internal and international remittances in 
Pakistan. The conclusion is presented in Section 7.6. 
 
7.2 Data set 
 
The rapid growth of remittances in Asia attracted the attention of the international policy circle, 
but the poor quality of earlier data poses a real challenge on the possibility of considering studies 
at the micro-level in receiving countries, especially in Pakistan. This research aims to address this 
data gap by providing an empirical analysis with a special focus on districts of Pakistan. We 
focus on Pakistan both because of data availability and because this is the source of the majority 
of remittances. In our data set remitting behaviour is measured as total remittances, inclusive of 
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zeroes for those that do not remit and the amount remitted for those who remit. There is already a 
rich literature, both theoretical and empirical, which explains the different key factors for the 
remitting behaviour along with the variety of household characteristics that attract remittances. 
Our selection of which household level characteristics to control for is motivated by these papers, 
but it should be noted that our intention in this paper in not to test which of these theories best fits 
in the context of Pakistan, but only to use these theories to help understand which characteristics 
might be associated with remittance multiplier or peer effects in rural Pakistan. With our data set 
we are able to control for a number of important household-level characteristics that the New 
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory suggests should be associated with remitting 
behaviour. These include demographic characteristics of household head (age, sex, education and 
civil status), difference in household demographics (household size and dependants by sex) and 
household level wealth (dwelling, rooms, landholding, commercial building, savings and loans). 
Our data set includes Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) and Pakistan Social and 
Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) for the years 2007-08. The Federal Bureau of Statistics 
(FBS) in Pakistan collects survey data at Provincial levels and District levels through PSLM and 
HIES. The PSLM collects data on social indicators at District levels, whereas HIES collects data 
on social and economic indicators such as income and consumption at Provincial levels in 
alternative years. The (PSLM) survey provides the social and economic indicators at Provincial 
and District levels in Pakistan. This survey is part of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which were initiated in July 2004 and is scheduled to be completed in June 2015. It 
consists of a sample size of 80,000 households at district level and 17,000 households at 
Provincial level. This is designed to provide population-based information of social and economic 
indicators under the direction of the United Nations (UN). There are 18 targets and 48 indicators, 
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and the Pakistan government is committed to achieving 16 targets and 37 indicators by 2015. Out 
of these 6 targets and 13 indicators are monitored through PSLM surveys.55 
The sample design of the PSLM survey consists of urban and rural areas in Pakistan. The urban 
area consists of either a city or town, which is further divided into enumeration blocks. Each 
enumeration block consists of 200 to 250 households. Each enumeration block is further divided 
among three income categories - a high-income group, a middle-income group and a low income 
group. The remaining defunct Division forms a separate stratum. The population census 
organization published the list of villages in rural areas in 1998, which is used for rural frame. In 
rural areas, each District in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP Provinces form a stratum while the 
administrative defunct Division in Balochistan Province constitutes a stratum. The PSLM data 
collection is based on several rounds and registered information at both individual and household 
level on different aspects such as income, expenditure, education, health and access to basic 
services56.  
The data collection methodology is based on a two-stage stratified sample design. Stage one is 
based on Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and stage two on Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs). 
The former includes enumeration blocks and villages in Urban and Rural areas respectively, 
which are selected with Probability Proportional to Size (PPS). The latter includes households 
which are selected (16 for rural areas and 12 for urban areas) using a systematic sampling 
technique with a random start. For district wise average earnings income and education levels, 
this paper utilizes micro data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement survey 
                                                             
 
 
55 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be grouped into 8 main following areas: MDG 1: Eradicate 
Extreme Poverty and Hunger, MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education, MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality and 
Women’s Empowerment, MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality, MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health, MDG 6: Combat 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases, MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability, and MDG 8: Develop Global 
Partnership for Development.  
56 For more detail see  http://www.pbs.gov.pk. 
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(PSLM) 2004-05. It is the only socio-economic micro data that is representative at the provincial 
and district level. Moreover, the sample size of the district level data is also substantially larger 
than the provincial level data contained in micro data surveys such as the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) of Pakistan and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of Pakistan. This has 
enabled researchers to draw socioeconomic information which is representative at lower 
administrative levels as well. The survey for 2007-08 provides district level welfare indicators for 
a sample size of about 7,200 households. It provides data on districts in all four provinces of 
Pakistan namely Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. The Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA region) along the Afghan border in the north-west and Azad Kashmir are not 
included in the data. To analyse the spatial differences in district wise remittances in rural 
Pakistan, this chapter has utilized the district level data only.  
In rural communities, information is also collected on a range of attributes such as employment, 
income, local infrastructure and provision of services, such as health and education. The 
probability of each household residing in different parts throughout the country differs. This 
sampling weight, used for different households, is weighted by a factor that is inversely 
proportional to their probability of selection in the survey sample.  
The data set also provides information on transfer payments received and paid-out by households. 
For the transfer payments received, it includes remittances received by households within 
Pakistan (internal remittances) and remittances received by households outside of Pakistan 
(international remittances). For the transfer payments paid-out, it includes remittances paid-out by 
households within Pakistan and remittance's paid-out by households outside of Pakistan.  
However, the data set does not include any information about the actual migrant. The only 
available information is the amount of remittances from a member to the family. The households 
that do not receive remittances are due to not having a member migrated or having a member 
migrated but not receiving remittances. The information on dwelling consists of type of dwelling, 
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occupancy status, rooms and electricity/gas/ telephone connection. Moreover, data identifies 
agricultural land, non-agricultural land, residential building and commercial building. Further 
information is collected by questions such as, did any members own or previously own any 
property? Is this property owned now? If yes, how much agriculture land is it in acres? Finally, 
agricultural activity includes information of a household's total operational land owned. The total 
land holding is further divided into two types irrigated and rainfed (barani) and also into 
cultivated and uncultivable.  Information is also available on household borrowing, lending, net 
current savings, and the total value of sold/purchased gold, securities and dividends.  
7.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
The definition of household includes either a single person or more than one person, who live and 
eat together, under the same roof and have no usual place of residence elsewhere. Absent 
members of the household such as internal or international migrants are not considered members 
of the household. If these members are present in the household at the time of the survey, then 
their income is included as either internal or international remittances received.  
 
The use of the home-country data is crucial for answering the questions of interest to this study. 
This survey can tell us which households have migrants, and which receive remittances, but 
cannot inform us which migrants have moved abroad, to which country, with their whole 
household, and whether they send remittances or not. Asking household members in home 
countries to report on the incomes, education and other characteristics of the migrant members is 
problematic for the household members to report such information.  
 
 In this data set, we construct comparable covariates to compare household income, remittances 
behavior, family composition and demographic characteristics, measured at the household level, 
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not at the individual level. All financial values are reported in the constant 2007-08 PKR 
(Pakistani Rupee). 
 
Table 7.1 Households distribution by Provinces and Districts 
Provinces Number of 
districts 
Number of 
Households 
Punjab 35 2,888 
Sindh 16 1,660 
NWFP 24 1,355 
Balochistan 6 1,297 
Total  81 7,200 
 
 
Table 7.2 Household head characteristics 
Households Head Marital 
Status  
Percent Household head sex Percent 
Never Married  2.07 Male  95.92 
Currently Married 92.83 Female 4.08 
Widow/Widower 4.86 Household head attended school Percent 
Divorced 0.14 Not Attended School  50.57 
Other 0.10 Attended School 48.36 
Total  100% Currently Attended School 1.07 
 
 
We present summary statistics of Pakistan Integrated household survey by concentrating on 
remittances data. However, there is considerable heterogeneity between households in the data 
set. Table 7.1 summarizes the total number of households (7,200) in rural Pakistan across 81 
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districts, which are further divided into four provinces. Punjab province covers 35 districts with 
2,888 households; Sindh province covers 16 districts with 1660 households; NWFP includes 24 
districts, which cover 1,355 households, and finally Balochistan province includes 6 districts by 
surveying 1,297 households. Furthermore, the number of the households covered in each district 
can be found in the Appendix.  
 
Table 7.2 summarizes the household head characteristics with respect to age, sex, education, and 
marital status. In our database, 90% of household heads are married, and 48% of the household 
heads attended school. The average age of the household head in years over the whole sample is 
46 years, and 96% of the household head are males. Household head characteristics, especially in 
from the perspective of the New Economic of Labor Migration (NELM) are an important 
determinant for understanding remittance behavior.   
 
We started by establishing prevalence and pattern of remittances by gender of the household head 
by provinces. We consider the key dimension of remittances behaviour that whether migrant 
chooses to remit at all or not, and the total amount remitted in rupees. Our data set records 
internal and international remittances that households receive from members working abroad. 
The descriptive statistics show a considerable variation across the provinces of Pakistan. Our data 
set reports differences in receiving an amount of remittances that arises from the gender of the 
household head. It is therefore, useful to begin by illustrating the differences in the incidence of 
remittances by the gender of the household head and provinces.  
Table 7.3 shows the average distribution of internal and international remittances across the four 
provinces of Pakistan. In Punjab, on average household receives around 6,000 rupees as  internal 
remittances and around 8,000 rupees as international remittances, while comparatively in NWFP 
(new name KPK) an average household receive 13,000 rupees as  internal remittances and 16,000 
rupees as  international remittances, almost double that of Punjab province. Balochistan province 
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does receive on average a minimal amount of both types of remittances. Finally, Sindh province 
only receives internal remittances, which is also quite small on average, and it does not receive 
international remittances at all.  
 
Table 7.3 Internal and international remittances (in thousand rupees) by Province 
Province Internal Remittances International Remittances Total Remittances 
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Punjab 6.158 21.901 7.745 47.189 13.904 52.366 
Sindh 0.343 5.752 0 0 0.343 5.752 
NWFP 13.097 39.866 16.059 62.656 29.157 72.561 
Balochistan 0.186 3.244 0.424 8.813 0.610 9.382 
Total 5.048 22.866 6.205 40.981 11.253 47.164 
 
Table 7.4 summarises the average internal and international remittances receive by household in 
each province by the gender of the household head (male versus female). Our data set shows that 
female-headed household receive a higher amount in remittances - both internal and international 
- than a counterpart male-headed household (thus confirming intra-household decision making 
power or may be that a female-headed household have migrants). The household head is the 
person, who takes the important decisions within the household such as employment, marriage, 
schooling, providing the needs of the households, and chooses between consumption and 
investment. Household heads whether male or female to be in a strong bargaining position within 
the household (Guzman, et al. 2008). The data set comprises of 7,200 households and is 
representative at the provincial and district level in rural areas. Although the survey is 
comprehensive in character and includes detailed information on household income and 
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consumption patterns it is not a specialized survey of migration. As such, it collects only basic 
information on household’s level characteristics. 
 
Table 7.4 Internal, international and total remittances (in thousand rupees) by the gender of the 
household head per provinces 
Province  Internal Remittances International 
Remittances 
Total Remittances 
  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
 
Punjab 
Male  4.950 19.853 6.461 44.990 11.411 49.928 
Female 25.476 38.192 28.282 71.044 53.758 71.208 
 
Sindh 
Male  0.316 5.652 0 0 0.316 5.652 
Female 4.000 13.856 0 0 4.000 13.856 
 
NWFP 
Male 10.965 37.684 15.261 63.526 26.227 72.313 
Female 38.218 54.072 25.462 50.606 63.681 66.621 
 
Balochistan 
Male  0.131 2.563 0.216 45.000 0.348 5.307 
 Female 12.000 29.393 4.653 110.227 57.000 108.249 
 
Neither does it contain comprehensive data on migrants; only migrants who remit (and whose 
remittances are declared by the receiving household) are captured by survey. The lack of data on 
migrants implies that we cannot observe the multiplier or spillover effects of remittances between 
remitters. However, we can observe the multiplier or spillover effects of remittances between 
remittance receiving households in different districts of Pakistan, since the data set does contain 
relatively good data on remittances, including those remitted in cash and in kind and the 
frequency with which remittances are received. Remittance- receiving households are defined as 
households receiving remittances from within Pakistan, from abroad, or from both.  
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Table 7.5 Summary Statistics 
Variable 
 
Household not receives 
remittances(observations 
624357) 
Household receives only 
internal 
remittances(observations 640) 
Household receives only 
international 
remittances(observations 288) 
Household receives both 
internal and international 
remittances(observations 29) 
 MEAN STD. DEV. 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. 
 
MEAN STD. DEV. 
 
Household Head Characteristics 
Household head sex (1 if male; 2 otherwise) 1.02 0.12 1.20 0.40 1.22 0.42 1.21 0.41 
Household head age  45.43 13.15 50.50 14.75 50.94 15.33 58.66 12.95 
Household head married (Dummy 1 if married; 0 otherwise) 0.94 0.25 0.89 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 
Household head attended school (Dummy 1 if Attended School; 0 otherwise) 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.50 
Household head can write (Dummy 1 if can write; 2 otherwise) 1.48 0.50 1.50 0.50 1.45 0.50 1.34 0.48 
Household level Characteristics 
Household size 7.26 3.26 7.23 4.19 8.94 5.20 10.03 4.96 
Number of children age 0 to 14 years 3.15 2.25 3.06 2.61 3.75 3.47 4 3.30 
Number of female age 15 to 30 years 0.99 0.95 1.31 1.23 1.55 1.29 2.21 1.18 
Number of male age 15 to 30 years 0.93 1.17 0.77 1.01 1.18 1.09 1.31 1.23 
Internal remittances in thousand Rupees - - 54.216 54.855 - - - - 
International  remittances in thousand  Rupees - - - - 142.419 140.931 - - 
Both internal plus international remittances in thousand Rupees - - - - - - 183.151 147.261 
Household own house  (Dummy 1 if own house; 0 otherwise) 0.81 0.39 0.90 0.29 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.31 
Household has 3 or less than 3 rooms (Dummy 1 if has 3 rooms; 0 otherwise)  0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.302 0.46 0.35 0.50 
Household has 4 or more than 4 rooms (Dummy 1 if has 4 rooms; 0 otherwise) 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.51 
Household has gas connection  (Dummy 1 if has gas; 0 otherwise) 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 
Household has telephone connection (Dummy 1 if has telephone; 0 otherwise) 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.50 
Household has electricity connection (Dummy 1 if has electricity; 0 otherwise) 0.79 0.41 0.89 0.31 0.95 0.21 0.93 0.26 
                                                             
 
 
57 Note: N=7200 households; 6243 households do not receive any type of  remittances, 640 households receive only internal remittances, 288 households receive only international remittances, and 29 households receive both 
internal and international remittances. 
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Household own commercial building (Dummy 1 if own building; 0 otherwise) 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.35 
Household own non-agricultural land (Dummy 1 if own land ; 0 otherwise) 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 
Household own agricultural land in acres 1.22 13.55 1.16 14.84 0.61 2.37 0.97 2.33 
Savings last year in thousand Rupees  10.480 58.456 20.000 185.466 28.675 73.893 20.931 47.382 
Loan borrowed last year in thousand Rupees 2.012 16.918 4.234 27.776 13.215 102.157 1.206 5.615 
District Level Averages  
Household head age 45.91 2.89 47.54 2.93 48.12 2.76 48.82 3.14 
Household size 7.33 1.01 7.16 0.96 7.94 1.54 7.76 1.42 
Number of children age 0 to 14 years 3.17 0.65 3.05 0.66 3.45 1.05 3.32 1.01 
Number of female age 15 to 30 years 1.03 0.18 1.10 0.19 1.19 0.21 1.22 0.24 
Number of male age 15 to 30 years 0.93 0.28 0.82 0.23 1.02 0.28 0.95 0.25 
Internal remittances in thousand Rupees 3.997 6.043 13.572 14.585 8.547 8.593 8.289 4.546 
International  remittances in thousand Rupees 4.923 10.905 8.392 11.916 27.724 21.240 20.122 19.187 
Household own agricultural land in acres 1.23 1.52 0.96 1.51 0.85 1.30 0.52 0.61 
Savings last year in thousand Rupees  11.332 13.934 16.891 15.140 17.365 17.179 18.257 18.997 
Loan borrowed last year in thousand Rupee 2.410 3.526 4.570 5.063 3.656 4.069 3.068 3.480 
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We make a distinction between remittances received from Pakistan (internal remittances) and 
remittances received from abroad (international remittances) as both differ both in frequency and 
amount. Of the 7,200 households included in the sample, 86.5% of households do not receive any 
type of remittances: 9% of households receive internal remittances, 4% receive remittances from 
abroad, and 0.5 percent receives both remittances. Altogether, 13.5% of households receive some 
form of remittances. Due to very small sample of household receiving remittances; in our 
analysis, we will consider only remittance receiving households irrespective of internal or 
international remittances. Since previous literature suggests that internal and international 
remittances differ both in frequency and amount (Guzman, et al., 2008), Table 7.5 descriptive 
statistics do not suggest any striking differences between the two types of household. 
7.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification 
 
The interaction based model has been studied by Manski (2000, 2003), Brock and Durlauf 
(2001a, 2001b), Moffitt (2001), Graham and Hahn (2005), and Graham (2008); and the list 
should contain many more. There are formally two approaches in interaction based models to 
uncover social interaction (Durlauf and Tanaka, 2008). The first approach is the linear-in-means 
framework, which presumes a linear relationship between the group characteristics (the credit 
goes to Manski for being the first to introduce this concept to the fullest). In econometrics, this 
approach estimates social interaction effects through changes in the linear expectation of 
individual outcomes when group level variables are included in the conditioning set. The second 
approach is the variance contrast framework which uses intragroup variation in behavior to infer 
social interactions (the second approach, originally proposed by Glaeser, et al. (1996) and 
developed into a full inferential procedure by Graham (2008). In econometrics, this approach 
estimates social interaction effects, which will induce intragroup dependences in behavior that 
affect sample variances for intragroup outcomes.  
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The cross-sectional data is always subject to potentially severe biases in direction that are not 
obvious a priori. Reverse causation is a major concern because it is difficult to separate the cross-
sectional relationship between remittances and average remittances but the instrumental variable 
approach could separate that correlation (Yang, 2011). There is also a concern with identification 
in empirical research, especially when using cross-section data, because of the possibility that the 
group versus individual influences is likely correlated.  The necessary condition for identification 
needs only one individual variable whose group level average is not an element of the individual 
behavior equation, and this average can be used for instrument. In this paper, we use household 
level data, which has an important advantage to the extent that the parameters of the household 
model are identified. On the technical note, our paper follows the empirical estimation that is 
used in the Graham (2008) seminal approach (variance contrast framework) by achieving 
identification through covariance restrictions on errors.  
 
In this section, we present our empirical strategy. Let 𝑅𝑖𝑑 denote outcome of household 𝑖 in 
district 𝑑, which in our context indicates the level of remittances in thousand Rupees. The 
household and the district (region of residence for households) define the reference group. 
Moreover, let 𝑋𝑖𝑑 and 𝑊𝑖𝑑, respectively, denote a household’s level characteristics and household 
level wealth. The basic regression model used in this paper is thus  
 
               𝑅𝑖𝑑 = 𝛼𝑑 + 𝑋𝑖𝑑  𝛼1 +𝑊𝑖𝑑𝛼2 + ?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑 𝛼3 + ?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑 𝛼4 + (𝛾0 − 1)?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑   + 𝜖𝑖𝑑 
 
Where ?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑  are district level variables calculated as the average household level 
characteristics and average household level wealth for the group of individual households of 
district 𝑑 where the household i indexes, but excluding from the average the value of the ith 
household (-i). The estimated coefficient of interest is 𝛾0 (known as social interaction), or the 
response of household 𝑖 to a change in the average remittances (?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑) of the district; which is 
the indirect response to the remittances. The terms 𝛼𝑑 represent district-level heterogeneity and 
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𝜀𝑖𝑑  represents random household-level heterogeneity. The terms 𝛼𝑑 and 𝜀𝑑𝑖 are the random latent 
variables unobserved by the econometrician. Positive social interaction will result if 𝛾0 > 1. By 
imposing restrictions on the conditional distribution of ?̅?(−𝑖)𝑑  given district level instruments 
(annual average rain fall, number of public hospitals) will help in the identification of  𝛾0 . We 
have normalized the total remittances at household level by their sample mean and standard 
deviation. Next, we generate the district-level mean remittances from the normalized total 
remittances at the household level. Similarly, we create household level remittance variable 
containing the deviation from the mean district-level remittances.  
 
Our interest is in the inter-district differences in remittances, but intra-district variances are also 
important in this context. The intra-district and inter-district remittance dispersion is measured by 
the residual variance of the household level normal remittances with OLS regression on district 
fixed effects and other relevant covariates. Then we calculate the mean district residual that help 
in derivation of intra and inter districts squares of remittances. Typically, the residual is viewed as 
unexplained, but in our case, it may vary substantially intra-and inter-districts. This variance 
decomposition explains not only average differences between districts but also differences in the 
heterogeneity of districts. A study by Western and Bloome (2009) argues that least-square 
regression residuals are uncorrelated with covariates (𝑥𝑖) by construction, so the variance of 
dependent variable (𝑦𝑖) equals the sum of the residual variance and the variance of predicted 
values for 𝑦𝑖. Furthermore, residual variance may reflect measurement error rather than social 
process and residuals are very useful for detecting omitted variables.     
 
Following Graham (2208), we work with mean of remittances in district, and manipulate the data 
in term of within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) and between-district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) deviation from the respective mean with 
the cross-district mean. In other word, within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) is simply the within district sample 
variance of remittances, while between-district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) is the square deviation of group average 
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remittances in the sample. This allows to address issue of selection in our analysis. We work with 
the inter-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) and intra-district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) remittance data to quantify the social interaction. We 
next introduce the two step GMM model. First, the within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) remittances is regressed 
on the extensive set of covariates including instrumental variables and district fixed effects. 
Second, the inter district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) remittances is regressed on the instrumental variables for intra-
district remittances (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) along with other control variables. In our estimation, 𝑅𝑑
𝑤 is instrumented 
with annual average rain fall and the number of hospitals in each district, and the outcome 
variable 𝑅𝑑
𝐵  is employed to calculate the social multiplier or spillover effect between-districts as 
the following: 
𝛾0
2 = (𝛽1[𝑅𝑑
𝐵])2. 
 
Social multiplier will result in 
                                                            𝛾0 = √𝛾0
2 . 
 
In this study, we take the advantage of the variance contrast approach to empirically identify a 
social interaction to avoid the reflection problem. The reflection problem arises when data on 
outcomes do not reveal whether group behavior actually affects individual behavior or group 
behavior is simply the aggregation of individual behaviors (Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 
2001a, 2001b). As mentioned, we identify the role of social interactions using annual average 
rainfall and the number of public hospitals in each district. We expect that the mean rainfall and 
hospital numbers be correlated with the mean level of remittances in districts and uncorrelated 
with the household level remittances. Another general concern in social interaction models is the 
choice of group and group size in each district. The eighty one districts are covered in four 
provinces of Pakistan, and each district contains four randomly surveyed villages.  Furthermore, 
each village covers 32 households in an equal number.  The method used in the survey for 
defining group size in rural areas of approximately equal densities is not problematic for 
identification and for spurious correlation. By defining “neighbor" as 16 households is 
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sufficiently small that spurious correlation between the loosely related neighbor should be 
minimized as an econometric issue (Towe and Lawley; 2013). Another advantage for formation 
of groups in our data set is to view groups as the social groups to which any household may 
belong.   
Our empirical analysis includes the variables that control for the contextual interactions and 
correlated effects which assist to isolate the influence of the endogenous interactions in 
remittances. The following discussion will sum up the intuition behind our selection of key 
variables used in social multiplier estimation.  The number of variables is measured at the 
district-level, which is required for empirical identification, controlling for contextual interactions 
that may drive common behaviour within districts. We control for contextual interaction using 
socio-demographic indicators such as, mean household head characteristics, mean household-
level characteristics and mean household-level wealth characteristics. Our analysis further 
includes the household wealth holding such as; household owned house, household owned 
commercial building, household owned non-commercial land and household owned agriculture 
land-holding in acres. These variables capture potential sorting of households into different types 
of districts and proxy for many unobservable factors such as resources available to household 
members to migrate (i.e. to afford the cost of migration).  Additionally, we also include loans in 
Rupees and savings in Rupees in our empirical estimation. To the extent that the prevalence of 
loans in the district can be thought of as a correlated effect that is the districts with more loans are 
more likely to experience higher remittances, because the types of the households with loans are 
correlated. Further the savings will also serve as the proxy for households to counter any natural 
calamities but further it serves as to cover any associated cost of migration. 
We include a measure of the mean wealth at the district level as a control for the exogenous 
influence of shocks to employment that are common within districts. We are not sure about the 
causality of wealth in explaining remittances a priori how the measure of wealth will interact in 
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this model - whether a lower wealth has a negative impact on the likelihood of remittances or a 
higher wealth leads to an increase in remittances. 
7.4.1 Instrumental variables  
A potential concern is that due to peer effect (or externality) the mean remittance at the district 
level is correlated with the household level remittances, which are our outcome variable, leading 
to biased estimates. To address this concern we need instrumental variables, which are expected 
to correlate with mean remittance at the district level but uncorrelated with individual household 
level remittances. We try several instruments. For example, the average rainfall at the district 
level is expected to be positively and significantly correlated with the district remittances in 
Pakistan. The rainfall and other community shocks, such as the total number of public/private 
schools, and the number of hospitals in each district may affect the community/district level mean 
remittances, but is unlikely to affect individual level remittances which may depend on individual 
level shock.  
The main threat to the validity of these instrumental variables for mean remittances is the 
possibility that the unobserved persistent adverse economic conditions were a factor determining 
remittances both historically and contemporaneously. Another potential threat to the validity of 
the instrument is the development of infrastructure (another unobservable), which may affect 
current mean remittances through the channel other than current migration rates (such as foods 
supply and delivery of government services). Similarly, historical remittances may have 
influenced the level of current development in the districts, the industrial structure, governance, 
and other infrastructure, all of which may also influence remittances (McKenzie and Rapoport 
2007). To investigate this, we also look at the correlation between the mean remittances and the 
average level of district growth rate, and the agricultural share of production in a district.  
Taken together, the results from Table 7.1 provide support for the exogeneity restriction required 
for our instruments. Our results are robust to using these instruments for mean remittances, 
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suggesting that this possible threat is not a concern in our data. These two variables affect the 
mean remittances, but have no other direct impact on the decision of the sender of the 
remittances. The growth rate of the district is used as an additional instrument. These all-
instrumental variables are used to form a test of over-identification for the instruments and test 
displayed in table C.4 in appendix. 
7.5 Results and Discussions 
 
We use the survey data to explore the multiplier or spillover effects of remittances in rural 
Pakistan, as a function of household head characteristics, household characteristics, and 
household wealth, which the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) suggests, should 
matter. All regression includes districts fixed effect. The research related to the impact of 
remittances on productive investment already proved that remittances lead to investment in the 
regions where capital is scarce. This supports the existence of interdependency of interaction, and 
it seems reasonable to expect to find a social multiplier in the level of remittances in the 81 
districts of Pakistan. We have estimated five different social multipliers at different levels of 
aggregation. The estimated multiplier rises nominally with the level of aggregation, confirming 
the importance of additional control in the estimation. We use the approach developed by Graham 
(2008) to the variances of district level average remittance outcomes to identify the social 
multiplier. Scheinkman (2008; 6) defined social multiplier as “the measure of  the ratio of the 
effect on the average action caused by a change in the parameter to the effect on the average 
action that would occur if the individual agents ignored the change in the action of their peers”.                   
In the first stage regression results, the Kleibergen—Paap under-identification LM and Wald tests 
fail to reject their null hypotheses at the 95% level, suggesting that even for over-identification 
with the order condition, the instruments may be inadequate to identify the equation. The 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM test readily reject their null hypothesis and 
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indicate that the endogenous regressors are relevant. Table 7.6 reports estimates of 𝛾0
2 using the 
remittances data. We focus on the column 1 remittance results (the column 5 results are equally 
similar, although less identified). The estimate of 𝛾0
2 in this case is approximately equal to 1.25, 
suggesting a social multiplier of 1.12.58 The no social interaction null is rejected at the 5% level. 
The 𝛾0
2 parameter is identified in our estimation. The first stage F-statistics is over 30, which 
suggest that weak instrument is not a concern.  
Column 1 results of 𝛾0
2 suggests that multiplier effect of remittances receiving households 
contributed to the district development of Pakistan. To get a rough idea of the implied social 
multiplier under randomly distributed remittances to districts a 1 standard deviation change in 
remittances is given by ( 𝛾0 − 1)/√𝐷.59 The effect on a household of a 1 standard deviation 
change in remittances relative to a 1 standard deviation change in its own remittances across 
districts of 40 to 90 households corresponds to relative changes in remittances of 0.02 to 0.01, 
respectively. This explains that the average spillover of remittances between districts 40 to 90 is 
between 1 to 2 %. Glaeser, et al. (2003) estimated a social multiplier of 8.16 for crime and 4.47 
for homicides and doubts that these high estimates are due to a correlation between demographics 
and the unobservable element. Similarly, the estimated social multiplier will result in very large 
value, if there is significant sorting on the basis of unobservable characteristics (Glaeser, et al. 
2003), but our modest results are in line with the estimation result provided by Graham (2008) for 
social multiplier for math data with 1.9. Our paper has a brief analysis of the social multiplier 
effect of remittances in rural Pakistan and the data is sufficient to support the idea that a social 
multiplier exists. 
 
                                                             
 
 
58 Social Multiplier can be calculated by    𝛾0 = √𝛾0
2   = √1.25 = 1.12  
59 Where D stand for the size of the district; let assume that each district size is changes from 40 to 90 households;  (1.12 −
1)/√40 = 0.02 and (1.12 − 1)/√90 = 0.01; see Graham (2008) for more detailed discussion. 
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Table 7.6 GMM Estimate of γ^2 for normalised remittances 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Remittances Remittances Remittances Remittances Remittances 
𝛾2 1.245 
(0.041) 
1.325 
(0.087) 
1.285 
(0.073) 
1.217 
(0.076) 
1.300 
(0.155) 
Household Head Sex (1 if 
male; 2 otherwise) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.030 
(0.056) 
-0.020 
(0.050) 
-0.051 
(0.051) 
-0.083 
(0.090) 
Household Head Age  0.007 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Household Head Married 
(Dummy 1 if married; 0 
otherwise) 
-0.063 
(0.025) 
-0.083 
(0.037) 
-0.073 
(0.029) 
-0.082 
(0.045) 
-0.122 
(0.090) 
Household Head Attended 
School (Dummy 1 for 
School; 0 otherwise) 
-0.133 
(0.142) 
-0.206 
(0.200) 
-0.170 
(0.171) 
-0.089 
(0.123) 
-0.147 
(0.193) 
Household Size - 0.022 
(0.015) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
Number of Children age 0 
to 14 years 
- -0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
Number of Female age 15 
to 30 years 
- -0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Number of Male age 15 to 
30 years 
- 0.011 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
Household Own House  
(Dummy 1 if own house; 0 
otherwise) 
- 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
Household Own log of 
agricultural land in acres 
- - -0.019 
(0.044) 
-0.015 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.058) 
Log of savings last year in 
Rupees  
- - -0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
Log of loan borrowed last 
year in Rupees 
- - 0.021 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
Mean of Household Head 
Age 
- - - -0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
Mean of  Household Size - - - 0.120 
(0.052) 
0.081 
(0.083) 
Mean of  Number of 
Children age 0 to 14 years 
- - - -0.052 
(0.046) 
-0.020 
(0.073) 
Mean of  Number of 
Female age 15 to 30 years 
- - - -0.104 
(0.068) 
-0.010 
(0.080) 
Mean of  Number of Male 
age 15 to 30 years 
- - - -0.217 
(0.102) 
-0.167 
(0.163) 
Mean of  Household Own 
log of agricultural land in 
acres 
- - - - 0.050 
(0.032) 
Mean of  Log of  savings 
last year in Rupees  
- - - - -0.013 
(0.015) 
Mean of  Log of loan 
borrowed last year in 
Rupee 
- - - - -0.020 
(0.018) 
𝐹(𝑑𝑓1,𝑑𝑓2) 
𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝐻0 : 𝛾
2 = 1 
34.83(1,7081) 
(0.000) 
13.77(1,7071) 
(0.000) 
15.13(1,7071) 
(0.000) 
8.11(1,7060) 
(0.000) 
3.76(1,7057) 
(0.053) 
𝐹(𝑑𝑓1,𝑑𝑓2) 1𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 
(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) 
14.92(2,7080) 
(0.000) 
5.86(2,7070) 
(0.003) 
6.71(2,7065) 
(0.001) 
3.55(2,7059) 
(0.029) 
1.59(1,7056) 
(0.204) 
Number of Districts 81 81 81 81 81 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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7.6 Conclusions 
 
There exists strong empirical evidence of the magnitude of the social multiplier, particularly in 
the areas of peer group effects in education and neighbourhood effects while successfully 
confronting the several basic identification and estimation problems such as Graham (2008) but 
with limited application in the areas of migration and remittances. The econometric result might 
suffer from a sorting bias in our case. It may be due to remittance receiving household's being 
located in more affluent districts and the multiplier effects being overestimated. We address this 
bias by controlling for rich information on household level characteristics and by including 
district-specific effects. Secondly, in this paper, we have applied Graham’s (2008) recently 
devised method which allows us to overcome the group’s unobservable variables and self-
selection. Our identification strategy uses instrumental variables. However, annual average 
rainfall and the number of hospital in a district do not have any obvious effects on the remitter. 
Given these facts, annual average rainfall and the number of hospitals in a districts provide us 
with a convincing instrument to identify the effect of a social multiplier in rural districts of 
Pakistan.  Our research is considered to be the starting point and should be regarded as an 
important example of how the social interactions model could be applied to remittances.   
The heterogeneous nature of districts in Pakistan might give rise to efficiency because non-
remittance receiving households benefit from the social interaction with remittance receiving 
households. The positive multiplier effects require that households which receive remittances will 
improve the overall condition of other households, which do not receive remittances and effects 
will propagate throughout the district by resulting in multiplier effects of the exogenous change. 
However, our results suggest that there are multiplier or spillover effects, as implied by a Glaeser, 
et al. (2003), Graham (2008), and Maurin and Moschion (2009). Furthermore, the results from 
our regression imply a consistent social multiplier with the previous research.  
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Appendix: 
 
Table C.1 List of Instrument variables at district level 
AARF             Annual Average rainfall in each district 
 
PD                   Population density in each district 
 
AAGR             Average annual growth rate of each district 
 
Area                Area of District in Sq.Kms 
 
SSD                 District-wise Ranking of Social Sector of Pakistan 
 
TPubS            Total Number of Public Schools in each district 
 
PPubS            Total Number of Public Primary Schools in each district 
 
MPubS           Number of Public Middle Schools in each district 
 
HPubS            Number of Public High Schools in each district 
 
HSPubS         Total Number of Public Higher Sec. Schools in each district 
 
TPvtS            Total Number of Private Schools in each district 
 
PPvtS            Total Number of Private Primary Schools in each district 
 
MPvtS           Total Number of Private Middle Schools in each district 
 
HPvtS            Total Number of Private High Schools in each district 
 
HSPvtS          Number of Private Higher Sec. Schools in each district 
 
HOSP            Number of Hospital in each district 
 
DISP              Number of Dispensary in each district 
 
RHC              Rural Health Centre in each district 
 
BHU              Basic Health Unit in each district 
 
TB_LC          TB Clinic and Leprosy Centre in each district 
 
MCHC           Mother & Child Health Centre in each district 
 
DPR               Dependency Ratio in each district 
 
LR                  Literacy Rate (age 10+) of each district 
 
NPER             Net Primary Enrolment Rate of each district 
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Table C.2 Number of household in each District 
S.No. 
 
DISTRICTS NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
IN EACH 
DISTRICT 
S.No. 
 
DISTRICTS NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLD
S 
IN EACH 
DISTRICT 
 PUNJAB  42 SHIKARPUR 102 
1 ISLAMABAD 112 43 LARKANA 98 
2 ATTOCK 108 44 DADU 154 
3 RAWALPINDI 60 45 HYDERABAD 97 
4 JHELUM 51 46 BADIN 118 
5 CHAKWAL 49 47 THATTA 83 
6 SARGODHA 92 48 SANGHAR 116 
7 BHAKAR 103 49 MPKHAS 161 
8 KHUSHAB 44 50 THARPARKAR 61 
9 MIANWALI 46 51 KARACHI 20 
10 FAISALABAD 147  NWFP  
11 TTSINGH 93 52 SWAT 80 
12 JHANG 140 53 UPPERDIR 49 
13 GUJRANWALA 95 54 LOWERD 54 
14 GUJRAT 88 55 CHITRAL 30 
15 SIALKOT 95 56 SHANGLA 52 
16 HAIFZABAD 51 57 MALAKAND 52 
17 MBAHUDDIN 42 58 BONAIR 38 
18 NAROWAL 42 59 CHARSADA 37 
19 LAHORE 32 60 NOWSHERA 41 
20 KASUR 63 61 PESHAWAR 83 
21 OKARA 72 62 KOHAT 40 
22 SHEIKHUPURA 157 63 KARAK 45 
23 VEHARI 110 64 HANGU 28 
24 SAHIWAL 69 65 TANK 48 
25 MULTAN 113 66 DIKHAN 102 
26 KHANEWAL 52 67 MANSHERA 101 
27 PPATTAIN 34 68 ABBOTABAD 52 
28 LODHRAN 54 69 HARIPUR 52 
29 DGKHAN 108 70 BATAGRAM 51 
30 RAJAANPUR 63 71 KOHISTAN 55 
31 LAYYA 54 72 MARDAN 84 
32 MURAFFARG 107 73 SWABI 34 
33 BAHAWALPUR 101 74 BANNU 93 
34 BAHAWALN 98 75 LAKKIM 54 
35 RYKHAN 143  BALOCHISTAN  
 SINDH  76 QUETTA 241 
36 KHAIRPUR 115 77 SIBBI 174 
37 SUKKAR 55 78 KALAT 293 
38 NAWABSHAH 114 79 MAKRAN 184 
39 NOWSHEROF 109 80 ZHOB 232 
40 GHOTKI 107 81 NASEERABAD 173 
41 JACCOBABAD 150    
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Table C.3 Household distribution between provinces 
Variable  Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household 7200 3600.5 20178.6 1 7200 
Village 580 297.95 170.17 1 580 
District 81 43.48 24.75 1 81 
Province 4 2.15 1.14 1 4 
Weight 7200 1364.07 53.19 53.189 20084.78 
Punjab 
Household 2888 1444.5 833.84 1 2888 
Village 244 121.95 72.90 1 244 
District 35 18.27 10.47 1 35 
Weight 2888 2082.99 1214.83 310.99 20084.78 
Sindh 
Household 1660 3718.5 479.35 2889 4548 
Village 130 306.92 37.42 245 374 
District 16 43.18 4.23 36 51 
weight 1660 1108.24 584.36 208.16 3592.34 
NWFP 
Household 1355 5226 391.30 4549 5903 
Village 118 433.90 34.62 375 492 
District 24 64.13 7.04 52 75 
weight 1355 1055.16 435.47 104.53 2112.94 
Balochistan 
Household 1297 6552 374.56 5904 7200 
Village 88 536.34 25.37 493 580 
District 6 78.39 1.67 76 81 
weight 1297 413.44 270.90 53.19 1270.41 
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Table C.4 GMM Estimates of γ^2 for normalised remittances 
 Within District 
Remittance 
Between District 
Remittances 
Within District 
Remittance 
Between District 
Remittances 
Within District 
Remittance 
Between District 
Remittances 
Within District 
Remittance 
Between District 
Remittances 
Within District 
Remittance 
Between District 
Remittances 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
𝜸𝟐 - 1.245 
(0.041) 
- 1.325 
(0.087) 
- 1.285 
(0.073) 
- 1.217 
(0.076) 
- 1.300 
(0.155) 
Within District Remittance - 1.549 
(0.103) 
- 1.756 
(0.232) 
- 1.652 
(0.188) 
- 1.480 
(0.185) 
- 1.690 
(0.403) 
Annual Average Rain fall 0.001 
(0.000) 
- 0.001 
(0.000) 
- 0.001 
(0.000) 
- 0.001 
(0.000) 
- 0.000 
(0.000) 
- 
Number of Hospital 0.009 
(0.005) 
- 0.005 
(0.005) 
- 0.005 
(0.005) 
- 0.008 
(0.005) 
- 0.007 
(0.005) 
- 
Household Head Sex (1 if 
male; 2 otherwise) 
0.093 
(0.060) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
0.072 
(0.069) 
-0.030 
(0.056) 
0.068 
(0.067) 
-0.020 
(0.050) 
0.191 
(0.056) 
-0.051 
(0.051) 
0.186 
(0.057) 
-0.083 
(0.090) 
 
Household Head Age  -0.014 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.014 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Household Head Age Sq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Household Head Married 
(Dummy 1 if married; 0 
otherwise) 
0.108 
(0.039) 
-0.063 
(0.025) 
0.102 
(0.038) 
-0.083 
(0.037) 
0.102 
(0.037) 
-0.073 
(0.029) 
0.200 
(0.049) 
-0.082 
(0.045) 
0.200 
(0.048) 
-0.122 
(0.090) 
Household Head Attended 
School (Dummy 1 if 
Attended School; 0 
otherwise) 
0.423 
(0.250) 
-0.133 
(0.142) 
0.385 
(0.240) 
-0.206 
(0.200) 
0.390 
(0.238) 
-0.170 
(0.171) 
0.282 
(0.235) 
-0.089 
(0.123) 
0.282 
(0.234) 
-0.147 
(0.193) 
Household Size   -0.031 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.034 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.034 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.034 
(0.015) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
Number of Children age 0 to 
14 years 
  0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
Number of Female age 15 to 
30 years 
  0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Number of Male age 15 to 30 
years 
  0.100 
(0.035) 
0.011 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.034) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
Household Own House  
(Dummy 1 if own house; 0 
otherwise) 
  -0.008 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
Household has 3 or less than 
3 rooms (Dummy 1 if has 3 
rooms; 0 otherwise)  
  0.175 
(0.080) 
-0.090 
(0.080) 
0.162 
(0.081) 
-0.064 
(0.059) 
0.156 
(0.081) 
-0.050 
(0.050) 
0.156 
(0.080) 
-0.083 
(0.090) 
Household has 4 or more 
than 4 rooms (Dummy 1 if 
has 4 rooms; 0 otherwise) 
  0.251 
(0.074) 
-0.122 
(0.080) 
0.229 
(0.071) 
-0.081 
(0.061) 
0.222 
(0.074) 
-0.071 
(0.049) 
0.224 
(0.078) 
-0.118 
(0.104) 
Household has gas 
connection  (Dummy 1 if has 
gas; 0 otherwise) 
  0.041 
(0.025) 
-0.040 
(0.020) 
0.046 
(0.026) 
-0.041 
(0.016) 
0.085 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.021) 
0.082 
(0.032) 
-0.062 
(0.040) 
Household has telephone 
connection (Dummy 1 if has 
telephone; 0 otherwise) 
  0.370 
(0.149) 
-0.244 
(0.148) 
0.366 
(0.151) 
-0.206 
(0.107) 
0.367 
(0.150) 
-0.141 
(0.098) 
0.361 
(0.148) 
-0.215 
(0.182) 
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Household has electricity 
connection (Dummy 1 if has 
electricity; 0 otherwise) 
  0.024 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.020 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
Household Own Commercial 
building (Dummy 1 if own 
building; 0 otherwise) 
    0.198 
(0.133) 
-0.141 
(0.102) 
0.197 
(0.134) 
-0.109 
(0.02) 
0.192 
(0.133) 
-0.147 
(0.129) 
Household Own non-
agricultural land (Dummy 1 
if own land ; 0 otherwise) 
    0.155 
(0.180) 
-0.045 
(0.114) 
0.149 
(0.181) 
-0.033 
(0.085) 
0.153 
(0.181) 
-0.069 
(0.123) 
Household Own log of 
agricultural land in acres 
    0.037 
(0.064) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
0.033 
(0.067) 
-0.015 
(0.035) 
0.035 
(0.071) 
-0.029 
(0.058) 
Log of savings last year in 
Rupees  
    0.007 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
Log of loan borrowed last 
year in Rupees 
    -0.022 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.007) 
-0.027 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
-0.030 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
Mean of Household Head 
Age 
      -0.065 
(0.021) 
-0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.060 
(0.023) 
-0.017 
(0.021) 
Mean of Household Head 
Age Sq. 
      0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Mean of  Household Size       0.351 
(0.165) 
0.120 
(0.052) 
0.304 
(0.226) 
0.081 
(0.083) 
Mean of  Number of 
Children age 0 to 14 years 
      -0.322 
(0.142) 
-0.052 
(0.046) 
-0.277 
(0.205) 
-0.020 
(0.073) 
Mean of  Number of Female 
age 15 to 30 years 
      -0.330 
(0.224) 
-0.104 
(0.068) 
-0.327 
(0.236) 
-0.010 
(0.080) 
Mean of  Number of Male 
age 15 to 30 years 
      -0.562 
(0.212) 
-0.217 
(0.102) 
-0.489 
(0.298) 
-0.167 
(0.163) 
Mean of  Household Own 
log of agricultural land in 
acres 
        -0.011 
(0.045) 
0.050 
(0.032) 
Mean of  Log of  savings last 
year in Rupees  
        0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
Mean of  Log of loan 
borrowed last year in Rupee 
        0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
𝑭(𝒅𝒇𝟏,𝒅𝒇𝟐) 
𝒑 − 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆  𝑯𝟎 : 𝜸
𝟐 = 𝟏 
- 34.83(1,7081) 
(0.000) 
 
- 13.77(1,7071) 
(0.000) 
 
- 15.13(1,7071) 
(0.000) 
 
- 8.11(1,7060) 
(0.000) 
 
- 3.76(1,7057) 
(0.053) 
 
𝑭(𝒅𝒇𝟏,𝒅𝒇𝟐) 𝟏𝒔𝒕 − 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 
(𝒑 − 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆) 
14.92(2,7080) 
(0.000) 
14.92(2,7080) 
(0.000) 
5.86(2,7070) 
(0.003) 
5.86(2,7070) 
(0.003) 
6.71(2,7065) 
(0.001) 
6.71(2,7065) 
(0.001) 
3.55(2,7059) 
(0.029) 
3.55(2,7059) 
(0.029) 
1.59(1,7056) 
(0.204) 
1.59(1,7056) 
(0.204) 
Number of Districts 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The chapters in this thesis have studied the determinants of internal and international migration 
and the role of remittances. We investigated remittances at the different level of spatial 
aggregation and their multiplier effect. An important lacuna within studies of migration and 
remittances for Pakistan is the absence of high-quality data. Our study fills this gap by utilising 
household surveys, which are main data sources, used in migration and remittances research for 
other countries. The chapters in the first part of this thesis rely on data from household surveys 
collected by official International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Although the study 
includes questions on migration and remittances it was not designed to deal specifically with 
migration and remittances issues. The latter chapters rely on data from household surveys 
conducted by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (FBS) as part of the United Nation ‘Millennium 
Development Goals’ (MDGs). A major item on the agenda of the United Nation is the poverty 
reduction strategy as well as development plans at the district-level. However, it also contains 
rich information on remittances that enables us to study the contribution of remittances at the 
district-level in Pakistan.  
This final chapter of the thesis contains three sections. The first section provides a brief summary 
of the key findings from each of the four essays and highlights the contributions that each study 
provides to the current literature. The policy implications that arise from these findings are also 
discussed in this section. The second section outlines the limitations of the four essays, while the 
last section discusses some suggestions for further research in this area.     
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8.1 Major findings and policy implications 
 
8.1.1 Chapter four 
 
Using discrete choice models Chapter four investigates migration as a whole and then looks at the 
more disaggregate choice. Pakistan is an ideal site to study the migration and remittances due to 
its overall significance for many beneficiaries. Pakistan’s rural economies are being transformed 
as non-migrants household integrate with migrants household in Pakistan and overseas. 
Household head and household level variables, including wealth, are expected to influence 
migration decisions via their effect on migration cost. The household level wealth provides the 
opportunity cost to households of allocating their members to migrate. We are not aware of any 
research in Pakistan that tests the effects of household wealth on internal-and-international 
migration. This is surprisingly in the light of interest at the household level in interaction between 
post-and pre-migration wealth and internal-and-international migration. We find evidence at the 
district-level that pre-migration landholding and migration may be substitutes to each other. Mora 
and Taylor (2006) argue that household head, family and wealth, as well as district-level 
variables are important for propensity to migrate, whether internal or international. Not including 
any these variables in the analysis is likely to result in a biased estimate of migration parameters.  
Our migration as a whole includes a heterogeneous mixture of migration to internal and 
international destinations. Our results show that despite this heterogeneity, most household 
characteristics, pre-and-post migration wealth and regional characteristics are significant in 
explaining the movement of household members out of districts. Household head years of 
completed schooling and age capture life cycle and experience. We did not detect household head 
characteristics to significantly explain the migration process. Household heads are less likely to 
migrate than non-migrant household heads, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
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household heads have farm specific and other management responsibilities, and thus a high 
opportunity cost of migrating. Children aged below 11 and females aged 12-30 reduce the 
probability of migration approximately 2% each member. This reflects the dependency argument. 
On the other hand, migration is positively associated with the household size. This is consistent 
with the household risk diversification strategy. Our results show that an additional household 
member raises the probability of migration by 3%. Interestingly, the number of male older than 
12 years in the family is not significantly related to migration propensities when we control for all 
other variables in the model.  
As the household pre-migration landholdings in acres decreases, the probability of migration 
increases. This is what we would expect if the household pre-migration landholdings reduce the 
demand for farm specific labour in rural setting or maybe to cover the cost related to migration 
through selling landholdings. Controlling for these sources of wealth, our variables of pre-
migration money borrowed from informal sector and money borrowed from formal sector lower 
significantly the probability of migration. This finding may suggest that households need for 
raising loan through formal and informal sector is not supported by our results. As migration 
involves a risk of not returning and not paying off the loans, having an outstanding loan adversely 
affects the probability of migration, possibly because of the local lenders insistence to pay off the 
loan before taking up outside employment. Similarly, the post-migration landholdings in acres is 
not significantly related to migration, while it assumes now a positive relationship. Contrary to 
earlier findings, pre-migration money borrowed from formal sector, also assumes positive sign 
and is statistically significant. Thus, our results leave room for the possibility that the effect of 
loan on migration is ambiguous. The districts fixed effects show that the probability of migration 
is lower for poorer districts. The propensity to migrate is 13.7% lower for the poorest district of 
Badin than the base category of Faisalabad district. On the other hand, Dir district shows a 13.8% 
higher probability of migration than that of base category. 
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Multinomial logit results related to the alternative choice of migration reveal that the impacts of 
these covariates are not uniform across two distinct destinations of migration—internal and—
international. The presence of children and females reduces the odds of internal migration by 
11% and 20%, respectively. Interestingly, Multinomial odds of males are 19% higher to migrate 
internally. Household size significantly and positively explains internal migration. Pre-migration 
landholdings have a significant negative effect on internal migration. The propensity of internal 
migration decreases significantly with pre-migration money borrowed from informal sector. 
There is no significant evidence of post-migration initial wealth on internal migration. Only 
Badin district has a significant negative effect on internal migration than the relatively prosperous 
base category of Faisalabad district. 
There is striking difference in the association between male and female for internal and 
international migration. Contrary to earlier findings, male and female are not statistically 
significant for international migration. However, household head education assumes positive 
correlation for international migration. Like internal migrants, international migrants are 
statistically positively related with household size and negatively with children. Pre-migration 
landholdings decrease significantly with an increase in international migration.  The odds of 
international migration increase by 11% with an acre reduction in landholding. This is consistent 
with many past studies. This no doubt reflects the greater costs and risks for international 
migration.  After controlling regional effects, contrary to internal migration, there is evidence that 
the districts Attock and Dir contribute substantially and significantly to international migration. 
The wealth variables are for 1986 (or initial wealth), the year in which migration decisions are 
modelled in our analysis and they are predetermined variables. A significant proportion of 
household landholdings may be inherited to the households’ decades earlier. It may still be 
argued that these variables (landholdings, money borrowed from formal and informal sectors etc.) 
are not truly exogenous that current migration are correlated with past migrations decision. To 
 
 
204 
 
address this concern, we generated the pre-migration and post-migration initial wealth variables 
by interacting migration and initial wealth variables. Secondly, they may be correlated with 
migration choices over time but that can be modelled utterly using panel data.  
The other concern may be the initial wealth variables are correlated with other explanatory 
variables in the model. To investigate this possibility, we estimated the model without the initial 
wealth variables and our results do not change substantially. The omitted variables may be 
correlated with the observed covariates in the model, and this may lead to bias econometric 
results. We included the time fixed effects, and district fixed effects to control for unobserved 
regional and time differences that might affect migration decisions. All things being equal, we 
find that international migration probabilities tend to be higher in the district of Attock and Dir, 
and internal migration probabilities tend to be lower in the Dir district than in the Faisalabad 
(base) district. Only the Dir district dummy variable is significant in explaining internal 
migration. Similarly, the Attock and Dir districts are significant in explaining international 
migration only. We find that internal migrant households are not very different from the 
international migrant households, but wealth and districts (region) are discriminating factors. 
The premise of this chapter is that the household, wealth, and community characteristics of 
migrants household are different than of those who stay behind. The present chapter includes two 
novel extensions of past empirical migration research. First, it takes into account both alternative 
destinations internal and international migration, versus non-migrant households, and pre-and 
post-migration wealth into a common empirical framework. To best of our knowledge, it is the 
first study for Pakistan at the household level considering both types of migration. Second, it 
includes both household-and district-level variables in the analysis along the lines of the New 
Economic of Labour Migration (NELM) theory, which states that migration (whether internal or 
international) decisions take place within the household. Past research on migration and 
remittances has had a country focus, and findings largely have been anecdotal (Mora and Taylor; 
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2006). The internal and international migration should be taken into account in a single study, 
otherwise; it may be that one looks at only one part of the story. Considering one form of 
migration without the other may result in a partial and unbalanced interpretation (King and 
Skeldon; 2010). Our aim in this chapter is not to test the validity of the one type of migration, but 
simply seek to examine how internal and international systems can be separated.  
More importantly, we see that the selling of land is a fairly significant way of financing 
migration. This is consistent with other authors’ findings, and the conventional wisdom. The 
insight of this analysis can be useful in making public policies. Government should facilitate 
greater movement of labour by reducing the cost of migration. The rural credit market should also 
be developed so that people can get affordable loans without having to sell land, which are vital 
assets for survival in rural areas. The other sets of government policy failure in rural areas of 
Pakistan include numerous development constraints directly linked with inadequate 
infrastructure, tenancy agreement (sharecropping versus fixed rent tenancy), undeveloped 
financial markets, non-existence of insurance markets, non-involvement of the private sector and 
targeted intervention by the state. 
8.1.2 Chapter five 
 
Continuing with the same data set as in the previous section, but making use of the remittances 
information, we estimate the determinants of remittances in rural Pakistan. The data panel 
contains information on 927 households over five years. However, it has one limitation that it 
does not distinguish between internal versus international remittances. By using support 
information on the migration status – internal or international—we could have distinguished 
between the sources of remittances; however, we have not done so. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) defines remittances as:  
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“Personal transfers that consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by 
resident households to or from other non-resident households”.    
The motivation behind using the Box-Cox double hurdle model in remittance studies is that there 
is a large cluster of zeroes denoting households receiving no remittances. In particular, the return 
on migration whether internal or international is given by the level of remittances, if one wishes 
to model remittances, they have to be aware of the large number of zeroes in the data. Due to the 
presence of zeros the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator yields inconsistent estimates, hence 
we need to consider an alternative estimation approach. Next, we need to recognize the fact that 
some migrants may not remit at all, and it is only those who decide to remit that choose an 
optimal amount to remit.  
The empirical results of the first hurdle determine the probability of receiving remittances using a 
binary dependent variable (D=1 if the household receives remittances and 0 otherwise), whereas 
the second hurdle shows the continuous choice of the amount of remittances (𝑅𝑇, conditional for 
those household that receive remittances). The explanatory variables considered both for 
participation and the level equation in the analysis of remittance behaviours include household 
head characteristics (age, years of education), household level characteristics (number of children 
aged less than 11 years, the presence of males and females and household size), and the wealth 
status of the household (landholding in acres, money received from sale assets, and money 
borrowed from formal and informal sources). Further, it includes the future migration status of 
the household members (travelling outside and within a country), and the regional fixed effect.  
Our results for household head age and education in participation to receive remittances are not 
significant. However, for level of remittances it is significant and positive. It is interesting to note 
that household head education and age (in years) appear to affect the level of remittances, unlike 
the participation results. Similarly, the variable capturing the dependence argument, as well as the 
ties between the migrant and the household, is the presence of children aged less than 11 years. 
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We find that presence of children in the household matters only for the participation to receive 
remittances, but for level of remittances it is not a significant determinant. Surprisingly, number 
of males is insignificant for the participation equation.  
Interestingly, for both hurdles participation and level of remittances, the positive coefficient of 
the members traveling abroad (international migrants) and traveling in a country (internal 
migrants), and the negative coefficient of its squared, confirm that the extent of remittance 
increases at a decreasing rate. Moreover, the money loaned (in thousand rupees) positively affects 
only the amount of remittances, and not participation. This suggests that remittances also serve as 
an insurance mechanism for other households in rural Pakistan. Our model did not capture any 
wealth effect on the incidence and the amount of remittances received by a household. The fixed 
effects for region also capture the key differences in participation and level of remittances. The 
district Attock and Dir is only significant for the first hurdle ‘likelihood to remit’, whereas, the 
district Dir and Badin are only significant for the second hurdle ‘level of remittances’. In the first 
hurdle the district Attock coefficient is positively, and the district Dir coefficient is negatively, 
related to the reference category (Faisalabad district). Similarly, for the second hurdle the district 
Badin coefficient is negatively, and the district Dir coefficient is positively, related to the 
reference category.       
Household head age and household size significantly affect remittances decision and household 
head age seems to be an important determinant of remittances. Conditional upon participation, it 
is possible to identify that household head age and household size significantly affect remittances 
decision and household head age seems to be an important determinant of remittances. Our 
results clearly differentiate between the probability to remit, and the level of remittances received 
by the household. It is noted that there exist opposing effects of probability to receive remittances 
and the level of remittances at a district-level. A combination of household level observed 
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characteristics and regional variables are key to explaining the remittance behaviours in rural 
Pakistan.  
Although there is extensive research on the issue of migration and remittances only a few of them 
is focused on this aspect in Pakistan by examining micro-level, which comes in the world top ten 
remittance receiving countries. The major part of the existing literature on remittances mainly 
concentrates on migrant transfer of remittances to Mexico, India, Philippine and China. Our 
analysis focuses on the remittances of migrants from traditional labour-exporting country. In 
addition to remittances received by the household in their country of origin, the data set allows us 
to check for the implication of remittances for further internal and international migration in rural 
areas. We fill this gap in the literature by analysing the determinants of remittances by employing 
the double-hurdle that determine the decision of migrant to remit and the level of remittances. 
There was a tendency in previous studies to adopt more restrictive models for binary or censored 
dependent variables to assess the determinants of remittances (Sinning 2011).  
These results imply that migration motives are in line with the risk diversification strategy of the 
rural households for receiving remittances to their origin countries (Stark and Taylor 1989). It 
may be concluded that migration affects household income through remittances and also helps 
reallocation of the labour supply.   
8.1.3 Chapter six 
 
The chapter six examines whether the household propensity to receive internal and external 
remittances varies with household heterogeneity – observed and unobserved – in terms of their 
area of residence (village and district) by utilizing the multilevel modelling. We use the data from 
the Pakistan Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) of 2001-02, in which households are 
nested within villages and villages within district. The multilevel model is helpful to investigate 
links between individual, household, and community characteristics in determining remittances 
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(Massey, 1990). The econometric regression that we estimate relies on a five-level hierarchical 
model; however, of these five levels we postulate that only three have unobserved random 
heterogeneity. Hence, we name the model a 3-level nested model. 
The main motivation is to find out whether the remittance pattern can be explained only by 
household characteristics, or also by heterogeneity at the community level, such as the village or 
district-levels. From the random unexplained heterogeneity at district and village level, we derive 
the intra class correlation (IC) of two selected random households between intra-and-inter-
village, and their respective odds. The Intra-class correlation (IC) is the proportion of the 
variation in the remittances that occurs at the area level. 
We first find that there are significant differences between determinants of internal and 
international remittances at different level of spatial aggregation. The determinants of internal 
remittances at the household level with regional fixed effects show that the household head age 
and gender, and the female and household size, all exert positive and significant effects, whereas 
adult male household members (aged 15-30 years), landholding and saving exert negative and 
significant effects. This is consistent with conventional wisdom. If there are more male members 
at home, or the household owns significant land, then the need for sending remittances back home 
is reduced. On the other hand, at the village level, again the presence of males in the household is 
significant and negative, whereas, average landholdings is positive and significant. This implies 
that households are in more need of additional resources to afford inputs and other expenditure 
related to raising the productivity of the land. However, at district-level only landholding is 
statistically significant, but negatively related to the internal remittances.  
The determinants of international remittances at the household, village, and district-level with 
regional fixed effects explain some key differences, in contrast with earlier findings. The 
determinants of international remittances at household level show that the household age and 
gender, household size, landholdings and saving all exert positive and significant effect. Contrary 
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to earlier findings, landholdings and international remittances share a positive relationship. The 
village level only the landholding is significant and negative. Generally speaking, the effects of 
household characteristics tend to vary between internal and international remittances, and they 
too get further modified when we introduce regional fixed effects.          
We also study the village and district-level unobservable heterogeneities. For this purpose we 
calculate the intra class correlation (IC) and odds of two randomly selected household’s prospects 
of receiving internal and international remittances, in two distinct cases – in one, two households 
are located in same village within the same district (intra-village), and in the other, they are 
located in two different villages within the same districts (inter-district). Both cases are computed 
relative to how households located in different district (kind of an outside option). It is worth 
noticing that the intra-village IC and odds are higher for international remittances (IC: 0.34 and 
odds: 1.40) than the internal remittances (IC: 0.15 and odds: 1.16). The inter-village IC and odds 
are also higher for international remittances (IC: 0.18 and odds: 1.20) than the internal 
remittances (IC: 0.08 and odds: 1.08). The magnitude of inter-village IC and odds are lower than 
the intra-village for both cases—international and internal remittances. We then employ odds to 
compute the odds ratio, which allow us to compare within village between village variations. The 
ratio of intra-class correlation are (0.34/0.18) with an odd ratio of (1.40/1.20) for international 
remittances and (0.15/0.08) versus (1.16/1.08) for internal remittances. These results are useful to 
understand the importance of the village level network for information gathering and seeking 
insurance from each other, and also suggests that residence in a particular village may be a more 
important determinant of receiving remittances in rural Pakistan rather than membership in a 
particular household. It is, however, clear that intra-village variations are significant, and the 
occurrence of migration is more widespread in same villages than the different villages in 
Pakistan. 
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The results for both internal and international remittances in term of IC and OR indicate that 
households are at least more likely to receive international than internal remittances, once other 
factors are held constant. Not surprisingly, the internal remittances are less clustered within 
villages and more between villages than for international remittances, probably because of their 
differences in payoff and economic gains.  
It may be concluded that the role of community migrant networks is an important determinant in 
the household probability of receiving remittances. In Pakistan’s rural areas communities create 
very close ties in terms of loyalties, rights and obligations through exchange of remittances and 
information. The migrant networks link migrant and non-migrant households to form a sustained 
migration system, which further helps to gain access to that system, and our results, support the 
conventional wisdom.  
The findings of the chapter provide important implications by suggesting that in addition to 
household characteristics, remittances may also be influenced by the community structure such as 
landholding, savings and loans. These interconnections among households and community-level 
factors determine remittances at each level. Most work on migration and remittances is based on 
the single level of analysis; however, less work has been done on interrelationships between 
levels. This analysis includes community characteristics that condition the effect of household 
variables to the remitter’s decision. 
This study provides evidence on how much random unexplained heterogeneity in remittances is 
explained at the village and district-level in Pakistan. Despite the massive migration from 
Pakistan that resulted in immense remittances the research is rather limited on how it has affected 
either rural migrant-sending communities or remittance-receiving communities.  
The determinants of international remittances are somewhat different from the determinants of 
internal remittances. In general regional policies, infrastructure and village networks all play 
important roles in both fostering migration and encouraging remittances. What we see is that the 
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decision to send remittances is a complex one. Not only do the household characteristics matter, 
but the village and district-level heterogeneities also play some role. There are competing views 
related to the impact of remittances on the origin areas; however, remittances serve as an 
equalizing phenomenon in disparity of wealth, improving living standards and stimulating 
community development. 
8.1.4 Chapter seven  
 
In fourth chapter, we go beyond the existing literature to investigate multiplier effects triggered 
by remittances in rural Pakistan. We use the recent Household Integrated Economic Survey 
(HIES) for the period 2007-08. The research in the area of migration still lacks consensus on 
whether the migrant is drawn from rich households or from relatively poor households. In the 
literature the theory that states that migrants come from rich household, is known as the positive 
selection hypothesis, whereas the alternative theory is known as the negative selection 
hypothesis. However, whether the literature confirms the positive or negative selection 
hypothesis, most researchers have found that remittances are a poor-friendly mechanism that 
improves life conditions through indirect multiplier effects (Kapur and McHale, 2003; Borjas, 
1987).  
According to the multiplier or peer effects model, individual behaviour is a function of the 
characteristics or average behaviour of others in the group. The presence of multiplier or peer 
effects creates a “social multiplier” where aggregate coefficients will be greater than individual 
coefficients (Glaeser et al. 2003). Other multiplier effects in different areas have been found by a 
large body of recent work, which includes spillover effects of residential foreclosures (Towe and 
Lawley, 2013), peer effects in criminal behaviour (Drago and Galbiati, 2012), lower-achieving 
pupils (Duflo et al. 2011), peer behaviour in education (De Giorgi, et al. 2010),  soft fruit pickers 
(Bandiera et al. 2009), grocery scanners (Mas and Moretti, 2009), neighbour labour-force 
 
 
213 
 
participation (Maurin and Moschion, 2009), peer effects in the workplace (Guryan et al. 2009), 
educational achievement among pupils (Graham, 2008), and playing partners abilities (Falk and 
Ichino, 2006). These seem to confirm spillover effects in a number of different areas. While 
taking into account of household level characteristics and wealth status, our unique data in the 
context of Pakistan allows us to compare the magnitude of multiplier effects across the different 
districts in rural areas to investigate whether the multiplier effects uncovered in the existing 
literature can be extended to this specific case.    
Past empirical literature provides ample evidence on the direct impact of remittances on 
investment, consumption, and reduction in poverty in receiving communities. If remittances 
result in reducing inequality, then there is no doubt about the indirect effect of remittances in the 
origin communities. It may be concluded that remittances has an ability to produce the multiplier 
or peer effects (De Haas, 2007).  
This kind of study suffers from two types of the problems. One is sorting, where migrant 
households may sort into a high migrant group (or district in our case), and another one is that the 
mean remittances at the district-level may be correlated with the error term. To address these 
issues, we control for an extensive set of fixed effects for districts, and asset holdings of 
household to account for potential sorting. Secondly, we use Graham’s (2008) noble ‘variance 
contrast approach’ that helps in derivation of intra-and Inter-district square of remittances. This 
method takes into account unexplained district-level heterogeneity to quantify a more accurate 
magnitude of the multiplier.  
 
Following Graham (2208), we work with mean of remittances in district, and manipulate the data 
in term of within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) and between-district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) deviation from the respective mean with 
the cross-district mean. In other word, within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) is simply the within district sample 
variance of remittances, while between-district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) is the square deviation of group average 
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remittances in the sample. This allows addressing issue of selection in our analysis. We employ a 
two-step GMM model. First, the within-district (𝑅𝑑
𝑤) remittances is regressed on the extensive set 
of covariates including instrumental variables and district fixed effects. Second, the inter-
district (𝑅𝑑
𝐵) remittances is regressed on the instrumental variables for intra-district remittances 
(𝑅𝑑
𝑤) along with other control variables. In our estimation, 𝑅𝑑
𝑤 is instrumented with annual 
average rain fall and the number of hospitals in each district, and the outcome variable 𝑅𝑑
𝐵  is 
employed to calculate the social multiplier or spillover effect between-districts.   
The estimate of social interaction (𝛾0
2) in this case is approximately equal to 1.25, suggesting a 
social multiplier of 1.12.60 The no social interaction null is rejected at the 5% level. The 𝛾0
2 
parameter is identified in our estimation. The first stage F-statistics is over 30, which suggest that 
a weak instrument is not a concern. Our result suggests that a social multiplier in terms of 
remittances has contributed to the development of rural households of Pakistan. The 
heterogeneous nature of districts in Pakistan might give rise to efficiency because non-remittance 
receiving households benefit from social interaction with remittance receiving households. The 
positive multiplier effects indicate that households which receive remittances will improve the 
overall condition of other households, which do not receive remittances and effects will 
propagate throughout the district by resulting in multiplier effects of the exogenous change.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by analysing the variation in remittance outcomes 
across districts or across subgroups of households within the districts. Our research is considered 
to be the starting point and should be regarded as an important example of how the social 
interactions' model could be applied to remittances.  
                                                             
 
 
60 Social Multiplier can be calculated by    𝛾0 = √𝛾0
2   = √1.25 = 1.12  
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The findings of the chapter provide important policy implications by suggesting the appropriate 
steps that need to be taken not only at the district-level but also at the national level to divert 
remittances into more productive uses. The Government of Pakistan has already taken a positive 
step by setting up the Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PRI) in 2009 to formulate a comprehensive 
strategy aimed at greater commitment of the financial sector towards remittance services and 
efficiency of payment system infrastructure. Now the big challenge for PRI is to support 
initiatives and enhance savings and/or investments in projects, which promote development in 
rural districts. Even though we have identified a positive social multiplier in rural Pakistan, more 
need to be done to enhance the constructive link between Diaspora and development through the 
productive use of remittances.  
There is a need for vocational and technical training institutes in rural areas to foster labour skills 
and knowledge to meet international labour standards. Furthermore, government should explore 
more legal channels to promote international migration in order to direct financial resource home 
countries in the form of in-kind and in-cash transfers. However, the scope and effect of such 
targeted policies are fundamentally limited. The contribution of remittances to the receiving 
community’s development depends on the institutional environment, political trust, the law and 
order situation, the consistency of economic policies and stable investment climate and whether 
or not social protection is offered to people. This seems quite limited in context of Pakistan.  
According to the alternative view by De Haas (2007: 26) “to a considerable extent, migration and 
remittances are a response to failing markets, institutions, nepotism and lack of meritocratic 
incentive structures, which tend to exclude non-elite groups from upward social and economic 
mobility”. However, if government improves the provision of basic services for poor, this will 
result in substantial proportion of remittances for investment, instead of being spent on solely 
basic need.            
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8.2 Limitations of the research 
 
This section outlines the limitations of each of the chapters, which support the need for future 
research opportunities discussed in the next section.  
The rapid growth of remittances in Asia attracted the attention of the international policy circle, 
but the poor quality of earlier data poses a real challenge on the possibility of considering studies 
at the micro-level in receiving countries, especially in Pakistan. This research aims to address this 
data gap by providing an empirical analysis with a special focus on districts of Pakistan. We 
focus on Pakistan both because of data availability and because this is the source of the majority 
of remittances. There are several limitations of the study. First is the time period of the study. 
Although the data set is detailed, it relates to a time period that might be useful for policy 
formulation now, as the Pakistani economy has changed significantly and the flow of 
international migration has increased in recent years. The second problem is that the data was not 
rich enough to find migrant-specific information, though the household level information is very 
detailed. There is always a concern of reverse causality between migration and wealth. This 
means that migration variable may be predetermined and may be correlated with both past 
migration and the current wealth of household. In our analysis, we addressed this concern by 
including a measure of migration-wealth interaction in the year 0, to generate post-migration 
initial wealth variables and pre-migration initial wealth variables.  
We use the cross-sectional data for the chapter six and seven. The definition of household 
includes either a single person or more than one person, who live and eat together, under the same 
roof and have no usual place of residence elsewhere. Absent members of the household such as 
internal or international migrants are not considered members of the household. If these members 
are present in the household at the time of the survey, then their income is included as either 
internal or international remittances received. Also, the data set does not include any information 
about the actual migrant. The only available information is the amount of remittances from a 
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member to the family. The households that do not receive remittances are due to not having a 
member migrated or having a member migrated but not receiving remittances.  
The cross-sectional data is always subject to potentially severe biases in direction that are not 
obvious a priori. However, we use an extensive set of control variables to address this concern 
and also validated our results by incorporating fixed and random effects in chapter six. In chapter 
seven, it is difficult to separate the cross-sectional relationship between remittances and average 
remittances but the instrumental variable approach could separate that correlation (Yang, 2011). 
There is also a concern with identification in empirical research, especially when using cross-
section data, because of the possibility that the group versus individual influences is likely 
correlated.  The necessary condition for identification needs only one individual variable whose 
group level average is not an element of the individual behavior equation, and this average can be 
used for instrument. Furthermore, our paper follows the empirical estimation that is used in the 
Graham (2008) seminal approach (variance contrast framework) by achieving identification 
through covariance restrictions on errors. 
8.3 Future areas of research   
 
The chapters contained in this thesis suggest a number of areas of research that might be 
undertaken in the future. It is expected that chapter four and five will encourage further work in 
several directions. First, future research with even larger sample of Asian countries such as India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan with more recent panel data may confirm or refute our 
findings. Given the differences in size and extent of remittances inflows in rural Pakistan may not 
inferable to developing countries. The further work should include and compare both types of 
migration (internal and international) in a single study and contrast the relative importance of 
each in understanding the determinants of migration. It would be more interesting to explore the 
role of internal migration in international migration. It may be possible that internal migration 
result in international migration. Finally, it would be more interesting to have a data with 
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complete migrant-specific information, wealth status prior to migration, cost of migration and 
sources to finance it.  
The findings of the chapter six reinforce the argument of the Massey (1990) that multilevel model 
is helpful to investigate links between individual, household, and community characteristics in 
determining remittances. The essay shows that how importance it is to includes regional level 
variables and measuring the extent of unexplained heterogeneity. Therefore, from methodological 
viewpoint, the analysis used in the chapter can be extended to assess the role of remittances 
among South Asian countries. Further research should present more cross-country evidence using 
state level data. Finally, our results highlight the importance of village and district-level 
information in the analysis of this kind of studies. The future surveys should include the extensive 
set of information at each hierarchical level such as; infrastructure, major economic activity in the 
area, basic needs facilities, and financial sector. For such data it is important that statistical model 
fitting takes account of these hierarchies, since failure to do so can result in inefficient and/or 
inconsistent parameter estimates. This is true for both observed variable models and latent 
variable models (Goldstein and McDonald; 1988).   
It would be interesting to observe the social interaction between migrants that how the decision of 
sending money to their home countries effects the behaviour of peers. Is there a pressure or peer 
effect that derives other migrants to remit home? The lack of data on migrants implies that we 
cannot observe the multiplier or spillover effects of remittances between remitters. However, we 
can observe the multiplier or spillover effects of remittances between remittance receiving 
households in different districts of Pakistan, since the data set does contain relatively good data 
on remittances, including those remitted in cash and in kind and the frequency with which 
remittances are received. 
The United Nation ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) will expire at the end of 2015. A 
major item on the agenda of the United Nation is the poverty reduction strategy as well as 
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development plans. Although the MDGs did not contain any target setting on migration and 
development. It is anticipated that the United Nations development agenda (post-2015) will set 
clear targets and mobilize global action to improve not only the quality of the migration process, 
but also enables researchers to benefit from the new data sources on both countries of origin and 
destination. However, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) highlights three areas that require specific attention for the United Nations 
development agenda (post-2015): (1) fostering partnerships to promote development, (2) 
promoting and protecting migrants’ rights and well-being, and (3) reducing the costs and risks of 
human mobility. 
This thesis has merely outlined the broad contours of migration and remittances in Pakistan. It 
has drawn on available data and analysis, as well as to provide new evidence in some instances. 
There is a need for more in-depth and focused policy-oriented research on diverse aspects of 
migration and remittances. Some of the themes and issues identified here – such as the 
importance of migration cost, and the gap between internal and international migration – indicate 
that there is much scope for multi-disciplinary approaches such as multilevel model and variance 
contrast approaches to understand issues of migration and remittances in fullest. It is also possible 
to extend existing findings and conclusions drawn with richer data set by further work. It may be 
concluded that the thesis considers a long time-1986-2008--, to study migration and remittances 
for Pakistan. Household level certain variables seem to be robust over time. Financing migration 
is important in rural areas. There is a need for reduction in social cost of migration. Village and 
community-level variables are equally important in the studies of migration and remittances. 
There is an evidence of multiplier effects of remittances in rural areas. There is a policy 
implication for government to strengthen community development in migration base areas to 
maximize the benefit of remittances.  
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